

SOCIAL PROBLEMS

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THE THEORY OF DIFFERENTIAL ASSOCIATION: AN INTRODUCTION

DONALD R. CRESSEY

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The first formal statement of Edwin H. Sutherland's theory of differential association appeared in the third edition of his *Principles of Criminology*, in 1939. Sutherland later pointed out that the idea of differential association was stated in an earlier edition of the text, and he confessed that he was unaware that this statement was a general theory of criminal behavior (2). At the insistence of his colleagues, he drew up a formal set of propositions based on this earlier notion and appended it to the 1939 edition of the textbook.

In one sense, this first formal statement of the theory of differential association was short lived. For reasons which never have been clear, the statement of the theory was qualified so that it pertained only to "systematic criminal behavior," rather than to the more general category, "criminal behavior." Further, the statement was redundant, for it proposed generally that individual criminality is learned in a process of differential association with criminal and anti-criminal behavior patterns, but then went on to use "consistency" of association with the two kinds of patterns as one of the conditions affecting the impact of differential association on individuals. Thus, "consistency" of behavior patterns presented was used as a general explanation of criminality, but "consistency" also was used to describe the process by which differential association takes place.

Sutherland recognized these errors almost immediately, but not soon enough to omit them from the first published statement of the theory. He deleted "consistency" from the second statement, which first appeared in the fourth edition of *Principles of Criminology* (1947), was carried in the fifth

edition, which I brought out in 1955, and will be continued in the sixth edition, to be published this year. He also deleted the word "systematic," principally because it led to errors of interpretation. He believed that "systematic criminal behavior" included almost all criminal behavior, while his readers, colleagues, and students considered only a very small proportion of criminal behavior to be "systematic." The theory now refers to all criminal behavior.

The current statement of the theory of differential association holds, in essence, that "criminal behavior is learned in interaction with persons in a pattern of communication," and that the specific direction of motives, drives, rationalizations, and attitudes—whether in the direction of anti-criminality or criminality—is learned from persons who define the codes as rules to be observed and from persons whose attitudes are favorable to violation of legal codes. "A person becomes delinquent because of an excess of definitions favorable to violation of law over definitions unfavorable to violations of law." In any society, the two kinds of definitions of what is desirable in reference to legal codes exist side by side, and a person might present contradictory definitions to another person at different times and in different situations. Sutherland called the process of receiving these definitions "differential association," because the content of what is learned in association with criminal behavior patterns differs from the content of what is learned in association with anti-criminal behavior patterns. "When persons become criminals, they do so because of contacts with criminal behavior patterns and also because of isolation from anti-criminal patterns."

These contacts, however, "may vary in frequency, duration, priority, and intensity."

When this idea is applied to a nation, a city, or a group, it becomes a sociological theory, rather than a social psychological theory, for it deals with differential rates of crime and delinquency. For example, a high crime rate in urban areas, as compared to rural areas, can be considered an end product of a situation in which a relatively large proportion of persons are presented with an excess of criminal behavior patterns. Similarly, the fact that the rate for all crimes is not higher in some urban areas than it is in some rural areas can be attributed to differences in probabilities of exposure to criminal behavior patterns. The important general point is that in a multi-group type of social organization, alternative and inconsistent standards of conduct are possessed by various groups, so that individuals who are members of one group have a higher probability of learning to use legal means for achieving success, or of learning to deny the importance of success, while individuals in other groups learn to accept the importance of success and to achieve it by illegal means. Stated in another way, there are alternative educational processes in operation, varying with groups, so that a person may be educated in either conventional or criminal means of achieving success (7). Sutherland called this situation "differential social organization" or "differential group organization," and he proposed that "differential group organization should explain the crime rate, while differential association should explain the criminal behavior of a person. The two explanations must be consistent with each other" (2, p. 21).

Sutherland's theory has had an important effect on sociological thought about criminality and crime, if only because it has become the center of

controversy. Strangely, it seems to have received more discussion, comment, and research attention in the last five years than in the first fifteen years of its existence. Also, there rapidly is developing a situation in which probation, parole, and prison workers have at least *heard* of the theory, even if they are barely beginning to try using it for prevention of crime and rehabilitation of criminals. A social worker has recently written, "The hall mark of this new departure [in delinquency prevention] is the recognition that delinquency is not primarily a psychological problem of neuroses but a social problem of differential values. Essentially most delinquent behavior arises from the fact that core concepts of what is right and wrong, what is worth striving for and what is attainable, are not transmitted with equal force and clarity throughout the community" (1, p. 4).

The current statement of the theory of differential association is neither precise nor clear. In two pages, Sutherland presented nine propositions, with little elaboration, that purport to explain both criminal and delinquent behavior and the distribution of crime and delinquency rates. It therefore is not surprising that the words do not always convey the meaning he intended. Most significantly, the published statement gives the incorrect impression that there is little concern for accounting for variations in crime and delinquency rates. This is a serious error in communication on Sutherland's part. In reference to individual criminality, however, the difficulty in communication seems to arise as much from failure to study words presented as from the words themselves. A few major errors, and a number of minor ones, have arisen because readers do not always understand what Sutherland was talking about. These errors, as well as some valid criticisms of the theory, have been discussed elsewhere (5).

The three papers on differential association appearing in this issue of *SOCIAL PROBLEMS* were prepared at my request for presentation at the meetings of the American Sociological Association, in 1959. Each of the authors has used the theory in his research, and each has found, at a minimum, that the theory is a valuable organizing principle. None of the authors commits any of the errors that often appear in discussions of the theory.

Professor Glaser deals with the social psychological part of Sutherland's theory and shows that it systematically orders data on individual criminality in a general way. He finds that the theory makes sense of both the predictive efficiency of some parole prediction items and the lack of predictive efficiency of other items. In effect, he tests the theory by determining whether parole prediction procedures which could have proven it false actually did prove it false. First, he shows that a majority of the most accurate predictors in criminological prediction research are deducible from differential association theory, while the least accurate predictors are not deducible at all. Second, he shows that his degree of accuracy does not characterize alternative theories. Finally, he notes that two efficient predictors of parole violation—type of offense and non-criminal employment opportunities—are not necessarily deducible from the theory, and he suggests a modification that would take this fact into account.

Although Professor Short describes a considerable body of research findings that are consistent with the theory of differential association, he correctly emphasizes the point that these and other findings do not demonstrate that the theory is valid. The article criticizes the statement of the theory on the ground that its component parts can be specified in opera-

tional terms only with great difficulty. This has been the most damaging of the many criticisms advanced by other authors as well. Glueck, for example, has asked, "Has anybody actually counted the number of definitions favorable to violation of law and definitions unfavorable to violation of law, and demonstrated that in the pre-delinquency experience of the vast majority of delinquents and criminals, the former exceeds the latter?" (6, p. 96). In my work on trust violation, I was unable with the methods at my disposal to get embezzlers to identify specific persons or agencies from whom they learned behavior patterns favorable to trust violation. My general conclusion was, "It is doubtful that it can be shown empirically that the differential association theory applies or does not apply to crimes of financial trust violation or even to other kinds of criminal behavior" (4, p. 52).

However, by referring to differential association as a "principle," Short indicates a conviction that Sutherland's idea may continue to be of great value to sociologists and others who would understand crime, even if specific hypotheses cannot be derived and tested. There is a great difference between differential association considered as a general principle that organizes and makes good sense of the data on crime rates, as compared to the theory considered only as a statement of the precise mechanism by which persons become criminals. A "principle" accounting for the distribution of deviancy, or any other phenomenon, can be valid even if the coordinate theory specifying the process by which deviancy occurs in individual cases is untestable or even incorrect, as the history of Darwinism has shown (5). "Because sociology seems to be dominated by a logic and methodology derived from physics, through psychology, sociologists seem reluctant to label a statement 'theory' unless it is a gen-

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eralization sufficiently detailed to permit derivation of predictive hypotheses that can be put to test by gathering new facts. Nevertheless, it might be argued that many "theories" in sociology are in fact principles that order known facts about rates in some logical way, and that they only in very general ways specify directions for accumulation of new facts that might prove them wrong. Durkheim, for example, invented what may be termed a "principle of group integration" to account for, organize logically, and integrate systematically the data on variations in suicide rates. Short suggests that Sutherland, similarly, has helped to "make sense" of variations in crime rates, even if his statement cannot be operationalized and tested with reference to criminality and delinquency in individual cases.

Henry McKay also treats the differential association idea as a broad principle which proposes that high crime rates occur in societies and groups that participate extensively in criminalistic subcultures. He observes that crime rates are unequally distributed because of differences in the degree to which various categories of persons participate in normative conflict, and then goes on to describe attempts to prevent crime and change criminals by intervention in this conflict process. Most significantly, he indicates that high delinquency rates appear both when institutions for inculcating conventional values are weak, and when institutions for inculcating such values are strong but institutions for inculcating values not in harmony with conventional ones also are strong. This approach uses the idea of differential association to explain the existence of both delinquency and non-delinquency in areas of high delinquency, which is what Sutherland intended it to do. It is quite erroneous to argue, as some authors have done, that the theory of differential association is challenged by the fact that not all the children in

areas of high delinquency are delinquent. McKay eloquently argues that delinquency is a matter of differential values, not a matter of personality disturbances, and then shows the difference this makes in treatment and prevention programs.

Together, the three papers are supportive of Sutherland's theory, but they also indicate directions for a refined formulation. Both Glaser and Short point out that sociological criminology needs a formulation which will unite the social structure theory of Merton, Cohen, and Cloward with the normative conflict theory of Sutherland, Shaw, and others. We need to know how social structure exerts pressures toward nonconformity of various kinds, but we also need to combine this knowledge with information about why only *some* of the persons on whom this pressure is exerted become nonconformists. We need theoretical formulations that pay attention to the distribution of opportunities for specific types of deviant behavior but which also recognize that there are differences in deviation rates of groups that have equal opportunities, and that these differences depend upon differences in the content of the socialization process (3).

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DIFFERENTIAL ASSOCIATION AND CRIMINOLOGICAL PREDICTION

DANIEL GLASER

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To consider differential association theory in the light of criminological prediction research, one must first establish what one expects of a criminological theory. For this purpose, the following six propositions provide a philosophy of science frame of reference:

First, scientific theories originate from efforts to summarize and to interrelate otherwise discrete observations. This proposition views a theory as a code for observations.

Secondly, theory testing begins by the deduction of those observations which would indicate the falsity of a theory. This proposition views the first step in theory testing as decoding, that is, formulating operational hypotheses which, if invalidated, would discredit the theory.

Third, a theory's utility is a function of the relevance to our problems of the hypotheses deduced from it, as well as the validity of these hypotheses.

Fourth, validation of a theory consists of evidence that hypotheses deduced from the theory were tested by operations which could have proven them false, but the operations failed to prove them false. This validation is never absolute or final (16).

Fifth, it is a common experience of all sciences that prevailing theories of high generality fail to fit all observations to which they might be applied.

Presented at 54th Annual Meeting, American Sociological Association, Chicago, September 4, 1959.

Physicist-philosopher Phillip Frank asserts: "There is certainly no theory which is in complete agreement with all our observations. If we require such a complete agreement, we can certainly achieve it by merely recording the observations" (2, p. 353). And he implies all of our propositions thus far when he says: "Every acceptance of a debatable theory is due to a compromise between . . . agreement with facts and efficiency as a code" (2, p. 341).

Sixth, theories of high generality proven partially false are not abandoned in science until alternative theories with respect to a given problem are proven less false. As James B. Conant expresses it: "A conceptual scheme is never discarded merely because of a few stubborn facts with which it cannot be reconciled; a conceptual scheme is either modified or replaced by a better one, never abandoned with nothing left to take its place" (2, p. 30).

MEASUREMENT DIFFICULTIES

Tests of theories by the findings of criminological prediction research are limited by several types of measurement problem. The two on which we wish to focus are first, predictor unreliability, and second, consequent restriction of sampling.

Procurement of predictor information must depend upon records or recollections of the past, if the research is not to be intolerably time consum-

ing. Because these are records not designed for research purposes, or are recollections elicited from persons emotionally involved with the subjects and not trained for research, predictor information almost always has serious unreliability due to imperfect recording or recall. Recording would be a major problem even if we took the years to do prospective prediction research by waiting for the criterion event, rather than retrospective research. However, even with optimum recording, unreliability in predictor information would remain in most studies published thus far, simply because some ambiguous or highly subjective predictors, like omnibus prognoses or case typologies, have always turned out to have more predictive utility than most more precisely defined and measured items.

Secondly, these difficulties in measuring predictors, plus difficulties in measuring what generally is a dichotomous criterion (such as presence or absence of crime conviction), create a need in criminological prediction research to approximate optimum sampling conditions for improving on chance. This optimum condition in dichotomous prediction is one in which the criterion event occurs in fifty per cent of the sample. However, the criterion events usually predicted, official crime or delinquency records, occur in less than ten per cent of most populations. This means that any predictor would have to be over ninety per cent accurate if it were to make more correct than erroneous predictions (12).

Since both predictor and criterion information generally is too imperfect for research on a sample with infrequent criterion events, predictive hypotheses have only been testable in criminological prediction by applying them to populations in which the criterion event, such as arrest or conviction, is unusually frequent. Populations fitting this requirement must either consist of persons with a known

prior crime or delinquency record, such as parolees or probationers, for whom the criterion becomes further offenses or rule infractions, or research must, at present, be confined to samples for which approximately equal numbers of criminals and non-criminals or delinquents and non-delinquents are specially selected. An alternative is to define the criterion as admitted rather than official delinquency, which makes it a more frequent event in most populations, but perhaps a significantly different kind of criterion.

SOME PREDICTIVE TESTS OF DIFFERENTIAL ASSOCIATION THEORY

The extent to which observations confirm or negate a theory is a function both of the validity of the theory, and of what Northrop called the "epistemic correlations" assumed in testing, that is, the extent to which that which is observed is an index of that which the theory conceptualizes (13). Inadequacy of predictors as indices of phenomena conceived in theory may result because availability or absence of records largely determines selection of predictors for research. The key concepts which should be operationalized if one is to test differential association theory as formulated by Sutherland are *intimacy, frequency, duration, priority and intensity*, of criminal and anti-criminal association (20). Tests, employing ostensibly reasonable indices of these variables, will be reported from recent criminological prediction literature for the following hypotheses deduced from differential association theory:

1. *Predominance of criminals or delinquents among intimate associates is predictive of subsequent criminal or delinquent behavior:* Relying on parental or teacher recall for their information, the Gluecks found predominance of delinquents among prior companions the most accurate predictor of delinquency, and gang membership seventh most accurate, of 175

predictors tested on their 50 per cent delinquent sample (7). (Our ranking is by "accuracy"; defined by Reiss as "the proportion of cases correctly predicted"; this yields a ranking differing slightly from that presented by Reckless, based only on Chi Square values, and limited to the Gluecks' discontinuous variables) (17, 19). We know of no other such direct tests of this hypothesis. A less direct test is provided by studies employing 100 per cent delinquent or criminal samples, which have compared offenders who had codefendants in their crimes with those who committed their crimes alone. These studies have contradicted each other in their findings on this item, and in no case is the number of codefendants outstandingly significant as a predictor. We suspect that this is because collaboration in crime is mainly a function of the type of offense, rather than of the offender's total criminal association pattern. As we shall point out, type of offense is one successful predictor not well explained by differential association.

2. *Priority of criminal or delinquent experience is predictive of further criminal or delinquent behavior:* Mannheim and Wilkins, and every one of several other published and unpublished prediction research studies which we have seen which has investigated age of first arrest or conviction as a predictor, have found it inversely related to further criminality (11; 3; 18). In the Reiss study of juvenile probationers, age at first recorded offense was the most significant of all stable predictors tested (18). All available evidence seems to suggest that for criminal populations of any age, the earlier crime or delinquency began, the more likely it is to continue.

3. *Frequency, Duration and Intensity of criminal or delinquent association is predictive of criminal behavior:* We are pooling these three variables

in one hypothesis because every index of one which we have found tested in criminological prediction literature is also an index of others. The extent of prior confinement with criminals, as indicated by number of prior arrests or convictions or by number of prior penal confinements, though crudely classified into a few gross categories, was among the most successful predictors of criminality (as well as of technical violations) in the Ohlin, Glaser, and most other parole prediction studies, and in the Mannheim and Wilkins study of recidivism by Borstal releasees (15; 3; 11).

4. *Alienation from anti-criminal influences is predictive of delinquent or criminal behavior:* Since the term "differential" is very crucial in Sutherland's theory, one can deduce from it hypotheses inverse to the foregoing; one would hypothesize that priority, frequency, intensity and duration of anti-criminal associates is predictive of non-criminal behavior. It would follow from Sutherland's presentation of his theory that alienation from school, and in most families, alienation from parents, as indicators of weakened anti-criminal association, would be predictive of crime or delinquency.

Truancy was second to delinquent companions in accuracy as a predictor of delinquency in the Glueck study (7). School misbehavior was third. The fourth, fifth and sixth most accurate of their predictors deal with alienation from parental influence. A combination of five indices of parental influence constitutes the Glueck Social Prediction Scale, which has been shown to be fairly effective for predicting delinquency in high delinquency populations.

Of the 15 most accurate predictors of the Glueck Unravelling Study, thirteen deal with intimacy of delinquent companionship or alienation from school or parental influence. The exceptions are the ninth-ranked predic-

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tor, on "Submissiveness," inferred from Rohrschach protocols, and one on "Number of Social Agencies Providing Service to the Family," which has fifteenth rank. The "Number of Social Agencies" predictor pools information on diverse types of social service, but one can assume that it is correlated both with weak parental influence and with economic need. The non-submissive attitudes of delinquents were interpreted by the Glueck's Rohrschach analysts as an index of weak parental or school influence. So in some respects, all of the top 15 predictors support differential association theory.

In the Ohlin, Glaser, and other parole prediction research, and in the Mannheim and Wilkins study, one of the best predictors of criminality was absence of prior regular work record. This could be taken as an index of non-association with persons promoting the ethic of work. However, by reflecting both economic conditions and vocational capacity, it may also be an index of non-criminal opportunities, a successful predictor not so directly deducible from differential association theory.

We have shown that certain operations in major recent criminological prediction research which could have proven differential association theory false, failed to do so. We have also indicated, and shall discuss in closing, some successful predictors not so readily deducible from differential association theory. But what of the least successful predictors? Are they as readily deducible from differential association theory?

In the Glueck study, the ten *least* accurate predictors were Disparity of Age Between Mother and Father, Total Performance weighted Score on the Wechsler-Bellevue Test, Difference Between Left and Right Hand in Dynamometric Strength, Age Boy Entered First Grade, Originality as Rated

by Rohrschach Test, Feeling of Not Being Taken Care of Rated by Rohrschach Test, Size of Family in Which Mother was Reared, Type of Home Residence, Dominant Parent, and Furnishings of Home. Prediction of delinquency by only one of these ten, Feeling of Not Being Taken Care of, as an index of anti-criminal parental influence, could reasonably be deduced from differential association theory. Since other indices of parental influence were among the most successful predictors, the deficiency of this Rohrschach rating as an indicator of this condition would seem to account for its failure as a predictor, rather than its theoretical irrelevance. However, lack of theoretical relevance rather than measurement difficulties would appear to be the predominant reason for failure of the other least successful predictors, since most of them, such as strength and intelligence tests or sibling counts, are at least as precisely measurable as the most successful predictors.

Other recent research, such as that of Mannheim and Wilkins, Ohlin, and Glaser, has been based on a smaller number of previously tested predictors, of which over half were deducible from differential association theory. Nevertheless, one finds that a larger proportion of the predictors which they found most significant than of those they found least significant were deducible from differential association theory.

Of 13 predictors which Mannheim and Wilkins list as most significant, all except two omnibus prognosis items are largely deducible from differential association theory. These consist of items on extent and priority of previous correctional experience, on work record and on parental influence. Of the 17 predictors which they designate as least significant, nine were clearly not deducible from differential association theory, such as number of siblings, size and economic class

of town, religion, home, intelligence and physical condition. Two others, on prior criminal record, only lacked significance in comparison with other measures of criminal record. So all of the eleven most predictive specific items and six of fifteen clearly least significant predictors in this British study, are predictors which would be hypothesized from differential association theory. The six of fifteen least successful predictors which were derivable from differential association theory were Age of Commitment to Borstal (not age of first arrest), family crime record, broken home, crowded home, truancy, and school reports (11, p. 134). None of these least successful items were as unrelated to the criterion as were the least successful items in the more comprehensive Glueck study.

Ohlin evaluated twenty years of parole prediction experience with 27 predictors in Illinois, and on this basis, retained twelve as most efficient, stable and reliable (15, p. 52 and pp. 122-23). Of these twelve, only six were clearly deducible from differential association theory (Type of Offender, Home Status, Family Interest, Social Type, Work Record and Community). Two others, Type of Offense and whether sentence is determinate or indeterminate, are both functions of type of offense in Illinois. These, and a successful predictor reflecting adequacy of parole job, will be discussed in the next section of this paper. Ohlin's most successful predictors also include a case study rating of personality and a predictor called "Psychiatric Prognosis," both of which generally were formulated by sociologists in Illinois, and in each of which only the most favorable of six categories was given a prediction score other than neutral. In the remaining most successful predictor, number of associates in the offense, "three or over" was a favorable prediction category

and any other number was neutral. This is not interpreted by Ohlin, but our impression is that having few associates in the offense is an index of professional procedure in crime, rather than a sign of lesser differential association with criminals.

Of the fifteen predictors rejected by Ohlin on the basis of his analysis of Illinois experience, nine clearly have no close relationship to differential association. These include such items as age, nationality and racial origin, prison punishment record, venereal infection and intelligence. Those relevant to differential association covered time served on sentence at parole, nature of prior criminal sentence, whether employed at time of offense, and neighborhood at offense and parole. As with the Mannheim and Wilkins study, and unlike the Glueck's *Unravelling* study, Ohlin's original battery of predictors had all been tested and found useful in prior research. None of those rejected were without some significant relationship to parole outcome.

ALTERNATIVE THEORIES

We must now consider how well alternative theories would account for the predominantly successful predictors which we cited in support of differential association theory.

The theory most vigorously set forth in opposition to differential association in today's criminological literature is multiple causation, which asserts that crime is a function of numerous variables. If these variables are interrelated in formulations of the theory, it is only by the suggestion that they have an additive relationship. In the absence of even ranking or weighting of the additive variables, the theory does not permit deduction of hypotheses as to what will be most predictive of crime or delinquency.

If one asserts that every predictor which anyone can possibly hypothesize provides a test of multiple causation

theory, both those predictors which are successful and those which fail must be considered, and multiple causation must then be rejected because of the many components which prove non-predictive. On the other hand, if one defines multiple causation theory as the class of all predictors found accurate, the theory is untestable; it then is defined so as to lack the distinguishing feature of scientific theory, that it conceivably could be proven false by empirical evidence. Or if one only says that any evidence that more than one predictor has validity supports multiple causation theory, the theory is both sterile as a source of more specific predictive hypotheses, and it is also then incapable of empirical disproof, since any observations classed together as one predictor can always be reclassified into multiple components. In conclusion, unless a multiple causation theory specifies the relative rank, weight or other interrelationship of its components, it first, is grossly inferior to differential association in codifying observations so that they may be decoded as specific hypotheses, and secondly, it must either be viewed as invalidated to the extent that any component predictors are invalidated, or as not amenable to empirical test.

A second theory recently set forth as an alternative to differential association is Jeffery's "Social alienation" theory (8). This asserts that "all criminals are social isolates." From it, one can, of course, deduce the hypotheses, generally validated with optimum samples, that alienation from anti-criminal influences, such as parents or school, is predictive of crime or delinquency. We cited these in support of differential association theory. One cannot deduce from Jeffery's theory the more markedly validated hypotheses that priority, intimacy, frequency, and duration of delinquent or criminal companionship is predictive of criminality. However, Jeffery as-

serts that the youth who becomes delinquent in contact with delinquents is procuring "a substitute for other types of interpersonal relations". But with "substitute" interpersonal relations, Jeffery's delinquent is no longer a "social isolate"; he is differentially associated with delinquents and isolated from non-delinquent influences. Indeed, the Glueck and other data indicating that in high delinquency areas non-delinquents have higher neuroticism rates than delinquents suggests that the *non*-delinquents may be the most isolated youth in these areas.

Jeffery seems to be reasserting the familiar notion that an individual's or a group's social isolation produces deviancy, which may or may not be criminally deviant behavior. Differential association theory specifies some conditions under which such deviancy consists of the behavior most commonly called "crime". Jeffery appropriately points out that differential association does not adequately explain all types of crime, but alienation theory does not even generate hypotheses as to why crime develops rather than alternative forms of deviant behavior.

One other leading competitor to differential association is that type of general theory which ascribes crime to a breakdown of behavior controls. Psychoanalysis refers to ego and super-ego controls over delinquent impulses, the impulses often conceived as instinctual. Reiss designates these controls as "personal" and "social," while Nye divides both personal and social regulation into "direct" and "indirect" controls (18; 14). From any of these conceptualizations, one would deduce that weakened parental or school influence would be predictive of delinquency or crime. However, one could only from these theories deduce that intimacy, frequency or duration of association with delinquents or criminals would be predictive of delinquency or crime if the theory fo-

cused on build-up of direct and indirect delinquent or criminal social control, in addition to breakdown of non-delinquent or anti-criminal controls. If delinquent or criminal group pressures are considered, breakdown of control theory becomes a theory of differential social control.

A reconceptualization of differential association as differential social control probably has not been considered by the control theorists because of their concern with personal or ego controls, in addition to social controls, as predictive of crime or delinquency. The weak personal control aspect of these theories provides a basis for deducing such predictors of delinquency as emotional instability or temper tantrums, or conversely, extreme introversion, none of which could be procured by decoding differential association theory. Weak personal control predictors have not been among the most successful, but have shown some predictive accuracy, primarily in studies of juvenile delinquents rather than of adult criminals. One suspects that the personal control factors' greater success in predicting delinquency than in predicting crime reflects the broad definition of delinquency, which comprehends emotional and impulsive behavior which does not constitute crime (5). But a theory confining attention to *breakdown* of controls, in order to include weak personal controls, must exclude the most successful predictors, those on build-up of delinquent or criminal control. These, we suggested, might be consistent with a differential social control theory, which would be highly convergent with differential association, but might broaden one's focus to encompass the larger societal and cultural influences on criminal acts, in addition to immediate primary group and sub-cultural influences. Also convergent with differential association is the Korn and McCorkle theory, which might be labelled "differential role

commitment," and which seems to be primarily a restatement of Sutherland's theory in more modern social psychological language (9).

SUCCESSFUL PREDICTORS NOT DEDUCIBLE FROM DIFFERENTIAL ASSOCIATION THEORY

We have found prevailing general theories of crime or delinquency to be either less fruitful than differential association theory as a source of successful predictors of criminality, or convergent with differential association theory. We should like now to discuss two successful predictors which suggest deficiencies in differential association theory. These predictors are type of offense and non-criminal employment opportunities.

Perhaps the most consistent statistical finding in adult parole and probation prediction research is that economic felonies are more predictive of further criminality than non-economic felonies. Homicide is least and rape is second least predictive of further crime, while larceny, burglary and forgery are most predictive of further crime. Robbery is intermediate between these groups as a predictor. Type of offense is less successful as a predictor for juvenile and youthful offenders, such as those studied by Reiss and by Mannheim and Wilkins, perhaps because younger law-violators are less specialized than older offenders in type of offense.

One might deduce the fact that larceny, burglary or robbery are more predictive of further crime than homicide, from differential association theory, since these economic offenses more often involve accomplices, both in the crime and in disposition of stolen goods. However, such a deduction could not apply to forgery, a highly recidivistic economic offense generally committed without direct involvement of associates before, during or after the crime (10). It is interesting that the probability of further

criminality, by type of offense, seems to be a function of the extent to which the crime is one which may be conceived as one's profession, independently of whether it involves relatively high or low association with other criminals. This would support our suggestion, some years ago, that differential association be reconceptualized as differential identification (4).

Both the probability of professionalization, and the probability of recidivism, by type of offense, seem to be directly related to probability of success in avoiding arrest or punishment. F.B.I. tabulations on the rate at which crimes are cleared by arrest, for eight major offenses, have persistently shown murder to be the most risky crime, with over ninety per cent cleared by arrest (although the few ostensibly professional 'gangland' murders are virtually never cleared). Larceny is the least risky offense in that only about twenty per cent are cleared. Rape is close to murder in arrest risk, while burglary is close to larceny, and robbery is intermediate. Thus arrest risk and recidivism risk by type of offense, are inversely related. This ranking of risk is reinforced by the more severe penalties imposed for the offenses most often leading to arrest. We do not have risk data for forgery, a highly recidivistic offense, but it obviously is a relatively safe crime in terms of the risk of immediate arrest, since the fact that a forgery has been committed generally is not known until the check is processed through a bank. Our conclusion is that differential opportunity for success in the offense may be more adequate than differential association to explain our ability to predict further crime by type of offense.

In the Ohlin analysis of twenty years of experience with 27 parole outcome predictors for adult felons in Illinois, the most stable and efficient predictor of success was the availability of an adequate post-release job. This

might also be indicative of future differential association with non-criminal persons, but it is specifically an index of non-criminal economic opportunity. In a recent study with Kent Rice, I have shown that if one considers persons between the ages of about 20 and 35 apart from other age groups, the direct relationship between crime and unemployment is greater than that indicated by studies which fail to hold age constant (6). All of this points to the need, suggested by Cloward, for subsuming differential association in a broader theory of differential access to criminal and non-criminal opportunities in the pursuit of basic goals (1).

While a theory of differential opportunity permits deduction of some successful criminological prediction hypotheses, opportunities affect voluntary actions only when the opportunities are perceived. Perhaps the most adequate criminological theory of extreme generality which can be formulated from our present knowledge is a theory of *differential anticipation*. Interest in an actor's anticipation from criminal and non-criminal activity would lead one to study his self-conceptions and both his membership and non-membership reference groups, as would a broad reformulation of differential association (e.g., 4; 9). However, focus on anticipation would simultaneously promote consideration of relevant external circumstances for the prediction of criminality. These circumstances include the non-criminal job market, and the community's harassment of ex-offenders at legitimate employment. From a differential anticipation theory one would predict that persons marginal in criminal identification would frequently be converted to or from criminal behavior according to the objective criminal and non-criminal opportunities which they encounter in the community.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In opening this paper, it was as-

serted that theories would be evaluated here by comparing them with alternative theories from the standpoint of efficiency in codifying observations and utility as a source of valid predictive hypotheses. On the basis of criminological prediction literature, it was concluded that differential association is superior to alternative theories by these standards. It was suggested, however, that a differential anticipation theory would meet these standards even more adequately than differential association.

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DIFFERENTIAL ASSOCIATION AS A HYPOTHESIS: PROBLEMS OF EMPIRICAL TESTING

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Assessment of the principle of differential association as a hypothesis,

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with specific reference to problems of empirical testing, imposes a heavy obligation. The obligation stems primarily from two sources: 1. the position of eminence occupied by the theory

and its author in criminology—in-
deed in behavioral science generally—
and 2. the challenge to the "socio-
logical imagination" of a theory which
has occupied such a position over a
period of years without being directly
and systematically subjected to exten-
sive empirical inquiry. This paper
represents an attempt to deal with cer-
tain empirical aspects of differential
association, by first of all pointing to
the lack of research directed specifical-
ly to testing the theory, and secondly
by discussing research implications of
various attempts to reformulate and/or
operationalize the theory. New data
are reported regarding certain aspects
of differential association. These meet
in part the objections to previous re-
search and they illustrate both concep-
tual and empirical problems in the
testing of differential association.

One of the research and theoretical
problems of differential association is
the very fact that it is formulated in
terms of criminal and delinquent be-
havior. Because the differential asso-
ciation theory has not been translated
into the language of more general so-
ciological and learning theory, the im-
plications for differential association of
such theory and research are not obvi-
ous and have been neglected. As a re-
sult, much evidence *consistent with*
but not demonstrative of Sutherland's
principle has accumulated, but little
research has been focused directly on
differential association. Three ex-
amples will suffice: 1. The oft-quoted
table from the Hartshorne and May
studies which presents the correlations
of the conceptions of right and wrong
among children and their associates
falls within this category (12). Cor-
relations were higher for children and
their parents, followed by friends, club
leaders, school teachers and Sunday
school teachers, in that order. These
data are consistent with the differ-
ential association formulation, for the
priority, frequency, duration, and in-
tensity of associations of children with

their parents is surely maximal among
the groups studied, with friends next,
and so on down the line. However,
these data are also consistent with
other social psychological formulations
and they are not necessarily demon-
strative of differential association. 2. ✓
The Gluecks found that 56.0 per cent
of their delinquents belonged to gangs,
as compared with only .6 per cent of
their non-delinquents (10, pp. 162-
163). These data are consistent with
Sutherland's formulation, though this
is denied on the grounds that their de-
linquents had displayed behavior prob-
lems prior to the age of ganging. The
Gluecks dismiss the gang finding with
the observation that "birds of a feather
flock together" (10, p. 164). They do
not demonstrate, however, that early
behavior problems *led to* delinquency,
nor is it clear that the gangs to which
their delinquents belonged were not
directly connected with the delinquen-
cies of these boys.

3. A considerable body of data
bearing upon the differential associa-
tion hypothesis in an indirect way is
found in small group research. Very
little of this research has to do with
specifically delinquent behavior, but
the implications for such behavior and
associated attitudes and definitions are
great. Thus, Festinger and Thibaut's
study of "Interpersonal Communica-
tion in Small Groups" of college un-
dergraduates found support for the
hypothesis that "the greater the pres-
sure toward uniformity and the great-
er the perception of homogeneous
group-composition, the greater is the
actual change toward uniformity which
takes place" (6). It is the task of
theory to relate findings such as this
to differential association. Thus, if
members of delinquent subcultures be-
come very dependent upon their own
delinquent groups, as it has been sug-
gested they do (3), the influence of
associations within these groups would
be expected to be exceptionally strong.

A major reason for the lack of re-

search directed specifically to the testing of differential association lies in the difficulty of operationalizing the principle as Sutherland stated it in terms of "definitions favorable to violation of law over definitions unfavorable to violation of law" (21). The equation involving such *associations* and *definitions* is extremely difficult to conceive in operational terms. Differential association has, in fact, come to be defined as a process by which individuals come to have differential access to criminal and/or conventional values through interaction with other people and with various aspects of the larger society. Such a formulation, while not directly operational, is more easily operationalized (see below, and 18; 19; 20). Additionally, such a formulation makes possible testing of differential association *without* operationalizing the *process* of differential association. Sociologically, the problem of determining the *distribution* of *opportunities* and avenues of access to criminal and conventional values becomes crucial to demonstration of the theory. Determination of one's position with reference to the network of such opportunities, and the probability that they will be perceived and exploited constitute theoretical and empirical questions of the greatest importance (2). Study of the relation between the distribution of opportunity structures relevant to differential association, and crime rates should provide indirect and inferential tests of the theory.

A third reason for the paucity of direct empirical research on differential association lies in its apparent simplicity. It is apparent, e.g., that persons adopt cultural forms provided within the social milieu and that they do so in a process of communicative interaction involving primary groups. It is clear that Sutherland meant much more than this, that he intended the theory to explain why some people become delinquent and others do not

within the same general social milieu. It is clear, also, that Sutherland recognized the complexity of such a problem, and that he was concerned with such problems as specification of the dimensions of association and the relation between personal traits and associational patterns in the production of behavior.

SOME NEW DIRECTIONS OF INQUIRY

Sutherland's theory is formulated in terms of variables directly descriptive of the process of association. Recent developments in theory have in various ways emphasized aspects of the *context* of association which have important bearing upon the process of association itself, and upon attempts to test the theory.

We have referred, above, to the notion that association depends upon socially structured opportunities for such association and for opportunities to perform and practice the patterns learned in such association. The *distribution* of delinquency, therefore, becomes a function of the ways in which the social structure determines patterns of opportunities and of how one is located in the structure with reference to these patterns.

Recent research has emphasized that there is a *variety* of patterns of delinquent behavior (2; 4; 7). It seems probable that the values of the variables involved in the description of association — frequency, priority, duration, and intensity — may themselves depend upon and, therefore, vary with the content of different patterns of delinquent behavior. For example, a member of a conflict, or "bopping," gang bops because of the favorable definitions of bopping provided by members of his gang — and these are considerably in excess of unfavorable definitions of bopping provided by parents, school officials, police, and others. That is, it seems probable that they exceed favorable

definitions *in impact* as a result of the component of intensity, or identification, and perhaps in terms of frequency, at this stage in a boy's life. And why is this so? It has been suggested that the participant in the delinquent subculture becomes all the more dependent *upon his gang* for status as he alienates himself from others as a result of participation in gang activities (3). It seems likely that this is especially true of members of bopping gangs because bopping is highly visible and socially disruptive behavior. Association with non-gang peers and with adults is lessened, thus increasing dependence of gang members upon one another, in terms of frequency and intensity of associations. Such a pattern may not be characteristic of other patterns of delinquency, however, especially if such patterns are less visible and socially disruptive. The notion of varieties of delinquent subcultures may thus be productive of further theory and research into differential association as a process.

There is still another implication of recent theoretical developments for differential association. Sutherland was reluctant to incorporate personality variables into his theory. He was *much concerned* about such variables and saw the relationship of such to differential association as a central problem of criminological theory. The introduction of the notion of structures of opportunity for association with patterns of criminal and delinquent behavior, and non-criminal patterns, suggests that personality variables must be taken into account with respect to their possible influence upon the ability to perceive and exploit opportunities within the social structure, which in turn provides opportunities for associations calculated to produce various types of adjustment with respect to patterns of delinquent behavior.

Lastly, the introduction of the notion of *variety* of patterns of delin-

quent behavior suggests that personality variables may be relevant in different ways to the ability to perceive and exploit differential associations. For example, it is probable that the drug-use pattern, and association with drug user groups may be attractive and accessible to persons with certain personality characteristics; but these same characteristics may make it more rather than less difficult to gain access to opportunities for association with bopping patterns.

RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS

These considerations should not obscure the fact that it is possible from Sutherland's development of his theory to derive testable hypotheses. Thus, Sutherland indicates that "the principal part of the learning of criminal behavior occurs within intimate personal groups," and "the impersonal agencies of communication, such as picture shows and newspapers, play a relatively unimportant part of the genesis of criminal behavior" (21). Although systematic data have not been brought to bear directly on this hypothesis, available evidence certainly does not allow its rejection, and indeed suggests confirmation.

But the formal statement of differential association, as such, remains untested and perhaps untestable. The reformulation of differential association by Glaser, in terms of differential *identification*, has been favorably received precisely because it meets, in part, the first of the difficulties cited at the beginning of the paper as accounting for the lack of research on differential association (9). Glaser's formulation relates to a body of theory and research which occupies a prominent theoretical position in social psychology, viz., role theory. The latter has itself not been especially productive in terms of empirical research, but there is evidence of greater sophistication in its research application in the recent work of Gross, Schrag, and

their respective students and collaborators (8; 11; 17; 22). We need not quibble as to whether Sutherland's statement of this theory could, by implication, account for the phenomena Glaser is talking about. I refer to the less denotative of the variables specified by Sutherland — intensity. The fact remains that Glaser makes explicit the dynamics of role theory in his concept of differential identification, whereas Sutherland's component of *intensity* remains to be interpreted according to the whims or the convenience of the researcher.

Short, for example, has attempted to operationalize a portion of the differential association formulation, in terms of the four variables specified by Sutherland (18; 19; 20). This research has concerned association with *friends* who were defined by respondents as *delinquent*. The questions asked of respondents have inquired as to the *first* friends they can remember (priority), those with whom they have been associated *most often* (frequency), for the *longest time* (duration), and their *best* friends (intensity). The latter is one of many ways in which intensity may be interpreted. Answers to such questions by institutionalized and non-institutionalized children have yielded much information directly applicable to the differential association formulation, as it has been operationalized, though alternative interpretations are possible and need to be empirically established.

Generally speaking, these studies are *supportive* of the differential association theory. The particular measures of differential association employed, having to do with specifically delinquent associations, were found to be more closely related to the delinquencies of boys than of girls, to the delinquencies of older than younger boys, and to the delinquencies of institutionalized as compared with non-institutionalized children. Among the variables of differential association ex-

amined, intensity was found to be most consistently and strongly related to the delinquencies of all children tested. A good deal of variation was found in the relation between measures of differential association and specific delinquencies. In general, again, these data are consistent with differential association. Thus, such delinquencies as driving a car without a license, drinking in the home, game violations, and homo-sexual behavior were found to have much lower correlations with our measures of differential association with delinquent friends than were such delinquencies as involved stealing, destruction of property, gang behavior, etc. Measures of differential association were found to be more closely related to the delinquencies of the children studied than was a measure of self-concept which was also employed in these studies. This was a very crude measure of self-concept, inquiring only as to whether or not a boy or girl considered himself to be delinquent. The findings, nevertheless, suggest that differential association is a fundamental process underlying both self-concept and delinquent behavior. It also helps to account for the fact that some children consider themselves as being delinquent even though their behavior is not objectively delinquent, and other children who may be quite delinquent objectively, because of different definitions of their conduct and their situations, do not consider themselves to be delinquent.

A number of criticisms of these studies have been made. It is obvious, for example, that limiting the investigation of associations to *friends* is a serious shortcoming, as is the fact that only "negative" differential associations have been examined, i.e., differential associations with friends *defined as delinquent*. Clinard indicates that these studies would have been more significant had they included control groups of non-delinquent children

(1). Later studies did include non-institutionalized children, and did demonstrate higher differential association scores among groups known to be delinquent (i.e., institutionalized) than among those assumed not to be delinquent.*

A REPORT OF NEW DATA

More recent data can be reported. These, unfortunately, are not relevant to the *patterns of delinquency* discussed under "new directions," but they bear upon criticisms of previous research on differential association by the author in that they investigate associational patterns expected to be delinquency inhibiting and neutral with respect to the production of delinquency, as well as delinquency producing patterns. The research problem to be investigated concerns the relation between the degree of delinquency involvement of the subject population and characteristics ascribed by these subjects to their best friends. The major research problem (drawn from the differential association theory) to be investigated may be stated as follows: those boys and girls who are *most seriously involved in delinquent behavior* will indicate that their best friends are persons whom they characterize in terms hypothesized to be *delinquency producing*; boys and girls who are *least involved in delinquent behavior* will have characterized their best friends in terms hypothesized to be *delinquency inhibiting*; boys and girls in-between these extremes in delinquency involvement will also fall in-between them in terms of characterizations of best friends.

The population studied consisted of all juniors in attendance in a Pacific

*There were "controls" in the studies criticized by Clinard in the sense that involvement in delinquency was controlled by use of a Guttman-type scale of delinquency, and differential association scores were related to positions on the delinquency scale.

City** high school, selected because it served the most economically depressed area in the city as well as a well-to-do-section, and because its student body consisted of large numbers of Negroes and Orientals as well as Caucasians. This report will be limited to presentation of certain frequency distributions, without detailed analysis of the data.

Questionnaires were administered to all juniors in attendance at X school early in June, 1958, just prior to the summer recess. The students were contacted through their attendance of a required social studies class. The timing proved to be somewhat unfortunate in that a few students were absent from class as a result of preparations for commencement exercises. This resulted in a slightly greater loss of girls than boys, as reflected in Ns of 184 boys and 118 girls. These populations represent the total numbers of boys and girls from whom measures of both differential association and delinquency scales were obtained.

Delinquency scales similar to those reported by Nye and Short (15) were constructed for each sex group. The boys' scale involved the 11 items listed in Table 1. The girls' scale involved the eight items reported in Table 2. In both cases, the order of listing reflects the scale ordering. Thus, the first listed item indicates the least serious involvement and the last items indicate more serious delinquency involvement. It will be noted that image analysis was applied to the boys' scale but not to the girls' scale (16). The distribution of error for the girls' scale was such as to rule out the feasibility of applying image analysis. Thus, for the girls, the precision in ordering achieved for the boys is lacking. The significance of scale position in terms of seriousness of delinquency involve-

**Pacific City is a large metropolitan city in the northwestern part of the United States.

TABLE 1
DELINQUENCY SCALE, PACIFIC CITY BOYS*

Scale type**	Isreal Gamma Order	Original Scale Item Order	Delinquent Act	Number of Boys in Scale type
01	1	1	Taken things of little value (under \$2)	19
02	2	3	Skipped school without a legitimate excuse	18
03	3	2	Driven a car without a license	8
04	4	4	Drank beer, wine, etc.	97
05	5	6	Sexual intercourse with person of opposite sex	5
06	6	5	Bought beer, wine, etc.	3
07	7	8	Been placed on school probation or expelled from school	9
08	8	7	Taken things of medium value (between \$2 and \$50)	14
09	9	10	Stolen a car	8
10	10	9	Run away from home	2
10 and 11	10	11	Taken things of large value (over \$50)	1
TOTAL				184

*These items are in order from least to most reported delinquent behavior; the order is based on Isreal Gamma techniques of image analysis. The third column of numbers is the order based on the scale before image analysis. Scale type indicates that the offense has been committed once or more often and the items are cumulative. Scale type 00 would indicate no delinquency. Since no boys were found in this scale type it is not entered in the table.

**Coefficient of Reproducibility before image analysis = .88; after image analysis = .97.

TABLE 2
DELINQUENCY SCALE, PACIFIC CITY GIRLS*

Scale type**	Scale Order	Delinquent Act	Number of Girls in Scale type
01	1	Skipped school without a legitimate excuse	23
02	2	Taken things of small value (under \$2)	38
03	3	Driven a car without a license	27
04	4	Defied parent's authority to their face	13
05	5	Sexual intercourse with person of opposite sex	11
06	6	Taken things of medium value (between \$2 and \$50)	3
07	7	Destroyed personal or public property purposely	2
08	8	Drank beer, wine, etc.	1
TOTAL			118

*These items are in order from least to most reported delinquent behavior. Scale type indicates that the offense has been committed once or more often and the items are cumulative. Scale type 00 would indicate no delinquency. Since no girls were found in this scale type it is not entered in the table.

**Coefficient of Reproducibility = .85.

ment is no less real in the case of girls than of boys, however.

Differential association measures are based upon responses to a check list which inquired of respondents as to characteristics which "would best apply to the people who have been your

best friends," and instructed them to "check as many as apply." Items were selected which would be hypothesized to be either delinquency *producing*, delinquency *inhibiting* or *neutral* with respect to definitions regarding juvenile delinquency. Tables 3 and 4 sum-

marize responses to the differential association items on the part of boys and girls who were found to be located at *low*, *medium*, and *high* positions on their respective *delinquency scales*. Questionnaire items did not appear in the order listed in Tables 3 and 4, or with the designation of their hypothesized relation to delinquency. The peculiar distribution of boys on their delinquency scale led to the delinquency distributions reported in Tables 3 and 4. Ninety-seven boys were found in a single delinquency

scale type, involving the first four offenses in the scale. This made division into turciles impossible without considerable distortion. As a result of this peculiarity, the girls were divided into a similar "normal"-type distribution.

The data reported in Tables 3 and 4 tend to confirm our hypotheses and so to support the theory of differential association. Not all the findings confirm our predictions in terms of our somewhat arbitrary designation of items as delinquency inhibiting, pro-

TABLE 3
NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF PACIFIC CITY BOYS WHO CHECKED EACH
DIFFERENTIAL ASSOCIATION ITEM, BY DELINQUENCY INVOLVEMENT

DIFFERENTIAL ASSOCIATION ITEMS EXPECTED TO BE	Delinquency Involvement (by grouped scale types)		
	Low (N=45)	Medium (N=97)	High (N=42)
DELINQUENCY INHIBITING			
good citizens	38 84.4%	69 71.2%	23 54.8%
always law abiding, no matter what the situation	19 42.2	22 22.7	6 14.3
good Christians	23 51.1	46 47.4	19 45.2
not so wild as I was or wanted to be	11 24.4	19 19.6	11 26.2
DELINQUENCY PRODUCING			
out for a good time	16 35.6	41 42.3	28 66.7
usually law abiding, except when nobody would be hurt if they disobeyed the law	22 48.9	59 60.8	25 59.5
usually law abiding, but they didn't mind breaking the law if it was to their advantage	2 4.4	18 18.6	20 47.6
often delinquent	2 4.4	7 7.2	11 26.2
the kind who felt the world owed them a living	2 4.4	6 6.2	5 11.9
"wild"	1 2.2	12 12.4	15 35.7
wilder than I wanted to be	2 4.4	12 12.4	8 19.0
NEUTRAL			
leaders in our crowd	21 46.7	45 46.4	21 50.0
just kids in our crowd, not leaders	21 46.7	43 44.3	18 42.9
ordinary nice guys (or girls) who got along with everybody	36 80.0	79 81.4	35 83.3
good kids who stuck pretty much to our crowd	19 42.2	38 39.2	21 50.0

TABLE 4
NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF PACIFIC CITY GIRLS WHO CHECKED EACH
DIFFERENTIAL ASSOCIATION ITEM, BY DELINQUENCY INVOLVEMENT

DIFFERENTIAL ASSOCIATION ITEMS EXPECTED TO BE	Delinquency Involvement (by grouped scale types)		
	Low (N=23)	Medium (N=65)	High (N=30)
DELINQUENCY INHIBITING			
good citizens	23 100%	54 83.1%	16 53.3%
always law abiding, no matter what the situation	13 56.5	28 43.1	9 30.0
good Christians	16 69.6	33 50.8	15 50.0
not so wild as I was or wanted to be	0 0.0	4 6.2	9 30.0
DELINQUENCY PRODUCING			
out for a good time	5 22.7	20 30.8	17 56.7
usually law abiding, except when nobody would be hurt if they disobeyed the law	5 22.7	22 33.8	15 50.0
usually law abiding, but they didn't mind breaking the law if it was to their advantage	1 4.3	5 7.7	8 26.7
often delinquent	0 0.0	2 3.1	8 26.7
the kind who felt the world owed them a living	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0
"wild"	0 0.0	4 6.2	6 20.0
wilder than I wanted to be	2 8.7	8 12.3	5 16.7
NEUTRAL			
leaders in our crowd	11 47.8	33 50.8	17 56.7
just kids in our crowd, not leaders	14 60.9	34 52.3	11 36.7
ordinary nice guys (or girls) who got along with everybody	18 78.3	54 83.1	23 76.7
good kids who stuck pretty much to our crowd	12 52.2	23 35.4	13 43.3

ducing, or neutral, and some of the observed differences are so small as to be attributable to chance, though for purposes of this paper tests of statistical significance have not been applied. Closer study of the variations found, however, may lead to enrichment of the empirical basis of the theory. The items indicating that best friends were "good citizens" and "always law abiding, no matter what the situation" are clearly associated with a lower degree of delinquency involvement as we have measured it. "Good Christians"

appears to bear no such clear relationship, though the variations found are in the direction of delinquency inhibition. The fact that boys and girls who checked this item are so evenly distributed along the delinquency scale is consistent with a body of research which has failed to demonstrate a close connection between religious knowledge, beliefs, and activity, on the one hand, and delinquency on the other hand.

The item indicating that best friends were "not so wild as I was or wanted

to be" points up one of the difficulties in operationalizing differential association. If one's friends are "not so wild as I was or wanted to be," would they not exert a delinquency inhibiting influence? Yet, one must be "wilder," perhaps more delinquent, than his group if he is to check this item. The item is non-discriminatory with respect to boys with various degrees of delinquency involvement as reported in Table 3. Yet, it is clearly associated with greater delinquency involvement among the girls we have studied (Table 4).

Reference group theory suggests an interpretation of this item which is not inconsistent with differential association, but which is not specified in Sutherland's development of the theory. The point is this: What is defined as appropriate behavior depends upon the role which is defined for a member by a group. In this sense it is apparent that identifying with a group may actually differentiate one's overt behavior from the behavior of the group, by virtue of their expectations and definitions as to how one should behave. Thus, the "life of the party" may be expected to engage in behavior which is atypical of the group; so, too, the "wild" member of a group of less wild peers.

This interpretation is subject to many qualifications and our data are not sensitive to the vagaries and subtleties of the theory under consideration. More adequate testing of differential association and its relation to theory and research in other areas of behavioral science requires that such questions be addressed.

Turning to the differential association items hypothesized as "delinquency producing," it is apparent that these data are generally supportive of differential association theory. There is a great deal of variation in the frequency with which these items are checked by our respondents as characterizing their friends between boys

and girls, and with respect both to different degrees of delinquency involvement and any given degree of delinquency involvement as reported in Tables 3 and 4. Discussion of the implications of these findings for differential association theory must be deferred to another paper.

The "neutral" items are in many ways the most interesting of the data to be reported. The consistency with which respondents checked these items, regardless of delinquency involvement, is striking, particularly for the boys. There is variation in the percentage of respondents who checked these items within delinquency categories, but even this is small with one exception, viz., the higher percentage of both boys and girls who checked that their best friends were "ordinary nice guys (or girls) who got along with everybody."

The fact that the "neutral" items are non-discriminating is again consistent with Sutherland's position. In his "Development of the Theory," Sutherland indicated that "a large portion of our experiences which are neutral so far as crime is concerned" are important only in "restricted ways" (5). We have deliberately selected "neutral" items which might be significant in some of the restricted ways specified by Sutherland and further analysis of the data will study these aspects of differential association. In combination with other more "delinquency relevant" items of differential association, these neutral items may be expected to be variously associated with delinquency involvement, e.g., "leaders in our crowd" in combination with either delinquency producing or inhibiting items.

This research has been concerned only with the variable of intensity, rather than with frequency, duration, and priority. It is important to study these other variables, and to study their interrelationships. How, for example, are they dependent upon one

another, and how do they interact in determining delinquency?

CONCLUSION

Much support has been found for the principle of differential association if the liberties taken in the process of its operationalization are granted. Yet, this is but an extremely limited application of a very broadly conceived principle. Much more is required than a cataloguing of different aspects of differential association which need to be tested. The fragments of differential association which might be documented by such a procedure, such as those reported in this and other papers by the writer, would be interesting and informative, but hardly crucial to demonstration of the theory. This sort of research is important in refocusing our attention on an important theoretical contribution—an empirical refocusing which may be necessary for revitalizing the theory.

The proposed new directions of inquiry discussed above call for a restatement of the theory of differential association into a series of "verifiable" propositions from which verifiable predictions may be derived (14). This would involve especially restatement of the principle of differential association. Such a restatement might result in alternative and more specific operational definitions which could be related to learning theory, small groups theory and research, and other sociologically and psychologically relevant formulations. In effect, this would involve transformation of the theory by specification. The content of a theory is given by the *definitions*—not the naming—of its variables; and by specification of the *functional relationships* among them. Changing either of these changes the theory; or, if the theory is equivocal or vague in either respect to begin with, it amounts to *creating* the theory. In "operationalizing" a theory to make it "researchable," precisely what one

must do is define the variables and their functional relationships. *Research* on a theory such as differential association, the variables and functional relationships of which, though they are not without meaning, are so imprecisely defined, is necessarily a theoretically creative task.

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DIFFERENTIAL ASSOCIATION AND CRIME PREVENTION: PROBLEMS OF UTILIZATION

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INTRODUCTION

This paper is concerned with Sutherland's theory of differential association as it relates to the prevention of crime and delinquency and the treatment of offenders after they have been officially identified. For the purpose of this discussion it will not be necessary to evaluate differential association as a theory, or to appraise the concept in relation to alternative terminology used to express approximately the same idea. In most instances, it seems to me, the terms are used to draw attention to the fact that children reflect, rather accurately, the range of experience in the social world in which they grow up.

Conventional values dominate the social life of most communities, but in varying degrees, alternative value systems, which challenge conventional values, are present. And when conflicting value systems are present both will be transmitted to children. Vari-

ation in conduct among persons is accounted for by the fact that kinds of values are transmitted differentially, both because all persons do not have the same experiences, and because what appears to be the same experience has different meaning to each individual. In other words, the proportion of law violators and non-violators in different types of areas will tend to vary with the extent to which conventional values dominate social life.

Implicit in attempts to intervene in this process is the assumption that the ratio of values in communities is modifiable in favor of conventionality, and the assumption that trends in the conduct of persons are not irrevocable. More specifically, from the perspective of the concept of differential association, this means that programs of prevention and treatment must change either the value ratio of the moral order in which the child lives, the heritage which is transmitted to him,

the patterns of participation as between conventional groups and institutions, or the range of opportunities for newer forms of participation in conventional activities. Theoretically this can be accomplished either by changing the person so that he participates differentially in conventional situations, or by changing the situation to increase the ratio of conventional contacts. In this paper, therefore, programs of prevention and treatment designed to change either the person or the situation, and some natural processes which operate in favor of conventionality, will be discussed in terms of the extent to which they bring about such modifications.

Before attempting to evaluate current prevention and treatment practice it seems desirable to discuss briefly the nature of the problem which the programs are designed to eliminate or control. Related to this are the differences among areas in large cities. These will be presented through the use of a set of rates of delinquents for Chicago and a discussion of the possible meaning of these rates.

THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

Recently the Sociology Department of the Institute for Juvenile Research released a new series of rates of delinquents by communities in Chicago based on male offenders appearing before the Family Court of Cook County on delinquency petitions. This was the sixth in a series of rates by areas, covering selected periods between 1900 and the present time, based on data from the same source. There were few new findings in this series. The pattern of distribution in Chicago has changed somewhat, but the range and extent of variation in rates among areas has changed very little. Furthermore in those communities where the rates rank higher or lower than in earlier series, corresponding changes in other indexes traditionally correlated with delinquency indicate that the changes in rates have represented

real changes in the character of the community.

One of the questions always raised about rates of delinquents is, what do they mean? First, it is clear that they represent an actual enumeration of the adolescent males who have been officially defined as delinquent by the legal agency which makes this definition for the community. Or, if the rates are based on a sample, the results serve about the same purpose because their primary use in cities is to reveal the relative incidence of delinquency among areas and not the amount. It is assumed that rates also have additional values. It will be argued subsequently that rates can be most meaningfully used to indicate the relative extent of violative behavior in the entire juvenile population, and that significant theoretical formulations about the nature of the problem can be centered around the differences which rates reveal. It is important, therefore, that their validity should be examined further.

The usefulness of rates of delinquency for city areas depends upon the extent to which they bear a more or less constant ratio to all violative behavior. It is argued by some that rates represent only a differential application of the law resulting from such practices as out of court settlements which favor the more advantaged areas. But out of court settlements are not limited to one type of area, and a high tolerance for non-conforming conduct operates to reduce the number of complaints in the less advantaged areas and thus minimize the actual recorded differences. With reference to this question the consistency of the distribution data, including court cases, police cases, commitments, truants and young adult offenders, which have been collected at the Institute for Juvenile Research over a period of many years, and the high correlation among rates based on these data, indicate that the differences

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among areas represented by variation in rates are not spurious. In fact, analysis of these data suggest that the operation of certain administrative and community factors tends to minimize the differences and supports the view that the actual variation in the incidence of violative behavior probably is greater than the rates indicate. It is reassuring to note also that variations in insurance rates support the assumption that differences in risks among areas are a reality.

As suggested earlier, rates of delinquents by areas can be used also as indexes of the level of violative behavior. This means that high rates of delinquents in an area reflect, in addition to a higher proportion of offenders, more juveniles who committed serious offenses and were taken to court but not acted upon officially, more who were arrested but not taken to court, more who engaged in activity for which they might have been arrested, and so on through the categories of norm violation, than would be found in parallel categories in areas with lower rates. It follows not only that the average amount of violative behavior is greater in an area of high rates as against an area of low rates, but that the corresponding differences would appear at the first quartile, the median, and the third quartile. From this perspective, rates of delinquents by areas may be seen as relative indexes of the extent to which law violation has permeated the juvenile population.*

It is suggested further that the fact of variation in rates of delinquents by communities must be recognized in theoretical formulations. The community characteristics which are related to real differences in the social experiences of children, must vary directly with variation in rates. As used here

the term community does not mean the land, or the people, or the housing, or the concentration of many types of social problems. It is used to designate the constellation of institutions around which life is organized and through which meaningful roles are found and control maintained. A meaningful use of the word community is even broader than this. It is the appropriate designation for the whole range of human activity, legal and illegal, formal and informal, organized or spontaneous, which is found in the area within which the institutions function. It is the name for the social world which the child comes to know through experience as he grows to adulthood. The differences among these worlds should be identified and described.

Variations among communities are readily observable. In areas of high rates of delinquents the institutions through which conventional values are transmitted have been disrupted and made ineffective as agencies of control. Change, migration, mobility within the area, as well as the presence of new problems for which there are no institutional answers, all are involved in varying degrees in this disruption. In the areas of highest rates, which usually are the ones which have undergone a rapid change in population, neither conventional nor unconventional institutions exercise much control. There are many organizations but little unanimity of opinion; there are many action groups but little social action dealing with broad issues. Institutions like the church and school give some support to conventional activities, but these are counteracted by the presence of crime and delinquency. Adolescent males tend to be detached from the basic institutions, and outside of these institutions the opportunities for meaningful conventional activities are extremely limited.

Some areas of high rates of delinquents are less disrupted than those

*Empirical evidence of the presence of extensive violative behavior outside of official categories is extensive. For examples see (2; 6).

just described. In these somewhat more stable communities conventional institutions exercise control, but institutions not in harmony with conventional values, sometimes designated collectively as the syndicate, exercise more control in the opposite direction. On the surface at least, these groups and institutions are rather well accommodated. But this accommodation only conceals the value conflicts.

While there are differences between these two types of areas with high rates, the common element is that both are characterized by the presence of conflicting value systems. Both present alternative modes of life to children. In this sense they are equally disrupted or disorganized.

Areas of low rates of delinquents differ only in degree from areas of higher rates. In areas of low rates institutions symbolizing conventional values are stronger, and those representing opposition to conventional values are weaker and less threatening, than are comparable institutions in areas of high rates. It is from the vantage point of the dominance of conventional institutions and values that these areas can be called better integrated or organized.

Finally, the question of the relationship between different proportions of conventional and non-conventional institutions and groups in an area and the conduct of children needs to be considered. Conceptually, this may profitably be thought of in terms of probability theory. If, for example, it is assumed that conventional and non-conventional values are equally represented in an area, it is not to be expected that each child will reflect this particular proportion of values in his conduct. Instead, on the basis of probability alone, and without reference to individual differences, early training, or similar variables, it is to be expected that a small proportion of the children would reflect conventional

values only, a few would reflect unconventional values only, and the rest would reflect combinations of these values ranging from one extreme to the other.

If non-conventional values are dominant, which is unlikely, the dominance of non-conforming or delinquent conduct is to be expected. If, on the other hand, conventional values are dominant, which is more likely because these values are represented by certain basic institutions, conforming conduct will be dominant with relatively few non-conforming individuals. With any possible combination of values in the area, conventional persons will be found at one extreme of the continuum and non-conventional persons at the other, with an infinite variety of combinations between. It should be noted that from this perspective the alleged problem of accounting for delinquency in non-delinquency areas, or non-delinquency in delinquency areas, does not exist.

This approach to the problem has several values. First, it draws attention to the fact that in areas of conflicting value systems predictions about conduct can be made only in terms of proportions of the population and not for particular individuals; second, it draws attention to the fact that most persons can be expected to participate, in varying degrees, in activities representing both value systems, and seldom in one or the other exclusively; and finally, it draws attention once more to the fact that the difference between the delinquent and the non-delinquent is only one of degree. Almost all children participate in some violative behavior. It is only when this violative behavior, either because of its seriousness or its repetitiveness, exceeds the tolerance of the community, that the courts define the violators as delinquents.

THE PROBLEM OF INTERVENTION

With this discussion of the problem

and the situation in which it is concentrated as a background, prevention and treatment as related to differential association will be discussed under three headings: (1) intervention in the life of the person; (2) intervention in the situation; (3) unplanned intervention. The first two represent the basic theoretical orientations used in prevention and treatment. The third category includes some forms of spontaneous intervention which do not fit into either of the others. The specific prevention or treatment programs will be allocated in this scheme by taking into consideration both their basic presuppositions and their current institutional forms. If the presuppositions have not been articulated they will be assumed from the activities. Only the dominant postulations will be considered. Activities included in programs from time to time which are not consistent with these postulations will be ignored.

From a legal point of view, prevention and treatment are quite different. In treatment, it is assumed that the person already has been defined as an offender. In prevention, it is assumed that acts which could be defined as offenses must be prevented from happening. But, if, as assumed here, violative behavior represents a continuum in the population, then the differences between prevention and treatment are only differences of degree. It follows that programs may be needed for many who are not official offenders. The additional elements in treatment programs for those already defined as delinquent arise from the fact that the violations committed by this group of offenders may have been more serious or more persistent than the acts of others in the population, plus the possible negative consequences of being defined as offenders.

Probably any discussion of prevention and treatment should be prefaced by acknowledgement of the fact that programs designed for these purposes

have had very limited success.* This applies both to the programs designed to influence persons so that they will not get into trouble, and the programs designed to keep persons who have been in serious trouble out of additional trouble. In either instance it must be recognized that the processes involved are so complicated and pervasive that their control or manipulation by rational means is not easy to achieve.

In the face of this fact a very elaborate array of institutional arrangements has been created to influence the person or the situation. Some of these institutions were created on the basis of assumptions which may or may not be supported by the evidence, some because they were considered to be good things to do, some because of the feeling that something ought to be done, and some to serve other purposes not necessarily related to the basic problems. Many of these institutions are strong, well supported, and well directed, but for the most part they have not been tested empirically.

From a rational point of view the effectiveness of these prevention and treatment institutions should be tested, even though this task is not without its difficulties. Some of these difficulties are methodological. Some, however, stem from the fact that institutions seek to avoid critical examination through the use of protective devices, which might be called institutional rationalizations. These protect the institution by implying that the idea is sound, but that it has not been adequately or expertly applied. Implicit is the assumption that more of the same would solve the problem.

INTERVENTION IN THE LIFE OF THE PERSON

Attempts to intervene in the life of the person are directed both toward prevention and toward treatment. Sev-

*For an evaluation of delinquency prevention programs see (4; 5; 7).

eral different assumptions underly these programs. When the legal system is involved some threat of punishment or censure for future action is implicit. If it is assumed, as it often is, that the crime problem developed in the family early in the life of the person, then some program for improving family life would be a preventive program. The alternative would be preventive psychotherapy to negate the effects of unfavorable family life. Psychotherapy also is the basic device for treatment. From the point of view of differential association, this might be presented as an effort to help the person to associate with others differentially.

The court system which deals with young offenders is oriented essentially toward the individual. The court defines the limits of tolerance of the community at any given moment, and deals with the offender within the limit of its facilities in terms of that definition. Of course, the policeman, or better, the juvenile officer, makes the first definition and, institutionally speaking, probably is in the most advantageous position for preventive work. He can deal with the alleged offender severely or gently, officially or personally, and for certain types of cases make use of whatever facilities are available outside of his own system. It seems probable that the significance of the role of the juvenile officer in the whole treatment and preventive program has been underestimated.

At this time in our country there is a lively debate over the value of the official defining process. Some take the point of view that a clear statement of the position of the community toward the offender is a necessary step in treatment. Others take the point of view that association with other young offenders in the detention home and in the court, plus the fact that a court record interferes with participation in conventional groups,

makes appearance in court an experience which stimulates delinquent conduct. Since one of these positions accents the legal and the other the behavioral point of view, they represent different axes and cannot easily be reconciled.

Probation by the court as a treatment procedure could be an attempt to intervene in the situation for the purpose of helping the offender establish new contacts in conventional groups, and at times the program has been so defined. In practice, however, probation tends to take two other directions. The first is a police function. The officer checks on the probationer to see that he obeys the rules and outlines the consequences of violation. The other, favored by highly professionalized staffs, is relationship therapy. Here it is assumed that the person is to be redirected in the therapeutic process.

Commitment to a training school by the court introduces differential association in its simplest form. In fairness to the court it should be said that in many instances there may be no alternative. But it can hardly be denied that the training school provides an opportunity for offenders to associate only with other offenders in their own age group, and to organize to limit the influence of conventional staff controls. Thus it is that the standard institution created to make conventional persons out of offenders often tends to do exactly the opposite.

One popular type of preventive program directed toward the individual is the program sometimes identified as early identification. In this program it is assumed that children who are secretive, inhibited, aggressive, rebellious, troublesome, or who in any other way challenge conventional values, either in the school, the playground or in the home, are likely to grow up to be delinquent and should therefore be treated to prevent such a development. Probably children with

such difficulties are more likely to become delinquents than are children without them. But this only states the problem. In answering it there are some real difficulties.

Psychotherapy usually has been considered to be the appropriate form of treatment for children identified early as potential offenders, and few would challenge the idea that children with serious personality problems should be treated to the full extent of our technique and knowledge. But a clear evaluation of the relation of this procedure to delinquency has been prevented by the uncritical assumption that the terms "personality problems" and "conduct problems" are two ways of saying the same thing. Actually, these are two types of problems representing separate axes. While some children with personality problems may be delinquent, and some delinquents may have personality problems, it does not follow even in these cases that one problem is causally related to the other.

Even without intervention the problems of some children are solved as they pass into other age grades, some keep their problems to adulthood without being more delinquent than their neighbors, and some do become delinquent. But this number represents a very small part of the delinquency problem. In fact, the proportion of distorted personalities in delinquent groups does not appear to differ much from the proportion of disturbed personalities in other groups.

But the most serious question about the early identification program arises out of the fact that it may increase delinquency. If the fact that a child has been defined as a troublemaker or a potential delinquent becomes known to his peers and defined by them negatively, his participation in social groups could be greatly affected. The negative results arising directly from this preventive program might be role

problems, isolation, or definition of self as an offender.

In treatment programs for delinquents psychotherapy seldom is used unless the offender has personality problems as well as being an offender. There are many reasons for this fact. One is that most group delinquents will not submit to treatment; another is the fact that delinquents may be well adjusted but not in the conventional world; and another is that there aren't enough therapists to treat even a small percentage of the total number of offenders. In spite of the limited use of therapy as a treatment program, it is very popular and the suggestion that psychiatric treatment is included in a program evokes a very favorable general reaction. In recent years this fact has been somewhat exploited. Institutions and agencies without psychiatric service even for seriously disturbed persons make use of the terms "treatment" and "treatment program" in the hope that the word "treatment" will evoke the image of psychiatric treatment for all offenders. Others seek the same responses by providing psychiatric services on a token basis.

The popularity of psychotherapy or other psychologically oriented programs in contrast with the sociologically oriented programs is an interesting phenomenon. Since the effectiveness of neither of these types of programs has been established, other elements must be involved. While space does not permit an adequate analysis, it is suggested that the popularity of the psychological approach rests on the fact that it offers a direct and simple method of dealing with the person who is a problem. It offers an opportunity for parents to take children with problems to a specialist, just as a television set is taken to another kind of specialist for repair. In contrast, the sociological point of view, with its emphasis on the social process, offers no comparable simple course

of action. Its programs are not so neat or so readily applied.

INTERVENTION IN THE SOCIAL SITUATION

Differential association enters into programs directed toward the person somewhat indirectly. On the other hand, in programs involving intervention in the social situation it is a central concept. It may take two forms: In the first place, it may represent an effort to change the situation in which the child participates, to change the moral order of his community, or, as Plant says, "to change the street" (3). In the second place, it may represent an effort to control or manipulate the areas of participation of the child without changing the whole moral order. While these differences are real, it is possible that prevention and treatment programs might be designed to do either or both.

As related to intervention in the social situation, there is not much difference between prevention and treatment. In terms of association, prevention might be defined as an attempt to increase the areas of participation in conventional groups, and decrease participation in non-conventional groups. Assuming that the process of being defined as an offender tends to destroy contacts with conventional groups, if any existed, treatment involves efforts to re-establish these contacts. Clearly, if this does not happen the offender will establish contact with non-conventional companions.

No attempt will be made to discuss each program designed to change the situation or participation in it. Instead programs will be grouped by type. The first group is the whole cluster of agencies designated as recreation, character building, and group work agencies. Essentially, these are non-indigenous institutions because most of the control and support comes from outside of the area in which they are located. In fact, their presence in the

areas of high rates suggests that traditional institutions have been disrupted and that these special institutions have been created by outsiders to help deal with certain types of problems.

These institutions represent a variety of ideologies. Unquestionably some of the early social settlements hoped to modify significantly the moral tone of the community where they were established, but there is little evidence to show that this has been achieved. Some of these institutions have put high value on recreation, others have emphasized contacts with group leaders, others favored arts and crafts and still others, athletics. No doubt these activities and others like them can be justified as ends in themselves. But the problem here is the relationship between these activities and conduct, and none has been established. From the vantage point of differential association the positive values would be those arising from bringing non-conventional persons into association with more conventional elements in the community, and from the presence of conventional staff members.

While some children in agency programs are insulated from delinquency it could be argued that others are inadvertently pushed in the opposite direction. Every agency tends unwittingly to pick its clientele. Conventional agencies favor conforming children and less conforming children tend to stay away. This results in a real separation on the basis of values. Thus, children in the agency have more contact with conforming children and fewer contacts with those engaged in violative behavior, while the children not in the agency lose the contact with conforming children and associate more with other violators. Whether the resulting differential participation is meaningful enough to be important in the total life experience of the child cannot be ascertained, but the nature of the process is clear.

Another type of intervention in the

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situation is the attempt to give leadership to groups of boys outside of the traditional institutional agency framework. This program will be identified as corner group work. About ten years ago, in a volume called *Reaching the Unreached*, the New York Board revealed to the public what had been known to workers for a long time, namely, that conventional agencies cannot reach serious offenders through regular programs. Since that time detached worker programs, outside of the regular conventional programs, have been established in many large cities. The forms of these programs have varied widely among cities and among agencies in the same city. Some of these programs have had modest success, but it is still too early to make a final appraisal.

The reason for the variation in corner group programs lies in the fact that there is no standard assumption about what is being done or why it is being done. On one axis the assumptions vary from the belief that the goal of the work is to protect the group because of its value to its members, to the other extreme, which has as its aim the destruction of the group. And there are many other axes along which assumptions vary in the same way. In spite of these differences there is one very positive assertion which can be made about the corner group programs: workers representing conventional values do reach and participate in the groups to which they have been assigned.

Only three other points will be mentioned briefly about this program. The first is that the worker has difficulty finding any substitute conventional activity which is as entertaining and as meaningful to corner boys as their own activity. The second is that workers report a tendency on the part of the more delinquent members of groups to split off into separate groups. The worker is likely to stay with the more conventional segment because

there his prospects of success are greater. But lacking the influences of the more conventional members the prospects of serious crime are increased among those in the "splinter" groups. Finally, the role of the corner group worker is an extremely difficult one. Probably in few other occupations is a worker so completely without institutional support and dependent upon his own skill and resourcefulness. In this setting it is not surprising that some of the workers literally join their groups.

In addition to his own influence, it would seem that about the best chance the corner group worker has to increase the ratio of conventional contacts for the members of his group is to develop for them meaningful contact with powerful conventional local persons or organizations. The nature of the difficulties associated with such a plan suggests why the problem of leadership is crucial in this program.

Several types of intervention in the social situation fall under the general heading, "community organization programs." As the terms imply these programs represent attempts to change, through social action, the milieu in which children grow up. Some of the characteristics of three of these types of programs will be discussed.

First to be considered are the somewhat new programs of coordination which are expected to involve private agencies, official agencies and local institutions. Coordination programs are service-oriented and the theoretical assumption is the notion that if all kinds of services are provided for children there will be no serious conduct problems. Included with the usual welfare services are health, dental care, employment, and protective agencies. Underlying this type of program is the hope that all of the facilities in the local community can be used more advantageously.

Such a program for coordination

has several strong points. It affords a possibility for better integration on the local scene of public and private agencies. This could be especially meaningful to police officers, particularly juvenile officers. But even more important, it offers a framework within which leadership and resources from outside the areas of high rates of delinquents can be combined with leadership and resources from the local area. This is the crucial problem. If the program is to succeed some opportunity for meaningful participation in it must be made available both to the people in the area and those outside. Both also must share in the control and the credit. Until such a division of power and responsibility is worked out there can be no real coordination of non-indigenous agencies and local institutions.

There are several difficulties with a coordination program. One is that institutions are not easily coordinated. Basically, social agencies are competitively oriented and jealous of their autonomy. Similarly, coordination of agencies adds little to what is being done. If an agency is totally unsuccessful in reaching the delinquent, coordination will not change this situation. Finally, there is little evidence to support the notion that services, as such, are preventive or therapeutic. Health services, a better chance to play, and good schools are justifiable ends in themselves. But there is little to suggest that improved facilities for such activities will influence the content of the social life of an area, or influence differentially the participation of children in delinquent or conforming groups.

Another type of community organization is called a community council. In many ways councils and coordination programs are alike. Both attempt to profit by unified effort. In practice, however, participants in council programs have been very largely the representatives of the social agen-

cies in the area. Some local people have participated but the problems of power and credit between local institutions and agencies have not been satisfactorily resolved.

A third type of community organization is represented by the Area Project program which was developed under the leadership of the late Clifford R. Shaw. This program represents a shift of power from outside to inside the areas of high incidence of problems. Under their own name and without controls from outside the neighborhood, these autonomous groups, called community committees, make their own decisions and control their own affairs. To some extent at least this program has combined local resources with those from the outside. Several of the community committees receive grants from the Community Fund and the Board of Directors of the Chicago Area Project and several advisory committees from outside the local communities have given support to these programs over a fairly extended period of time.

The Area Project program represents, to some extent, efforts to change the community, efforts to control participation, and a type of group treatment. Since the processes which underly the development of a community are general and not local, it is hardly to be expected that the social life of an area could be completely changed by a small indigenous group. But several activities aim in that direction. First, on the adult level the activities of the committee represent an increase in participation in conventional activities. Then the continuous discussion of the problems of the community and the problems of children tends to define the issues, create opinion, and open the way for action. What the committees do for children probably is not nearly so important as the fact that they are doing something. At least it is assumed that

these activities represent an additional positive element in the milieu.

The committees, which are the heart of the Area Project program, seek to intervene in patterns of participation in several different ways. One is by using as much as possible the control afforded by local influential young men and adults; another by helping young people to stay in school or to get employment; and the third is through leadership furnished for corner groups. This corner group work, which has been part of the program for nearly thirty years, has been operated under the assumption that local workers might redirect groups of offenders or groups with some offenders in them, into conventional activities. More recently, through service-study projects, the Institute for Juvenile Research is studying the life cycle of groups, the effectiveness of different kinds of leaders, and the subsequent history of corner group boys. It is worth noting here that a local community committee office affords an ideal operating base for corner group workers.

One of the unplanned but probably most significant of the treatment programs growing out of the Area Project program has been the group effort of the committees in re-establishing offenders in the community. This has involved visiting offenders in institutions, welcoming them into participation in the committee's activities upon their return, and helping to establish contacts with employers and other local groups. These legitimate activities furnish the framework within which the offender can become accepted and also come to think of himself as a conventional person. In this program the entire community committee represents a differential influence toward conventionality.

This discussion of intervention in the life of the person and intervention in the situation has not been an attempt to participate in what Glaser

has called "The Great Debates" over the relative merits of the two perspectives (1). Instead, programs representing the two points of view have been appraised within the framework of the concept, differential association. From this perspective most attempts to intervene in the life of the person, including legal and psychologically oriented programs, represent attempts to change the characteristics of the person and in this way to change differentially the pattern of participation. On the other hand, programs designed to change the situation represent attempts either to modify the conventional—non-conventional value ratio in the community, or to manipulate differentially the groups in which the child participates.

Most of the programs for prevention and treatment have been attempts to change the situation. In areas of conflicting values even modest success involves raising the ratio of conventional influences, because if this is not done, manipulation of participation will result only in an increase in the conventional contacts of some children and a proportionate decrease in the conventional contacts of others. Conventional non-indigenous institutions have had very modest success in changing this ratio. In an effort to increase their effectiveness some programs are seeking to combine resources from outside the area with local strengths and leadership.

UNPLANNED PROGRAMS

Finally, three "natural" or unplanned processes which fall outside the area of deliberate intervention should be mentioned. In the attainment of broad goals these processes seem to operate somewhat more effectively than our more rationally formulated plans. It is appropriate that their functioning should be recognized.

The first is the tendency of young men to get out of crime as they reach the age when they take on adult roles

and obligations. Responsibilities which develop with marriage, parenthood, and the support of a family relieve somewhat the detachment from basic institutions which characterizes the late adolescent years by furnishing devices through which contact with conventional activities can be established. Participation in the conventional institutional arrangements automatically changes proportionately the pattern of association as between conventional and non-conventional activities.

The second natural process is the development of new institutional forms. Such a development can be assumed as a corollary to the loss in effectiveness in old institutional forms which comes with rapid social change. The tendency can be noted in corner groups which become much more conventional as social athletic clubs; in adult crime organizations which move toward more conventional businesses; and in non-professional offenders who seek conventional affiliations. It can be seen even more clearly in the numberless organizations and voluntary associations which are found in socially disrupted areas. Most of these social forms will not survive but some, if they meet real human needs, will develop in the direction of basic social institutions. Couple this with the tendency of disrupted institutions to develop new forms and you have the basis for a structure which might alter the pattern of association. Of course this will not happen in areas where mobility is very high, but given a little less change, stabilizing social forms tend to appear. Apparently we do not know how to stimulate such developments. It would seem that neither non-indigenous agencies nor present community organizations represent social forms which will develop into basic institutions.

The last of these processes is the movement of groups from inner city areas outward in space and upward in the social structure, and the decrease

in delinquency and crime as they move. In a sense this parallels the population movement in earlier American history when the rejected and devalued members of communities moved westward to become leading citizens in new communities in one generation. Our data indicate that the rates of delinquents in the outer areas do not increase relatively with this outward movement. This suggests that the stronger, more integrated conventional institutions in these communities not only incorporate the newcomers and furnish them with new roles and opportunities, but also counteract the unconventional patterns brought from the inner city areas. In this way the odds in the differential association process are modified.

Social problems such as delinquency are not solved by services because services are not directed at the basic social processes. But it does not follow that the regenerative tendencies just described furnish a solution. They work slowly and sometimes are not permitted to work naturally. For example, some of the ethnic groups now occupying the inner city areas of large cities are encountering serious barriers in their outward movement. It follows that rates of delinquents in the inner city areas will continue to be high, and that the need for the development of more effective programs will continue to be urgent.

SUMMARY

Broadly defined, differential association includes the whole range of human participation in community life. Variations in rates of delinquents among areas reflect differentials in the number of official offenders, differentials in the levels of violative behavior, and wide differences in the stability and effectiveness of basic institutions.

Programs for the prevention of delinquency and the treatment of delinquents in inner city areas characterized by value conflict are divided into three

types. First are the programs aimed at intervention in the life of the person such as psychotherapy; second are the wide varieties of programs designed to change the situation either by modifying the moral order, with such activities as community organizations, or by altering the pattern of participation with programs such as corner group guidance; and third are the natural processes which tend to decrease delinquency without planned programs as seen when groups move out of inner city areas. All of these activities alter, or seek to alter, human experiences differentially. At the present time the combined influences of those rational programs and natural processes furnish only fair prospects for the control of delinquency in the inner city areas of large cities.

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DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT OF FAMILY DISORGANIZATION ON MALE ADOLESCENTS

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It is generally agreed that family experiences and relationships have a substantial influence on the behavior patterns and personality development of children. Sociologists who specialize in the study of the family consistently hypothesize causal relationships between: (a) wholesome family experiences and stable, socially acceptable behavior and (b) unsatisfying, inadequate family experiences and unstable, deviant, anti-social behavior. Many who specialize in the study of social disorganization, social problems, and criminology see criminal and delinquent behavior as resulting, in large part, from breakdowns in the normal functioning of family life.

The index of family disorganization

most frequently associated with delinquency has been broken homes. Although much of the evidence supports the hypothesis that delinquency is more likely to occur in broken homes than in unbroken homes, there are notable exceptions (13; 14; 17). Findings are now accumulating which support the conclusion that broken homes correlate substantially with the delinquency of girls and pre-adolescent boys but not with the delinquency of adolescent boys.

This study was primarily concerned with the impact of family organization and disorganization on adolescent boys. Several writers have concluded that the disorganizing conflicts and tensions in structurally unbroken

homes may be as important in their contribution to delinquency as physical breaks in family structure (5; 12; 14; 15), which suggests that "broken home", as legally defined, may not be an accurate indicator of family disorganization. There may be a much stronger relationship between the family experiences of adolescent boys and their behavior than the more carefully controlled broken-home studies conclude. Therefore, the hypothesis that male adolescent delinquents are as likely to come from disorganized but structurally unbroken homes as they are from broken homes was subjected to further testing.

Toby (17, p. 508), attempting to explain the lack of an appreciable relationship between broken homes and delinquency among adolescent males, observed that such weak control is exercised over them in the modal American family that there is little difference between the supervision in a well integrated family and a disorganized one. This seriously challenges the relationship of family organization to the behavior of adolescent males and raises the hypothesis that male adolescent delinquents are as likely to come from well integrated as from disorganized families.

METHODS

The separation of well integrated from disorganized families has been attempted by comparing naturally occurring groups whose families in aggregate are known to differ in incidence of family disorganization (17), and individually by means of clinical methods of assessment (3; 6; 9). This study attempted to separate families individually by means of sociometric scales and adjustment tests. Frequency of broken homes, family solidarity, marital adjustment, and boys' ratings of family relations were the indicators selected to ascertain the degree of integration or disorganization which existed in each family.

Broken homes were defined as those in which a boy was not living with both of his natural parents. Family solidarity was measured with scales developed by Jansen (10). He defined it as a dimension which emphasizes the interpersonal relations between family members. The marital adjustment test was developed by Locke (11) and others. It had differentiated rather sharply between happily-married and divorced couples. The California Test of Personality was used to get each boy's personal evaluation of his own family relations.

The socioeconomic status of each family was also measured, by means of Chapin's scale of 1933 revised by Guttman (8). This made it possible to estimate the contribution which it made to marital adjustment and family solidarity, and to check for variations in the allegedly disproportionate number of official delinquents who come from the lower socioeconomic stratum.

The populations from which the delinquents and nondelinquents were to be taken were delimited to include the following kinds of families only: (a) white, majority-group families; (b) families in which parents and offspring were American born; and (c) Protestant, Catholic, or families claiming no religious faith. Within those families, the study concentrated on: (a) boys only, (b) boys enrolled in public schools, and (c) boys living in a common court jurisdiction.

Methodologically, it seemed desirable to select samples of boys whose family patterns might represent rather distinct positions on an organization-disorganization continuum. Therefore, separation of families of boys adjudicated for violation of the penal code and families of boys adjudicated for offenses not in violation of the penal code was attempted. The use of families in which there had been no

official delinquents, whose sons' behavior was in part the logical opposite of the "less serious" delinquency category, promised to provide for separation of the nondelinquent families from both groups of delinquent families. This procedure assumed that family disorganization would increase significantly as one moved from families of nondelinquents to families of "less serious" delinquents to families of "more serious" delinquents, in that order.

Two samples of delinquents from the Los Angeles County Juvenile Court and one sample of nondelinquents were selected. The first sample consisted of boys who had been adjudicated delinquent for *truancy only* within a period of twelve months.* In each case the boy had not been adjudicated for behavior which violated the penal code.** The second sample consisted of boys who had been adjudicated for behavior which had violated the penal code, auto theft. This category of behavior was selected because its much greater number of cases compared with other offenses allowed for more rigorous matching of the boys in terms of: (a) age, (b) grade in school, and (c) school enrolled in.*** For this reason, and also because the court made no consistent distinction, "joy-riders" were not separated from the allegedly more serious offenders in the auto theft category.

Wattenberg found auto theft to be significantly associated with relatively

*This group constituted a census of active cases for the time period indicated who satisfied the control factors.

**Truants who had police records of auto theft were excluded in order to improve the separation of the auto theft and truancy samples.

***Matching tolerances were one whole grade in school and one year of age; 56 per cent of the auto theft boys were from the same school as the truant boys, 24 per cent from another school in the same district, and 20 per cent from the nearest school outside the district.

favorable neighborhoods, older age, and better peer relationships; on indexes of family relationships, school adjustment, and religious training they were like a cross-section of all other white boys interviewed on complaint by the Detroit police (18, p. 60). Controlling for age and enrollment in the same school, and using court cases instead of police investigations, the use of auto theft in this study allowed for further testing of the impact of family relations on that kind of delinquent behavior. Do boys adjudicated for auto theft experience the same degree of family disorganization as boys adjudicated for other offenses?

The sample taken from the nondelinquent population consisted of boys who had not missed a day of school for the entire year in which the truancies and auto thefts had occurred. In every case these "perfect attenders" were from the same school as the truant boys, and this group was matched with the two delinquent groups on the three factors listed above. Neither these boys nor their siblings were known to the juvenile court and no evidence of arrests by law-enforcement agencies was discovered in school records or home interviews.

This sampling procedure yielded 60 sets of three boys each, matched boy-for-boy in each set.**** The modal age of boys in each group was 15 years; the median age was 15 in both of the delinquent groups, 14.5 in the nondelinquent group. The slightly lower median age for nondelinquents was a consequence of matching for age and grade in school simultaneously; delinquent boys tend to be slightly older grade-for-grade than nondelinquent boys.

****The auto theft, like the truancy, population was known. The number of auto theft cases necessary to equal the truancy population amounted to a 10 per cent sample (after delimitation). The total perfect attendance population was not known but the sample taken was randomized except for age and grade.

The data were collected from probation records, school records, and home interviews with mothers or stepmothers. The family solidarity scales and marital-adjustment test were filled in by the parents themselves, the California Test of Personality by the boys themselves.

FINDINGS

Boys in the truancy and auto theft groups were more frequently from broken homes than boys in the per-

fect attendance group. The per cents were 57.1 for auto theft, 53.6 for truancy, and 24.1 for perfect attendance. The difference in per cent between either of the delinquent groups and the nondelinquent group was significant beyond the .01 level; between the truancy and auto theft groups, the difference was insignificant. The per cent of broken homes caused by death was 33 for truancy, 22 for auto theft, and 14 for perfect attendance. The per cent of broken homes caused by

TABLE 1
SIZE OF SAMPLES*, MEAN SCORES, AND VARIANCES** OF DELINQUENT AND NONDELINQUENT GROUPS FOR THE FAMILY LIFE VARIABLES, UNBROKEN AND BROKEN HOMES

	UNBROKEN HOMES								
	Socioeconomic Status			Marital Adjustment			Family Solidarity		
	N	Mean	Variance	N	Mean	Variance	N	Mean	Variance
Auto Theft	27	112.1	1913	27	157.4	961	27	14.3	25.1
Perfect Attendance	42	124.4	1415	44	167.1	505	43	16.9	11.6
Truancy	22	87.8	2857	25	141.2	1319	24	12.5	23.0
	BROKEN HOMES***								
				(a) 0	—	—	(a) 0	—	—
				(b) 4	108.3	2054	(b) 4	13.4	22.3
Perfect Attendance	11	107.6	758	(c) 7	172.0	172	(c) 8	19.3	13.4
				(d) 2	175.0	72	(d) 1	17.0	—
				(a) 4	163.5	831	(a) 6	16.2	6.8
				(b) 10	79.1	670	(b) 9	9.9	23.6
Auto Theft	32	96.3	1967	(c) 14	163.4	564	(c) 15	11.3	22.1
				(d) 4	179.3	19	(d) 2	13.5	.3
				(a) 4	179.8	127	(a) 5	14.2	20.6
				(b) 10	55.1	317	(b) 10	13.4	47.6
Truancy	25	98.3	1153	(c) 6	147.3	1643	(c) 7	10.9	30.1
				(d) 3	173.7	618	(d) 4	13.5	28.3

*Deviation of sample N's from number of families reported to have participated in the study, in both broken and unbroken homes, resulted from the inapplicability of a test or scale or the refusal of a parent to complete one or another of them.

**The variances are quite large, particularly for the delinquent groups and more particularly for the truancy group. There was a consistent tendency for scores in all the groups to skew toward the lower ends. Skewing was greatest for the marital adjustment scores, less great for the socioeconomic status scores, and least for the family solidarity scores. The marital adjustment test was much less discriminating in the upper than in the lower ranges; this was also true of the socioeconomic status scale but to a lesser extent. Aside from scale and test characteristics, however, there was reason to believe that the delinquency populations from which the samples were drawn were, in fact, negatively skewed on the variables measured in this study.

***Data for socioeconomic status are for all categories of broken homes combined; data for marital adjustment and family solidarity are for categories as follows: (a) mothers living alone, fathers deceased; (b) mothers living alone, fathers divorced, separated, or deserted; (c) mothers living with stepfathers; and (d) fathers living with stepmothers.

divorce, desertion, or separation was 86 for perfect attendance, 78 for auto theft, and 67 for truancy.

Table 1 indicates that families of perfect attenders scored consistently higher than families of truants and auto thieves in socioeconomic status, marital adjustment, and family solidarity. These findings obtained when broken and unbroken homes were analyzed separately. Either variances or mean scores were significantly different, beyond the .01 level in the majority of instances and beyond the .05 level in the others (see Table 2).^{*} Combining the delinquent samples yielded the same results and also increased the statistical reliability of the findings.

^{*}The statistical analysis followed Guilford (7). Bartlett's test of homogeneity of variances, the F test of differences between variances, and the T test of differences between means were employed in the appropriate order. Two-tailed tests of significance were used and probabilities were doubled for the particular use of the F test that was made.

The data in Table 1 for broken homes are presented largely for descriptive purposes. While the sizes of the subsamples hardly provide for reliable conclusions concerning the significance of differences, they do give a rough idea of what tends to happen to scores from category to category of broken homes. The categories are: (a) mother living alone, father deceased; (b) mother living alone, father divorced, separated or deserted; (c) mother living with stepfather; and (d) father living with stepmother. The findings were essentially the same as for unbroken homes except that the difference in socioeconomic status between the delinquent groups disappeared. However, when scores of broken homes were compared with those of unbroken homes *within* each group, all broken home categories except (b) tended to have as high or higher scores than unbroken homes. This might have also been expected in category (a) where memory of a deceased father could have introduced a

TABLE 2
SIGNIFICANCE OF DIFFERENCES IN VARIANCES AND MEAN SCORES* OF
FAMILY LIFE VARIABLES—EACH GROUP COMPARED WITH THE OTHER—
FOR UNBROKEN AND BROKEN HOMES

	SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS		MARITAL ADJUSTMENT		FAMILY SOLIDARITY	
	Unbroken Homes	Broken Homes (All)	Unbroken Homes	Broken Homes (c)	Unbroken Homes	Broken Homes (c)
Perfect Attendance-Truancy	B<.01	B>.05	B<.01	B<.01	B<.01	B>.05
Perfect Attendance-Auto Theft	F<.05	t<.01	F<.01	F<.05	F<.05	t<.01
Auto Theft-Truancy	t<.01	t<.05	F<.05	t<.01	F<.05	t<.01
	t<.01	t<.05	t>.05	t<.05	t>.05	t>.05

^{*}Bartlett's test of homogeneity of variance was computed for the combined groups on each variable. If variances were found to be homogeneous ($B > .05$), t ratios of differences between mean scores were then computed for each pair of groups. If variances were not homogeneous ($B < .05$), F ratios were computed to discover if some of the pairs were homogeneous ($F > .05$); t ratios were then computed for the pairs which were homogeneous. Differences in variance and mean score beyond the .05 level were considered to be statistically significant; below the .05 level, statistically insignificant.

^{**}Broken home categories were combined in the computation of socioeconomic status. For marital adjustment and family solidarity, only the reconstituted broken homes, (c) where mothers were living with stepfathers, were considered to satisfy the necessary conditions for computation of significance.

halo effect, but it is not so easily explained in the reconstituted homes of categories (c) and (d) where step-parents were involved.

The family relations scores of the boys agreed essentially with their mothers' ratings of family solidarity. And again no significant differences were discovered when the scores of boys from broken homes were compared with the scores of boys from unbroken homes, the comparisons being *within* rather than between groups.*

The families in the auto theft group, contrary to initial assumptions, scored consistently higher than families in the truancy group. In the case of socioeconomic status (unbroken homes) the difference was significant beyond the .01 level. Although all other differences between the two delinquent groups were below the .05 level (or size of subsamples was too small to test significance) they were in the same direction. The findings on socioeconomic status support Wattenberg's thesis that auto theft is a favored-group delinquency. In addition, the findings on family solidarity, marital adjustment, and family relations of the boys provided some evidence that it is a favored group, compared with truancy, on those factors also.

Since socioeconomic status scores, like those for family solidarity and marital adjustment, were lower in general for delinquents than for nondelinquents, Pearson coefficients of correlation were computed to estimate the contribution of socioeconomic status to the other variables. The correlation between socioeconomic status and family solidarity was .10, indicating almost negligible relationship; between socioeconomic status and marital adjustment it was .36, indicat-

ing definite but small relationship. The design of the study did not provide for the determination of causal relationships, but these findings supported the conclusion that family solidarity and marital adjustment depended in large measure on factors other than socioeconomic status. It was the only variable which significantly separated all three groups, but its relationship to delinquency ($C = .32$) was rather small.*

CONCLUSIONS

This study was able to substantially separate the families of truants from the families of perfect attenders in terms of family solidarity and marital adjustment. The separation of the families of auto thieves from the families of perfect attenders was less substantial. In both cases, however, the indicator, broken home, made no significant difference in the degree of separation. It failed to separate the more integrated from the more disorganized families *within* each of the groups. The findings would have been essentially the same if broken and unbroken homes had not been analyzed separately. This might have been expected in the truancy and auto theft groups where delinquency itself, acting as both independent and dependent variable, could have increased the disorganization in unbroken homes to an equivalent frequency or degree as in broken homes. But, since these results were obtained in the perfect attendance group also, some additional explanation seemed to be required. It is probable that reconstituted broken homes, where there was no child delinquency to complicate the family relations, were sufficiently well integrated and frequent enough in occurrence to raise the mean scores in

*In the larger section of the test purporting to measure social adjustment, which included the family relations items, the results of comparisons within groups were the same.

*The groups were concentrated in the lower middle class category, 100-149, of the revised norms for Chapin's scale, except the truancy group whose mean score of 94 was slightly below the lower limit.

broken home categories to statistical equivalence with those in unbroken home categories.

Broken home, as it is generally defined, does not appear to be a valid indicator of family disorganization. Because it is in such widespread use and conjures stereotypes pertaining to delinquency, it should either be abandoned or redefined. Enough problems have been discovered in its use to raise serious doubts about its being a causal factor in delinquency, even if sufficiently high correlations could be obtained.

The obtained higher frequency of broken homes in the truancy and auto theft groups loses much of its significance in light of the above findings. In fact, those findings support the hypothesis that delinquents are as likely to come from disorganized but structurally unbroken homes as they are from broken homes. Therefore, whether or not broken homes are over-represented in court records, as Nye found, may have more legal than sociological and psychological import. It may be that juvenile court officials are becoming more concerned with family disorganization than with whether a boy is living in an unbroken home, a reconstituted broken home, or a home with only one parent. This interpretation is supported by the finding that the broken homes of delinquents appeared to be less integrated and adjusted than the broken homes of the perfect attenders.

An alternative to Toby's explanation for the lack of an appreciable relationship between broken homes and delinquency among adolescent males is:

- (a) Broken home, as generally defined, is ineffective and probably meaningless as an indicator of family disorganization and other characteristics of family life known to be associated with deviant behavior. It does not include all homes which are sociologically and

psychologically broken nor exclude reconstituted homes which are well integrated.

- (b) The homes of delinquents are substantially more disorganized than the homes of non-delinquents.
- (c) What appears to be weak control may in fact be lack of supervision in disorganized families, but in well integrated families it may be the more effective use of informal and indirect controls.
- (d) Male adolescent delinquents are more likely to come from disorganized than from well integrated homes, unbroken or broken.

No doubt family disorganization has some differential impact according to age and sex. Girls and younger boys in well integrated families may be shielded from criminogenic influences more than their adolescent brothers. But minimum supervision of male adolescents does not necessarily mean weak control or weak influence by the well integrated family. Both the perfect attenders and their mothers rated their family relations consistently and substantially higher than did the truants and auto thieves and their mothers. In a society where males are still expected to "cut the apron strings", become economically independent, and take the initiative in finding mates and establishing their own homes, parents gradually relinquish the formal and direct controls over their sons as they proceed through adolescence. They are given the opportunity to take more and more responsibility for their own behavior, and those in well integrated families are more frequently able to succeed without becoming official delinquents than those in disorganized families.

The findings on marital adjustment were consistent with Nye's (he used happiness), and support the conclusion that adjustment or happiness in

marriage is much more closely related to delinquent behavior among adolescents than whether the marriage is an original marriage, a remarriage, or one in which the child was living with one parent only.

The findings that the auto theft group scored consistently higher than the truancy group on all the family life variables, confirming Nye's (13) and Wattenberg's (18) findings, suggest that in so far as these factors are related to the development of delinquent careers, truancy is not a stage in the natural history of delinquent careers which later results in auto theft. On the contrary, truancy and auto theft may be related to quite different patterns of delinquency.

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ETHNIC DIFFERENCES IN THE FIRST DRINKING EXPERIENCE

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In an unpublished paper, the writer has presented a general model of addiction as follows:

Conflicting values with reference to an activity or the use of a substance (such as alcohol) results in ambivalence in actors or users. Ambivalence influences their perceptions of experiences with the activity or substance so that they are anxious or fearful in them. Anxiety or fear fulfill the prophecy of negative feelings which is implicit in ambivalence. However, the result of the activity is temporary anxiety-reduction or fear-reduction followed by an increase. Compulsive repetition occurs when negative aspects of ambivalence toward the activity or substance are repressed (13).

The model provides for transition from the sociocultural to the personality systems in a manner which has been described in some detail in the work cited.

In the present paper, we shall show that there are systematic relationships among value conflict, ambivalence toward drinking, and the prevalence of addiction in seven ethnic groups with differing rates of alcoholism.

THE HYPOTHESES

When there is conflict of values with regard to some behavior, its psychological product, ambivalence, may exist prior to any direct experience with the behavior. As we shall see, this is clearly true for many segments of American society with respect to drinking. Drinking, like other potentially addictive behaviors, is regarded by many as a vice, therefore it is reserved for an age group presumably able to be "safely" vicious. Among other segments of the society, drinking

is not regarded as a vice, and children are introduced to alcoholic beverages at such an early age that there is no opportunity for attitudes to form prior to actual experience.

It follows that it should be possible to discover if members of certain groups were ambivalent about drinking even before they drank. The manner in which they were introduced to drinking should reveal something of prevailing attitudes toward drinking. One may assume that groups vary in the degree to which they consider drinking to be a vice, and that belief that it is bad to drink is correlated with avoidance of sanctioned introduction to the practice.

It is generally true that sanctioned behavior arouses less anxiety and guilt than unsanctioned. This is another way of saying that conflict of values with respect to drinking produces ambivalence. We should then expect to find a correlation between unsanctioned introduction to drinking and the occurrence of addiction.

The first step was to look at first drinking experiences reported by alcohol addicts and normal drinkers. They were found to differ in certain respects, and the differences provided the basis for further investigation, all directed toward the relationship between culture conflict with respect to drinking and ambivalence toward drinking. The findings pointed to the fact that the first drinking experiences of the alcoholics were more productive of ambivalence than those of the normal drinkers.

It was reasoned that the conditions associated with the addictive drinker's first drink ought to appear *relatively* frequently in *any* population having a high rate of alcoholism. We seek support for the theory from a check of the

*I am grateful to William Kellett, Sandra Henricson, Joan Lipton, and Arlene Schwartzman for their help in handling the data. My colleagues at Tufts were kind enough to read and criticize the manuscript. I am particularly indebted to H. Kent Geiger for his comments.

same factors among groups which vary on the basis of ethnicity and which differ from one another in rates of alcoholism.

To do this certain hypotheses drawn from the earlier work (10) were altered slightly to fit the present context. The new set follows.

1. Members of ethnic groups with *high* alcoholism rates are *more likely* to remember their first drink than members of ethnic groups with low alcoholism rates.
2. Members of ethnic groups having *higher* rates of alcoholism will have their first drink at a *later* age.
3. Members of groups having *higher* rates of alcoholism are *more likely* to have had their first drink in a place other than a private home or in a place where liquor is normally sold and drunk.
4. Members of groups having *higher* rates of alcoholism are *more likely* to have had their first drink in the company of persons outside their families.
5. Members of groups having *higher* rates of alcoholism are more likely to have been in some degree intoxicated on the occasion of their first drink.
6. Members of groups with *higher* rates of alcoholism are likely to have waited longer before the next drinking experience than others.

Although these hypotheses are derived from statistically significant differences between alcoholics and normal drinkers, we now expect these differences to occur among any populations which differ in prevalence of alcoholism. When, however, a test was made for such differences in the first drinking experience between men and women, chosen because of the 11

to 2 ratio of alcoholism, the picture was not so clear (11).

Women instead of men remembered the first drink with greater frequency, and they waited longer before another drinking episode occurred. Furthermore, there was no significant difference in the age of the first drink.

However, the men were more likely to have become intoxicated in some degree, and to have had their first drink under circumstances not sanctioned by the family. The general picture of differences between sexes is that some of the items were not well-chosen to express them. Interview and anecdotal records show that women are less ego-involved in drinking, less ambivalent than men, with less concern for appropriate role performance. Indeed, the "proper" drinking behavior for most women in our society is moderate with no intoxication, thus presenting limited demands on the drinker.

Rather than discard or revise those hypotheses which did not effectively discriminate between men and women in the predicted directions, we have chosen to deal with the same six in the present investigation. Known differences in rates of alcoholism for various ethnic groups make possible the same kind of investigation that was conducted with respect to sex differences in the first drinking experience. We should expect sex differences to exist among various ethnic groups, but that the relative positions of men and women within each ethnic group and with respect to their counterparts in other ethnic groups remain constant.

From a variety of reports, we ascertain that Irish-Americans and English-Americans have higher rates of alcoholism than Jews and Italian-Americans (1; 2; 3; 5; 8; 14). Consequently, we should expect that the first named groups clearly reveal a higher incidence of characteristics associated

with the first drinking experience of alcoholics than do others.

We use the term "English-American" for all those whose ancestors came from Great Britain. The category includes most of those sometimes called "Old Americans"—those representing several generations of residence in the United States and the American colonies. We refer to Jews as an ethnic rather than a religious entity.

When we look at the intermediary groups, our expectations must be more modest. Skolnick's data indicate that German-Americans probably belong at the low-alcoholism end of an imaginary scale (8). If we take the prevalence of alcoholism in France as an indication of what to expect from Franco-Americans, then this group is relatively high (7). Scandinavians generally belong with the high-alcoholism groups as well (7). Although one must feel slightly uncomfortable with this ranking, it represents the best we can do at the moment. Most important are the extremes (Irish in particular at the high end of the continuum, Jews and Italians at the low end). If there are no reversals at the extremes in our data, then the discomfort may be somewhat lessened.

THE INVESTIGATION

As in earlier studies, data were gathered by questionnaire. Respondents were 1,524 students at Tufts University, almost evenly divided by sex. The writer was present and gave simple instructions, which read, "This questionnaire is part of an investigation of early drinking experiences. In answering the questions below, please think of a drinking episode as all of the drinking done by you on a given occasion. For example, if at a party you had one drink or several, we should consider this a single drinking episode or occasion."

The first four questions asked for sex, age, religion, and predominant nationality (ethnicity), then, the birth-

place of respondent, his parents and grandparents. Students were next asked if they had ever had a drink of an alcoholic beverage, and, if they had, whether they remembered it. There followed a series of questions on age at that time, what was drunk, where, with whom, its effect, length of time before the next drinking episode. Finally, they were asked to give their names and addresses if they were willing to be questioned further on their drinking experiences. Many of the items used were reproduced in an earlier report (11).

Very few answers had to be discarded because they could not be coded. A few respondents stated they did not remember their first drink, but then proceeded to fill out answers for the first drink they *did* remember. In case of doubt, these were coded as first drinks despite the fact that they tended to reduce rather than emphasize ethnic differences. Thus, our case for the differences is probably understated.

Most Tufts students use or have used alcoholic beverages. Ninety-three per cent (1,420) report some experience with alcohol, with the women slightly exceeding the men. When we separate the respondents by ethnicity, we find there are only seven groups containing more than 50 members who have ever had a drink. This further reduces the sample with which we shall work to 1,259, of whom 897 remember their first drink. We may note in Table 1 that a majority of the members of each ethnic group remembers the first drink. It is probable that if the population from which the sample is drawn were older, the proportion of those remembering would be reduced. All but 5 respondents were under 20.

In the light of Hypothesis 1 and what is to follow, the rank order of ethnic groups in recall of the first drinking experience is important. The order goes from high alcoholism groups with high rates of recall of the

TABLE 1
ETHNIC DIFFERENCES IN RECALL OF THE FIRST DRINK

Ethnic Group	Total	Recall		No Recall	
		N	%	N	%
Irish	191	150	78.5	41	21.5
English, Welch, Scot, etc.	411	308	74.9	103	25.1
Scandinavian	63	46	73.0	17	27.0
French	54	39	72.2	15	27.8
German	117	83	70.9	34	29.1
Jewish	304	196	64.5	108	35.5
Italian	119	75	63.0	44	37.0
TOTAL	1259	897	71.2	362	28.8

TABLE 2
AGE AT TIME OF FIRST DRINK

Ethnic Group	Total	Under 15		15 and over	
		N	%	N	%
Irish	140	61	43.6	79	56.4
English	299	129	43.1	170	56.9
Scandinavian	46	17	37.0	29	63.0
French	38	17	44.7	21	55.3
German	82	52	63.4	30	36.6
Jewish	191	136	71.2	55	28.8
Italian	68	45	66.2	23	33.8
TOTAL	864	457	52.9	407	47.1

first drinking experience to low alcoholism with low rates of recall and the hypothesis is supported. *Thus, we suggest that if the data were available to rank exactly the seven ethnic groups on alcoholism, the correlation between alcoholism and rate of recall would be positive and very high.* At least we know that those groups which are rated at the extremes on the basis of available information appear in the appropriate positions in Table 1, and that those groups which we know to be intermediate in alcoholism fall in the middle positions in recall.

The chi-square test of the significance of the differences was used here as well as throughout the work. Unless otherwise stated, the differences for each distribution were significant at the .01 level.

Because the ranking on the basis of recall of the first drink is so important theoretically, the rest of the data will

be presented with ethnic groups arranged in descending order of recall. Rank order correlations between ethnic groups' recall of the first drink and certain characteristics of the sample and of that experience will be presented below using Kendall's *tau* as the appropriate statistic (4). Inasmuch as we have indicated above that we see a positive rank order correlation between alcoholism rates and recall of the first drink, it is obvious that we cannot, nor do we wish to avoid interpreting correlations between recall and other factors as correlations between potential alcoholism and the same factors.

The rest of the data deal with characteristics of the drinker and of his first drinking experience at the time of its occurrence. Table 2 shows the age at the time members of each ethnic group had their first drinks. Probably those who did not remember

TABLE 3
PLACE OF FIRST DRINK

Ethnic Group	Total	Own Home		Elsewhere	
		N	%	N	%
Irish	149	59	39.6	90	60.4
English	307	121	39.4	186	60.6
Scandinavian	46	14	30.4	32	69.6
French	39	14	35.9	25	64.1
German	83	43	51.8	40	48.2
Jewish	195	106	54.4	89	45.6
Italian	75	43	57.3	32	42.7
TOTAL	894	400	44.7	494	55.3

TABLE 4
FIRST DRINK WITH PARENTS OR OTHERS

Ethnic Group	Total	With Parents		With Others	
		N	%	N	%
Irish	146	60	41.1	86	58.9
English	308	140	45.5	168	54.5
Scandinavian	46	17	37.0	29	63.0
French	39	14	35.9	25	64.1
German	83	46	55.4	37	44.6
Jewish	196	124	63.3	72	36.7
Italian	78	46	59.0	32	41.0
TOTAL	896	447	49.9	449	50.1

their first drink actually had it at an earlier age than those who recalled it; thus the actual difference among ethnic groups in this respect may be more impressive than the table indicates.

Using age 15 as the dividing line, the data are dichotomized for each ethnic group. The table indicates clear support for Hypothesis 2 which positively relates late introduction to alcohol and high rates of alcoholism. The rank order correlation between rate of recall of first drink, which we associate with alcoholism, and having the first drink at age 15 ($\tau_{au}=.43$) is interesting although not highly significant. This statistic is presented with other rank order correlations (τ_{au}) in Table 9.

The third hypothesis states that the relationship between having the first drink in an unusual place and alcoholism is positive. Although data were

gathered on several kinds of places where alcohol was consumed for the first time by the respondents, what stood out when ethnic groups were compared was whether or not one had his first drink at home. The data are presented in Table 3. Hypothesis 3 may now be reworded to read, "Members of groups having higher rates of alcoholism are *more likely* to have had their first drink outside their own home." The rank order correlation of first drink outside one's own home with recall has rather high significance ($\tau_{au}=.62$, $p=.035$. See Table 9).

As one would expect, data with reference to Hypothesis 4, which raises the expectation that one's first drink will be taken with persons other than one's family, are similar to those with respect to place of first drink. Our expectations are gratified, as we see in Table 4. The correlation with recall is large and in the appropriate

TABLE 5
DEGREE OF EFFECT OF FIRST DRINK

Ethnic Group	Total	No Effect		Some		Drunk	
		N	%	N	%	N	%
Irish	150	106	70.7	34	22.7	10	6.7
English	308	243	78.9	52	16.9	13	4.2
Scandinavian	40	39	97.5	0	0	1	2.5
French	39	32	82.1	5	12.8	2	5.1
German	81	57	70.4	20	24.7	4	4.9
Jewish	191	150	78.5	36	18.8	5	2.6
Italian	74	59	79.7	14	18.9	1	1.4
TOTAL	883	686	77.7	161	18.2	36	4.1

TABLE 6
TIME PASSED BEFORE ANOTHER DRINK WAS TAKEN

Ethnic Groups	Total	Days		Weeks		Months		Years	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Irish	139	20	14.4	35	25.2	60	43.2	24	17.2
English	293	36	12.3	58	19.8	116	39.6	83	28.3
Scandinavian	46	5	10.8	3	6.5	21	45.7	17	37.0
French	33	5	15.2	7	21.2	11	33.3	10	30.3
German	77	4	5.2	21	27.3	37	48.1	15	19.5
Jewish	183	17	9.3	20	10.9	89	48.6	57	31.1
Italian	69	8	11.6	17	24.6	30	43.5	14	20.3
TOTAL	840	95	11.3	161	19.2	364	43.3	220	26.2

direction, but not highly significant (Table 9).

Data in Table 5, related to Hypothesis 5 are confusing, to say the least. The hypothesis suggests that members of high alcoholism groups are more likely to become intoxicated on the occasion of the first drink. When we combine the "Some Effect" and "Drunk" columns and apply the chi-square test, the statistic obtained is highly significant (p is less than .01). The rank order correlation between recall and "Drunk" (Table 9) is quite high, thus lending further support to Hypothesis 5. Despite these statistics, it is obvious from Table 5 that the relationships involved are complex.

In Table 6, data on the interval between first and second drinking episodes are presented. Hypothesis 6 sets up the expectation that the interval will be longer for members of high alcoholism groups. Although the chi-

square test gives significant evidence of the existence of differences, it tells us nothing of their direction. Somewhat better evidence is obtained from the rank order correlations presented in Table 9. However, what seems most important here is the extent to which one's first experience influences the second. Thus, the effect of the first drink was "plotted" against the length of time between drinking episodes in Table 7. Here we see that getting drunk on the occasion of the first drink is highly associated with going back for more at an early date: just the reverse of the prediction! Although the number of those who reported becoming drunk at the time of the first drink is small, the proportion of them going back for another try within a week is impressive.

One more item needs mention. In the original study (10) from which the hypotheses currently being tested

TABLE 7
LENGTH OF TIME BETWEEN FIRST AND SECOND DRINKING EPISODES BY
EFFECTS OF FIRST EXPERIENCE

Effect of First Drinking Episode	Total	Days		Weeks		Months		Years	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
None	505	49	9.7	112	22.2	291	57.6	53	10.5
Some	120	23	19.2	40	33.3	55	45.8	2	1.7
Drunk	47	20	42.6	9	19.1	15	31.9	3	6.4
TOTAL	672	92	13.7	161	24.0	361	53.7	58	8.6

TABLE 8
WHAT WAS DRUNK

Ethnic Group	Total	Wine		Beer		Distilled	
		N	%	N	%	N	%
Irish	145	23	15.9	65	44.8	57	39.3
English	300	69	23.0	115	38.3	116	38.7
Scandinavian	41	10	24.4	17	41.5	14	34.1
French	38	7	18.4	13	34.2	18	47.4
German	81	18	22.2	22	27.2	41	50.6
Jewish	190	80	42.1	34	17.9	76	40.0
Italian	72	30	41.7	18	25.0	24	33.3
TOTAL	867	237	27.3	284	32.8	346	39.9

TABLE 9
RANK ORDER CORRELATION (τ) BETWEEN PER CENT OF EACH
ETHNIC GROUP RECALLING THE FIRST DRINK, AND
SELECTED VARIABLES

Recall and:	τ	p
1. Age 15 and over	.43	.119
2. Place other than home	.62	.035
3. Companions other than family	.43	.119
4. "No" effect	.05	.500
5. "Some" effect	.14	.386
6. "Drunk"	.52	.068
7. Interval of Days before next drink	.33	.191
8. Interval of Weeks before next drink	— .05	.500
9. Interval of Months before next drink	— .33	.191
10. Interval of Years before next drink	— .14	.386
11. Wine	— .52	.068
12. Beer	.81	.0054
13. Distilled	.05	.500

were drawn, it was found that the beverage used at the time of the first drink did not differ significantly for alcoholics and normal drinkers. In the present study, the alcoholic beverage drunk appears to be significantly associated with ethnicity. The data are

presented in Table 8, and in Table 9 we see correlations between each type of drink—wine, beer, or distilled—and recall. τ for recall and drinking wine and drinking beer at the time of the first drink are both high. Wine is negatively associated with recall (and

therefore with prevalence of alcoholism), while beer is positively associated. The level of significance of correlation between recall and having beer was the highest computed in this study.

DISCUSSION

It was stated earlier that the chief task of this paper is to demonstrate relationships, described in the general model, among value conflict, ambivalence, and addiction prevalence. Alcohol use and addiction to it provide the vehicle for the exposition. However, the material with which we shall deal is appropriate mainly to part of the model: that dealing with culture conflict and ambivalence.

A number of ethnological studies support the notion that ethnic groups vary in amount of value conflict shown over the use of alcohol. Their review led to the proposition that:

... in any group or society in which the drinking customs, values, and sanctions—together with the attitudes of all segments of the group or society—are well established, known to and agreed upon by all, and are consistent with the rest of the culture, the rate of alcoholism will be low (12, p. 50).

Illustrations of this proposition were provided. Orthodox Jews, Italian-Americans and Chinese-Americans were examples of low-alcoholism groups. What Bacon called "United States Americans of the Northeast quarter of the nation—Protestant, middle-class, urban, white, from Anglo-Saxon background of three or more generations in this country," provided one example of a high-alcoholism group. Irish-Americans and Mormons were others.

After a little thought we see that the proposition actually is included within the general model of addiction, and is, indeed, the obverse. The conditions described in the proposition *do not* engender ambivalence on the part of the drinker, while their opposites do.

Interestingly, the groups which were used as examples of holders of non-conflicted values are found together in the present study with respect to several variables investigated; the same is true for the conflicted. To Jews and Italians in the former group, we add Germans. In the case of age of first drink, place and companions, there is a rather sharp distinction between this cluster and another made up of Irish, English, Scandinavian, and French. A majority of members of the first cluster had their first drink below the age of 15, at home, with their parents. A majority of those in the second had their first drink at age 15 or over, at places other than their own homes, with persons other than their families.

The fact that the family does or does not take responsibility for introducing its children to drinking is taken as an index of the family's values with respect to drinking. If parents regard it as vice, then the family will not initiate its members into the activity, even though the parents may suspect that some day the children will drink. Their attitudes and practices with regard to drinking are similar to those directed toward their children's sexual behavior. They expect that the children will grow up and have certain experiences, but, rather than act as sanctioning agents, parents prefer to know nothing about it.

Among the Irish, English, Scandinavian and French,* the evidence on the manner of introduction points to the fact that these groups tend to re-

*The French situation is particularly difficult to deal with in this context. One has the impression from press accounts that all young children are introduced to wine by their parents, but we do not have available adequate studies of drinking practices which enable us to check this impression. There is some indication that regional differences are important.

This difficulty is intensified by the fact that the number of addictive drinkers included in alcoholism rates is unknown. Apparently, many French alcoholics seek

gard drinking as a moral problem. But the fact that drinking so often does occur leads to the inevitable assumption that there is a conflict of values.

When we look at the actual experiences of the members of these groups, we see that their first drinking experiences are described in such a way as to indicate the presence of ambivalence toward drinking. Anecdotal accounts of the first drinking experience of representatives of the various groups in our sample show a "scale" of ambivalence or anxiety concerning drinking. Here are some samples.

1. Irish Male: first drink age 15.

"My first and only experience with the drinking of an alcoholic beverage occurred when I was roughly 15 years old. I was in kind of a reckless frame of mind at the time since I remember also smoking in secret. This occasion of my first drink took place at home and alone since my parents would have been quite angry had they known. I had just finished smoking a cigar and was feeling pretty cocky, so I went to the refrigerator and took a few swigs of ale. That was all. I got no "kick" or after-effects from this experience physically. Mentally, I suppose I had some kind of guilt feelings or fear that someone would find out."

2. English female: first drink age 17.

"My boy friend and I were guests at my Godparents' home for the weekend, and we were all invited to have dinner at the home of a friend of my Godparents. The host was a professor and his wife, a well-dressed, intelligent woman who showed upper-class tradition in her meal, dress, and home decoration. A toast was drunk before the meal in which I participated with some hesitation. (My parents have never used alcoholic beverages and did not want me to do so either, yet here I was with people

somewhat above my own station and I wanted to be gracious and sophisticated — and equal.)

I enjoyed the meal, did not feel at all sick but felt rather keyed up by the whole situation. Later, as my boyfriend and I went for a walk, we joked about the 'scandalous high life' to which I had just been initiated. Since he was 21, he frequently ordered an alcoholic beverage with his meal when we dined out, but never let me drink even though I jokingly said I wanted to. I never felt that I had to prove myself sophisticated or worldly-wise to keep his esteem. The day was remembered as a pleasant, amusing occasion."

3. Scandinavian female: first drink age 16.

"My father was against drinking. My mother was neutral. My father had told me not to drink at that age, but I did so at a party socially because everyone else was. My parents drink rarely. I started drinking at parties in my home town. At seventeen I went to places to drink and dance. My father is still opposed to my drinking, but has come to accept it somewhat. He knows that I have a drink or two on dates, but he doesn't object verbally anymore."

4. French male: does not recall first drink.

"Alcohol has always been used in moderation in my family. As far back as I can remember the use of alcohol was for some occasion such as at Thanksgiving, Christmas, and New Year's. Most alcohol used at those times consisted of wine, although in recent years cocktails have been introduced.

"My parents have what I believe to be an open view on drinking — rarely objecting to my drinking. At present I, personally, often have a drink, usually scotch. Often, meaning on a weekend visit or such."

5. German male: first drink around age 5.

"My parents consider drink as a normal beverage, and drink in great moderation. They allow me a drink or two in the house, but frown upon indulgence elsewhere, even though they realize this is inevitable. However, I feel they have made me appreciate their sense of moderation, for I have never seen either of them intoxicated, and have never been so myself."

ing treatment are suffering from physiological disturbances (See 6).

At any rate, we know so little at the moment that the "absence of fit" with impressions of the problems of alcoholism in France is not distressing. The data from French-American respondents in the current study is consistent with high alcoholism.

6. Jewish male: does not recall first drink.

"Alcoholic beverages are used in my family very infrequently. During the Jewish Holy Days we partake of the traditional wine. At other times my father might take a drink (a small one) before a meal.

"My parents never cared if I drank. They always said, 'If you want to drink, don't be ashamed to drink in the house in front of us.' I did. Aside from these occasions, I began drinking socially at age 16. My parents were never strict with alcohol, and only insisted that I use my good judgment in when, where, and how much to drink."

7. Italian female: does not recall first drink.

"The use of alcohol in my family, as far as I can remember, has always been in two ways: first, at meals I can remember my grandmothers have always served wine. My own mother does not unless it is a special dinner party. At those holiday meals at my grandparents, we all had to join in a toast before the meal. We children did with much distaste for the wine.

"Second, my parents have served alcoholic beverages at social gatherings in our home as long as I can remember. Sometimes my sister and I would taste the remains in the glasses after a cocktail party my parents had had. On the whole, drinking has not been frowned upon and my parents taught me how and what to drink before I came away to college."

As we have already noted, these accounts provide something like a "scale of ambivalence" in the drinking situation. Another way to describe it would be as a scale of "ego-involvement" or even "emotional arousal" in drinking. Those high on the scale report clear differences of opinion with parents on the matter of drinking, and a feeling of guilt when they drink. *This occurs even in families in which the parents themselves drink.* The middle position on the scale is one in which the drinker is aware that he is doing something unusual for him, and something which has significance for his life-situation. At the lower end, drinking is a matter of indifference,

with no significance for the life-situation.

The groups which are low in alcoholism are clearly the very ones which introduce their members to alcohol comparatively early — *usually before their young are concerned with problems of adult role-assumption.* Thus, there is no opportunity for drinking to become a *rite de passage*, as is so often the case with high-alcoholism groups whose members first drink during adolescence.

If the first drink is taken when the adolescent is in the process of assuming adult roles, and if he is in doubt as to his ability to assume them (or, occasionally, of his desire to take on adult roles), then his doubts are likely to extend to his ability to drink like an adult. He must prove himself in the drinking situation in order to prove himself capable of enacting adult roles.

Furthermore, if he first drinks in the presence of his peers without any adult model on the scene, he may well be in doubt as to what is appropriate adult drinking behavior.

Introduction of role theory provides us with the possibility of a *rapprochement* between theories of alcohol addiction which hold that it is symptomatic of an underlying personality disorder and the position implicit in this paper, that addiction itself is the basic problem. Although we hold that the mechanism of addiction is independent of personality disorder, we can see that one's ability to enact certain roles may be impaired by such a disorder, thus indirectly contributing to the establishment of addiction. Particularly important in this respect are roles involving fundamental aspects of the self-concept such as sex identity and adulthood. For example, it is possible that the woman alcoholic is one whose sex identification is confused. She has taken the masculine model, at least as far as drinking is

concerned, thus falling under the same pressures to drink "like a man."

The reasoning employed in this analysis requires that we emphasize the importance of timing the introduction of the young to alcohol use. Even though we agree that those who have personality disorders are more likely to be ambivalent about drinking, we must add the proviso that *other things must be equal*. We need this proviso because other things are *not* equal. If they were, we should have no answer to the question of why some who suffer from personality disorders become alcohol addicts and others do not. Obviously, the answer is given in the general model of addiction and in the supporting evidence provided in this paper. Within some groups, deviates have their attention directed toward drinking as a "choice" of symptom; in others, some other mode of neurotic adjustment occurs.

As we have seen, the custom of introducing children to alcohol early is associated with ethnic groups having low rates of alcoholism. If the role models are free of conflict with respect to drinking, and if drinking is in no way connected with "graduation" to any new role, then the new drinker is unlikely to find or need solace in the effect of alcohol. In fact, in many early-drinking groups the sanctions against drunkenness are strong. Thus, the conditions necessary to direct one's attention to the use of alcohol as a tension-reducing substance are absent: one is in no conflict about drinking and one does not drink enough to notice any particular effect. In brief, there is no particular gain in drinking, whether neurotic or normal.

Having one's first drink at home in the presence of one's parents is an indication that the family is free of conflict with regard to drinking. It involves less ambivalence than other first drinking experiences. When one drinks at home with his parents, no matter what the age, there are appro-

priate adult models present. There is no uncertainty over the appropriateness of one's behavior. The appropriate and familiar sanctioning agents are present, and one's behavior conforms to expectations. For example, one is unlikely to get drunk at such an occasion, or even to have enough alcohol to note any effect. Both setting and the experience itself are innocuous.

The first drinking experience not only is indicative of the presence of value conflict and ambivalence, but it influences subsequent experiences in drinking. The finding (see Table 7) that those who get drunk on the occasion of their first drink are more likely than those who are unaffected or only slightly intoxicated to drink within a matter of days indicates that what happens on the first occasion has some effect upon the occurrence of the second. What seems to be happening to those who get drunk at the time of the first drink is that they are "challenged" by the situation and go back quickly to try again. Unfortunately, we have no data on what happens on succeeding drinking episodes. Such information would be most pertinent.

It is assumed that getting drunk is more fear or anxiety-arousing than drinking without perceptible effect. However, those who are most anxious about drinking are also most likely to get drunk. For them, drinking is a form of risk-taking. One has to take such risks in order to live up to one's self-concept, but one also fails or "loses" upon occasion. We can suspect that the challenge is more likely to exist for those who associate drinking with a role or roles such as adult male.

Our data and the discussion have dealt only with sociocultural factors and their psychological products. The psychodynamics referred to in the general model of addiction must be discussed and probably revised by those competent to do so. The data we have show the need for still more

information on the nature of psychological events occurring concurrently with the first and early drinking experiences. The same is true with respect to other key events in the life history. We need to know what difference it makes if introduction to potentially addictive substances and activities takes place early or late, accidentally or purposefully, sanctioned or unsanctioned, and by whom sanctioned. We need information to enable us to relate these events to the structure of predictable psychological needs at the time. Only in the clinical literature, where they occur in a framework which may or may not relate them to the sociocultural setting, do we now have descriptions of need states. Yet, because of cultural and developmental regularities, statements applicable to discriminable groups can be developed. The present effort is one such attempt.

SUMMARY

A general model of the addictive process related cultural inconsistency or conflict (with respect to alcohol) to ambivalence toward its use and, eventually, to addiction. The manner of introduction of its members to the use of alcohol is thought to indicate the degree of a group's conflict regarding alcohol. Hypotheses relating the nature of the first drinking experience to ethnicity are tested. Results show that ethnic groups with a high prevalence of alcoholism are likely to permit their members to have their first drink under conditions unsanctioned by adults.

Members of high alcoholism groups are more likely to remember their first drink, to have had it at a later age, to have had it in a place other than their own homes, and with persons other than their families, to have become intoxicated in some degree, and to have drunk beer on that occasion.

The "goodness of fit" of these data with the general model is discussed.

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THE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION FOR JUVENILE OFFENDERS: AN ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATIONAL "CHARACTER"

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INTRODUCTION

During the last decade the sociological study of large organizations has emphasized the limitations of Weber's ideal-type of bureaucracy as a model of organizational behavior. Moving away from a focus on bureaucracy and its pathologies, organizational research has begun to examine the variety of factors that affect and limit different types of organizations. The purpose of this paper is to describe the juvenile correctional institution as one type of large-scale social organization.*

First of all, institutions for delinquents share with other organizations, such as hospitals, certain attributes usually associated with communities. Secondly, they belong to a class of large-scale social organizations that have multiple goals, and thus have functional problems like these organizations. Thirdly, correctional institutions are of interest because of their critical role in our society's attempt to minimize anti-social behavior.

In this paper the major patterns of similarity and dissimilarity between correctional institutions and other types of organizations will be delineated and explained. Further, some of the dimensions along which correc-

tional institutions vary among themselves will be indicated. A "character analysis" of these organizations, as systems of action, may make it possible (a) to summarize and integrate a scattered body of knowledge; (b) to specify areas where research is needed; and (c) to set forth some concepts and dimensions that may be useful in such research.

The concept of organizational "character," most fully developed by Philip Selznick (30), stresses interdependencies, commitments, fixed limitations and capacities of different types of organizations. Using the concept of organizational "character" the present analysis aims at a middle range level of theoretical abstraction.**

To describe the "character" of correctional institutions we will discuss their goals, their relationships to the larger community, and, finally, their internal structures.***

THE GOALS OF CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Like universities, mental hospitals and some other large-scale social organizations, correctional institutions can be said to have multiple goals. Their prime functions are to incarcerate—that is, establish custody over—the offender *and* to rehabilitate the delinquent. These goals may be in-

**Francis Scott has recently discussed mental hospitals and prisons within a Parsonian framework (27). The analysis presented here will be less inclusive.

***On occasion this analysis uses studies of mental hospitals as well as prisons. Paucity of organizational research on juvenile correctional institutions, as well as similarities among these organizations justifies this extension. Pertinent recent studies include those of McCleery (16; 17) and Sykes (33) for prisons, Belknap (1), Caudill (3), Stanton and Schwartz (31), and the book edited by Greenblatt, Levinson, and Williams (11) on mental hospitals.

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*The terms large-scale organization and organization are used interchangeably in this paper.

compatible because maximization of one may lead to inadequate fulfillment of the other. Business firms, in contrast, typically have one primary goal and several secondary goals or "functions" that are usually evaluated in relation to the primary goal.

It is often said that mental hospitals and, to a lesser extent, prisons are moving from an emphasis on incarceration and punishment to an emphasis on treatment and rehabilitation. Institutions for delinquents have had a goal of rehabilitation from the beginning. Bowler and Bloodgood (2, p. 9) point out that the first Houses of Refuge in Boston, New York, and Philadelphia were quite clear in their emphasis upon rehabilitation as the primary goal of the organization. The earliest state institutions combined emphasis on rehabilitation with a covert goal of custody. Advocates of military training, of farming, of vocational programs all visualized their programs as rehabilitative. Society has become more humanitarian and less repressive in its concepts of social control. As social welfare, mental hygiene, and social science concepts have spread, the general public and the expanding mental health professions have pressed for the implementation of treatment goals, even though the details of treatment techniques have in themselves been subject to considerable debate among contending professional groups.

In many states physical punishment and repressive controls have been legally denied the juvenile institution, and rehabilitative goals have been formally established. Yet it is rarely the case that correctional institutions can also abandon custodial goals. A variety of legal statutes govern the admission and retention of the offender by the institution, and assignment of the delinquent is often intended to protect the community. Rehabilitative goals have not been substituted for custodial goals in most cases; rather they have

been added to organizational goals. It is possible, therefore, to place a given institution on a continuum whose poles are defined by goal ratios in which custody or rehabilitation predominate. Most institutions may be characterized by the degree of dominance of one goal over the other. However, knowledge of the goal ratio alone is insufficient for understanding the structures of the institutions. Institutions with similar goal ratios may stress differing means. Thus one treatment-oriented institution may stress the casework relationship as the primary means while another might stress the utilization of the milieu. One custodial institution might stress negative sanctions for running away while another might not allow opportunities for escape.

All of the diverse functions associated with these two goals are not inherently in conflict. A custodially-oriented institution, for example, could use techniques usually associated with treatment to achieve discipline and control (36; 23). Conversely, custodial control may be a prerequisite in some cases for effective rehabilitation. In certain situations custodial needs and therapeutic needs might dictate similar policies or decisions. But it is also true that they might dictate divergent solutions. If the multiple goals of the organization have not been clearly delineated and their relationship defined, the potentiality of organizational conflict is raised. That is, consensual validation of the norms and rules and of their relative importance will be absent.

In a formal sense an organization may be said to have split or multiple goals when the goal-setting agents—those who charter the organization and to whom the highest organizational authorities are responsible—conceive of the organization as having multiple purposes or functions. However, the actual degree of dominance of one goal over another is not wholly

determined by the chartering agents. Even if they were to specify quite precisely the relative emphasis upon goals that were to be expected, the organization might not be able to realize this goal ratio. Depending upon its resources, structure, personnel, and clientele, the institution might be more or less successful in attaining its goals. Moreover, in many cases there may be a large degree of indeterminacy in the charter. Internal and external pressure groups may argue for one or another interpretation of the goals at various times and for policies which support their interpretations (7). The existence of the two major goals of custody and rehabilitation heighten the possibility of conflicting occupational role groups and the development of conflicting policies. The manner in which multiple goals affect the relation of the institution to the larger society and how they affect the structure and effectiveness of the organization will be discussed in later sections.

THE ORGANIZATION AND THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT

The relation of an organization to its environment may profitably be discussed in terms of (1) external factors that affect the input of facilities and legitimation, (2) the process of evaluation of the output of the organization, and (3) factors that affect the demographic characteristics of staff and clientele.

Sources of Legitimation and Facilities. Resource inputs to an organization are of several different kinds and effect the autonomy or independence of an organization. The designation of organizations as autonomous is largely a matter of degree. Any organization exists in a matrix of intricate relations with the larger society and must meet certain standards in order to exist. One organization may be said to be more autonomous than another to the extent that it has great-

er control over its environment, has more freedom in determining its own goals, judging its own effectiveness, and perpetuating its own personnel. An organization may have a narrowly limited area of operation and yet be largely autonomous in its operation. The converse may also be true. A correctional institution organized under a department of corrections is ordinarily less autonomous than is an institution less directly related to a department of government. The more a private institution depends on a limited number of sources for facilities, the more its autonomy is limited.

Public institutions receive facilities — money and capital investment — from legislative and judicial units of government or their administrative agents, while private institutions are primarily dependent upon charitable organizations or fund raising drives. Both public and private institutions receive legitimation from the state and from professional and lay associations. As sources of facilities, legislatures operate primarily with reference to two criteria: the tenor of the times and the pressure of the budget. The variability of both of these factors is conducive to organizational instability.

Facilities for public institutions are often channeled through a state agency responsible for all organizations of a similar type. Operating through a state department has both advantages and disadvantages for an organization. On the one hand it allows all of the correctional institutions to be treated as a single power unit rather than as fragmented institutions. It is a further advantage to give the job of organizational defense into a separate department of government with prestige and a staff of civil servants. However, this arrangement necessitates meeting standards set by an external agency directly responsible for the institution's continual effectiveness. Since the agency is more likely to accept rehabilitative goals, is not in direct contact with

the clients, is more often in contact with standard-setting national welfare agencies, such as the Children's Bureau, we would expect the operating organizations to develop defensive patterns of relating to the parent agency. This should be especially true of the more custodially oriented organizations.

There is little research in this area. The literature on public administration treats of somewhat similar situations in its discussion of central office-field office relations, but there are no systematic studies of the relationship of correctional institutions to their administrative departments.

Private institutions, although relatively more autonomous in establishing organizational policy and acquiring personnel, have the complex problem of insuring the receipt of facilities through fund raising associations and foundations.

Etzioni (9) has recently traced the implications, for both society and organizations, of receiving financial support from a source different from the payment of clients for services received. Almost all public and many private organizations fall into this category. As compared with business organizations, such organizations should have problems in harmonizing the possibly conflicting interests of clients and sponsors. First, there is not a necessary relationship between the quality of service rendered to clients and the input of resources. Secondly, clients sent to these organizations are usually involuntary participants.

Evaluation of Output. It is obvious that any large-scale organization must satisfy the needs of others in the society by its output if it is to continue in existence. Organizational stability is dependent upon how successful it is in fulfilling its custodial and rehabilitative tasks with the allotted resources. Unlike a private business which may go into bankruptcy if it fails to offer a satisfactory product, correctional in-

stitutions monopolistically meet a continuing need of our society. Thus, lack of organizational success in satisfying this need is more likely to lead to a turnover of executive personnel.

The output of the correctional organization is evaluated by the agencies directly in contact with it, and, more diffusely, by the general public. The broader public usually becomes involved in the organization only when: (1) the organization does not maintain control over those committed to it, as reflected in riots or escapes; (2) some level of care dictated by the standards of the times is not maintained; (3) public norms of humanitarian treatment are violated. Public officials, professional associations, and crusading journalists may bring pressure to bear when the second and third conditions occur as judged by professional criteria. Ohlin and Pappenfort have pointed out that there are many possible incidents which could be used to threaten organizational stability. Only a few of these are actually turned into crises, sometimes by external organizations or associations (22).

The rehabilitative output of the organization can be judged in terms of several criteria. It can be judged by evaluating the recidivism rate of released clients, by evaluating the "personality" changes occurring while in the institution, or by evaluating the degree to which the organization meets standards (empirical or theoretical) which are supposed to insure success. At best, however, rehabilitation seems to "pay off" to the society at large only in the long run. However, when there are either runaways or other "incidents" the larger public is quick to apply pressure. Since control and rehabilitation are not always compatible and since rehabilitation is a vague and difficult to establish criterion, a continuous pressure for emphasizing control instead of rehabilitation is implied, if an institution is to be free of demands for reorganization.

In addition to official agencies directly related to the institution, various professional associations influence operations by establishing standards for their members and for organizations utilizing the members' services. Social work, psychiatric, correctional, medical, and educational associations all formulate standards which can be utilized in defense of their functions, and which are related to their "professional images." Sociologists have, unfortunately, rarely studied the relationships *between* organizations. As Levine, White, and Pierson note, sociologists make many assumptions about the interaction of organizations, but few study it directly (14). Ohlin's paper "Interest Group Conflict and Correctional Objectives," is one of the few exceptions to this generalization (20).

An institution may attempt to create sources of support by coopting elements of the local community (29). Cooptation may involve the formation of citizens' advisory committees or the encouragement of volunteer activities for the institution. Such devices, while helping to create a stable relationship with the community, may also lead to lessened organizational autonomy, problems of internal coordination, and others.

Demographic Characteristics of Staff and Clients. The external environment effects not only the type and amount of resources allocated to the institution but also affects its personnel and clientele. The state of the local labor market may markedly affect the character of institutional personnel. For instance, a college community can provide staff at the lower levels quite different from an industrial community in terms of their orientation toward juvenile offenders. This does not imply that college students *per se* are more desirable as rehabilitative employees. Rather, a college community provides a large number of potential employees whose ideologies

may be more compatible with the rehabilitative philosophy, but whose student status precludes high salary demands. However, use of college students leads to high turnover and other instabilities (15, p. 23). Further, the opportunity for various types of activities, for both clients and staff, will vary from community to community. The size of the local community may also determine the off-the-job social relations of the staff. The isolation of some institutions increases the dependence of the staff upon each other for social activity, heightening the communal aspects of the institution.

The characteristics of the clients are to an even greater extent affected by the environment of the institution. Clients are provided the organization by the courts. Operating under mandates from the legal system, the courts must determine who among their clientele are to be sent to correctional institutions and how the clients are to be treated. This complex decision involves a variety of factors, such as the available capacity of institutions in the area, the nature of the offense and the available ways of dealing with the offender. The nature of this decision may be systematic apart from the requirements for admission formally set by an institution. For example, offenders may be sent to the institution in the absence of a reasonable alternative and not with the intention of thereby protecting society or rehabilitating delinquents. If this were a constant practice, it would affect organizational operation at several points including, among others, its discharge policy and process, its training program, its distribution of facilities, and the nature of its clientele. Some of these problems have been dealt with in social work research concerning the intake and referral systems of agencies. However, this research tends to be administrative rather than sociological.

The type of community from which the delinquent comes may also influ-

ence his values and orientations. The physical isolation of the correctional institution also contributes to the degree of deprivation that the delinquent feels; e.g., he may be deprived of contacts with family and peers.

Client characteristics together with the input of facilities largely determine the degree to which various organizational goals can be pursued. If, as workers in the field claim (13, p. 34) delinquents have become more aggressive, brutal, and acting-out in their anti-social acts, more organizational activity may have to be devoted to meeting custodial requirements in order to placate the surrounding community.

THE INTERNAL SYSTEM

Within an institution power and resources are distributed to maintain stability and attain goals. However, depending upon the distribution of power and the ideology of key personnel goals may be redefined and reshaped to differing specifications than those held by the governing board of the institution. The translation of goals into organizational practice can be shown by discussing three sets of interpersonal relationships; (1) staff relationships with other staff, (2) staff relationships with clients, and (3) client relationships with clients.

Staff-staff relations. The formal table of organization of the correctional institution defines the positions and the authority relations among positions that are supposed to characterize the institution. At a minimum, the table indicates a superintendent and an assistant superintendent; teachers, a nurse; a business and maintenance staff; and a staff variously called cottage parents, attendants, or supervisors. Even the most custodial institution for delinquents must have teachers, for in most states the law requires that children under sixteen years of age go to school. As institutions adopt contemporary modes of differentiating and treating delin-

quents, psychologists, psychiatrists, and social workers are added to the staff. The formal organization is not synonymous with the actual organization, nor is it complete. Any discussion of the internal structure of a correctional institution must include an analysis of the informal structure of the staff—as well as the social organization of the clientele. McCleery (16, 17), John and Elaine Cummings (11, pp. 50-72) and Novick (19) have shown that even on the formal level, however, the correctional institutions with different goal orientations will differ sharply in their authority structures; decentralization of power tending to be greater in rehabilitative institutions.

The existence in the organization of more than one goal raises the probability of role behavior having to meet diverse criteria. It allows conflict to develop between position occupants whose individual tasks are associated with the divergent goals. Thus, cottage parents and counselors whose performances largely are judged, respectively, in terms of their contributions to custodial and rehabilitative goals and whose perspectives are largely shaped by these goals, will often find themselves in conflict (37). "Interest groups" may form in any organization. But the value of their effects on the organization can usually be determined by reference to the dominant goal. In correctional institutions a group may develop an ideology, defenses, and norms which further its goal and its power and prestige at the expense of another group's goals and power (1, pp. 123-144; 23; 36).

Correctional institutions with marked custodial orientations are characterized by the relatively high actual power of the cottage parent and custodial staff, while institutions with predominantly rehabilitative orientations raise the power level of rehabilitative positions, defining custodial roles in relation to the rehabilitative function and lowering the power of the cottage staff. In

many cases, where the definition of goals is in flux and unstable, inter-group conflict may be chronic or the external and internal necessities of control will emphasize custodial goals by default. For example, eligibility for discharge, in theory a rehabilitative decision, may be manipulated by the custodial staff as a control sanction.

Even if inter-group conflict is minimal, conflicting role expectations of the administration may lead to intra-role conflict. Thus the cottage counselors at one of the schools described in the MacIver report on institutions for delinquents seem to be subject to extreme role strain (16, p. 23). Cressey (8) and Grusky (13) have described such conflicts in a prison setting and in the setting of a minimum security camp. In less custodial institutions the cottage parent is generally asked to maintain control but is not, from his point of view, given the sanctions to do his job right.

Since correctional institutions are often in an unstable relation to their environment, superintendents typically find a good deal of their time taken up with organizational defense; that is, with protecting the organization and maximizing the receipt of facilities and legitimation (36). The superintendent may be led to abrogate his authority to personnel that insure organizational stability. The combination of chronic pressure to economize, the inherent difficulty of evaluating the efficacy of rehabilitative policy, and the need to maintain organizational stability and control create recurring pressures that minimize the rehabilitative orientation. However, there is evidence that various organizations of personnel and policy are compatible with a given budget, and, furthermore, that adequate funds do not insure rehabilitative organization (21).

A typical bifurcation occurs along professional - non - professional lines. Part of the staff is highly educated,

trained, middle class, and professionally oriented, while another part tends to be poorly trained, have little education and is of lower class origin. Status distinctions may lead to restricted communication between groups, turning each into a closed social unit similar to the status-linked groupings in hospitals.

Adult members of lower status groups have difficulty gaining access to higher status groups. In contrast, many organizations provide defined channels of mobility by which members can rise in the organization. Blocked upward mobility increases the individual's dependence on his own status group for support and solidifies the group as a unit for social control. This tends to raise the power of key custodial personnel through their ability to reward or punish individuals dependent on them. Thus effective institutionalization of rehabilitative policy is further blocked. Barriers to communication and interaction are probably lowest between the maintenance staff and the custodial staff, allowing informal patterns of cooperation to develop. Some institutions have developed committee mechanisms to help bridge this gap (5, 19).

Staff-client relations. As compared with most organizations in our society, staff-client relationships differ significantly in the juvenile correctional institution. Basic to this difference are four characteristics: (1) clientele and staff form a community; (2) the clients typically are drawn from a low social class and are social deviants; (3) staff are in a clearly superordinate position in relation to clients; and (4) adult and adolescent cultures are markedly divergent in our society. The fact that the staff associate almost continuously with the clients means that relationships tend to diffuseness, particularism, and affectivity; staff may easily develop warm relationships with some boys and none at all with

others. This is in contrast with most bureaucratic organizations in which the relationships with clients tend towards specificity, universalism, and affective-neutrality. In most correctional institutions the cottage personnel tend to interact on a more intimate, diffuse, and personalized basis with the delinquents than do the rehabilitative, professional staff. The professional staff tend to interact on a segmented and specific basis with the clients (12). Thus, in many ways, lower level staff have more chance to establish warm, supportive relationships than anyone else, which according to current theory, are necessary for changing identifications and values. Yet, the demands of the role of the cottage parent and his own attitudes may only reinforce the boys' estrangement from society. Cottage staff find themselves confronted with the problem of managing from 15 to 70 boys. They must accomplish routine housekeeping, keep order, and prevent escapes. Unlike prisons, juvenile institutions usually do not even provide a wall to contain the delinquents. Few sanctions are available to the cottage staff; they have little training, often get little positive support from the professionals or the administration, and are most readily evaluated in terms of the visible criteria of control and cleanliness.

The correctional institution must maintain discipline and minimize violence in a population that has demonstrated its own lack of personal controls. The difficulty of maintaining control will vary with the age, sex, and traits of the delinquents that the institution serves. Since rewards may be largely controlled by staff, they have the opportunity to develop a variety of reward structures to achieve ends. However, the reward structure is a reflection not only of the ends sought but also of staff perspectives on what means will achieve these ends. This entails a view of the nature of the clientele and how they will respond (an

implicit learning and behavior theory).

As stated by Gilbert and Levinson (11, pp. 20-36), the custodial orientation gives rise to an ideology that focuses upon the inherent nature of the client's difficulty and his lack of malleability. The ideology stresses rigid distinctions between types of people and the use of authoritarian techniques of interpersonal control. In contrast, the ideology of rehabilitation and therapy focuses on the socio-psychological causes of deviancy, on malleability and on permissiveness in interpersonal relations.

The utilization of sanction structures and interpersonal relationships congruent with these ideologies may have great effect upon client attitudes and upon client informal organization (12; 27). Client attitudes may be hostile to the organization, or docile but distant, or cooperative and cynical, or cooperative and personally involved in the institution's program. An instructive comparison of attitudes can be made from the description of attitudes reported by Clemmer (4, p. 152) and McCorkle, Elias and Bixby (18, pp. 109-157). Our knowledge in this area has been gained predominantly with prison populations. We would expect anti-social and anti-organizational attitudes to be less crystallized for juvenile offenders than for adult criminals. Therefore, the institution should be able to have a greater effect upon the former.

Staff-client relations in an institution with custodial goals tend to be more restrictive than in a rehabilitative institution. They are more "rule-oriented" and work to maintain social distance between staff and client. In ideal form they serve to maintain an objective fairness. At worst, favoritism and individual bargaining take place (32).

Client-client relations. Rehabilitation implies a substitution of positive social values for anti-social values. Yet it has long been said that the major

product of penal institutions is the teaching of criminal values. If it is assumed that the juvenile delinquent is more amenable to change than the adult offender and is less committed to anti-social patterns, then the values esteemed by the client informal organization may be crucial in negating or supporting delinquent behavior patterns.

The incoming delinquent is completely dependent upon other offenders and upon staff for all social gratifications and deprivations, and for many definitions of cognitive reality. Thus, other clients serve as a major socialization agent to organizational practices and perspectives. As in any social system, clients rank actors and behave towards them in terms of a set of relevant criteria. The new client must, if he or she is to gain status and its rewards, adequately meet these criteria.

To a certain extent status criteria are imported into the organization. Instrumental and socio-emotional leadership have a degree of similarity in both delinquent and nondelinquent peer groups. Sophistication, athletic ability, personal appearance, strength, personality characteristics are all brought with the boy into the organization. However, the criteria that may be most affected by institutional practices are also those that are most relevant to rehabilitative goals. For instance, client organization may stress "con" values — the unfairness of society and staff, and the necessity of proving one's worth by anti-social behavior; or it may stress the necessity of facing reality, being fair, and proving one's worth by socially approved means.

Like the mental hospital which must accommodate the hospital to the patient, correctional institutions with rehabilitative aims cannot merely force the offender to accommodate to it. They require voluntaristic participation and identification. We would expect client organization to favor attitudes that support goals of rehabilita-

tion the more the clients perceive the staff as working for the interests of the clients.* When there is not this perception overt compliance may take place, but covertly rehabilitative goals are sabotaged. Professional staff working in predominantly custodial institutions have often found themselves being "used" by the other staff and by the clients.

Some kind of *modus vivendi* must be reached between client leadership and staff in any institution if perpetual crisis is to be avoided. Staff in an institution have something to bargain with. They can "sell" prerogatives, positions, and psychological rewards. And what they "sell" influences not only the ranking criteria but also the structure of client organization. Structures can be found ranging from those that are hierarchically organized around the control of violence and communication to those that are less rigid and decentralized (16; 38). The multiple goals of most institutions affect client structure by: (1) introducing inconsistencies into the relationships between staff and clients; (2) allowing clients to play off one staff group against the other; and (3) by presenting client organization with an unstable situation. The existence of conflicting staff groups contributes to the breakdown of a rigid client structure by giving access to facilities to clients who are not among the more influential of the clients, thus breaching the monolithic client system of more custodial institutions or prisons.

The ability of the institution to affect client organization is also dependent upon the personality structure of the offender. Reiss's investigations would imply that the "Relatively Integrated" delinquent should be more

*In many ways delinquents stand in a relation to the organization similar to the primary members of military or industrial organizations. Their identification with the organization seems to be a crucial determinant of their organizational behavior.

adaptive than either the "Defective Super-Ego" or the "Weak Ego" offender (25; 26). Since the delinquent sub-culture supports the values of the peer group, the problem of the correctional institution is to structure the situation so that the anti-social values of the primary group are replaced by more positive ones (6). Rehabilitation of the "Defective Super-Ego" and the "Weak Ego" offender may well require both extinction of delinquent values and development of socially approved values by therapeutic techniques.

CONCLUSIONS

We have attempted to delineate the character of correctional institutions for delinquents. Reflecting a growing body of literature, the analysis has stressed the fact, that, like other large-scale organizations, these dependent institutions are involved in a web of relationships with the external environment.

Strategically, the analysis has proceeded from the characteristics of the goals and the external environment to the structured relationships of the staff and their effects upon client behavior. Some of the characteristics which are most striking about correctional institutions are (a) the critical climate of opinion in which they operate; (b) the fact that they are resource-deprived institutions; (c) the abstract quality of rehabilitative goals and the difficulty of proving one technique to be more successful than another; (d) the multiplicity of functions assigned the institutions; and finally (e) the fact that these are "total institutions."

Correctional institutions will vary along many of the dimensions discussed. For example, we should not expect all local communities to have equal tolerance of escapees. The size of the community, its history, and other factors will condition its reaction to the institution. Similarly we

should not expect all guards or cottage parents to develop ideologies congruent with the goals of the organization. Future research must be directed at ascertaining the conditions under which the phenomena herein described occur.

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IMAGES OF WITHDRAWAL BEHAVIOR IN DISASTERS: SOME BASIC MISCONCEPTIONS

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In the last decade, the research efforts of social scientists have increasingly been directed to the reaction of people and communities in disaster situations (5; 9; 17; 28; 29). Much of the research has been stimulated by the threat posed for American society by nuclear warfare and the necessity of deriving civilian defense measures (20; 45). However, disasters are not confined to wartime and research in the area has theoretical as well as practical implications. The present paper assumes this larger framework.

Various studies have uncovered basic misconceptions about human behavior in disasters. This paper brings together such findings concerning one selected kind of disaster reaction. Our starting point is the perspective of those persons or organizations who are most involved in disaster control and relief activities. Most agencies and officials assume victim populations withdraw as soon as possible from impact areas (23). This assumption involves three not altogether consistent images of withdrawal behavior. One image is that of "panic"; another is that of "dependency". Additionally superimposed on these two images is another one of "control". That is, whether withdrawal be thought of in the form of panic and/or dependency, the assumption is made that such behavior can be controlled. Certain mis-

conceptions about all three images will be examined.

THE "PANIC" IMAGE

Withdrawal behavior is often visualized as taking the form of highly disorganized flight by hysterical individuals who have stampeded at the sight of actual or potential danger. The flight is pictured as marked by irrational decisions, illogical actions, and an anti-social disregard for others. In general, the expectation is one of widespread personal and social chaos as the disaster victims flee.

As depicted, this image might appear extreme. However it is the implicit image that is operative in many cases. This can be seen in what officials and administrators assume in their planning and thinking, as well as in what they do and decide about disaster problems.

The expectation of a panicky form of withdrawal is illustrated, for instance, in a recent statement on community disasters prepared for the guidance of nurses. Panic is stated as being one of the five most common reactions to disasters, if not the most common. The behavior is said to be characterized by a:

... "blind flight" reaction, manifested by wild running about . . . or otherwise disorganized hysterical behavior. Absence of judgment and logical thinking will be conspicuous. Such an individual requires prompt and effective action, both to protect him from the consequences of his undirected behavior and to prevent his panic from spreading throughout the group (34, p. 437).

Also indicative of the image held is the failure of responsible officials, at times, to take appropriate actions during pre-impact periods of possible disasters because of their anxiety about initiating panic. For example, city officials and state police refused to order

The author has in the past worked as a member of the Disaster Team of the National Opinion Research Center, and as a consultant to the Committee on Disaster Studies (now called the Disaster Research Group) of the National Research Council. Some of the examples used, and part of the analysis set forth, were obtained as a result of this work. However, the views expressed and the interpretations of the data are solely the responsibility of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the opinions of any of these organizations.

the evacuation of an eastern ocean resort, despite the urgent recommendations of the Weather Bureau and the Coast Guard, because they feared such action on their part would precipitate a panicky flight. They preferred to chance the danger of inaction, even though they knew the intensity of the hurricane heading for their low lying area, and the likelihood that the two routes from the city would become impassable if the storm were of the magnitude predicted (22, p. 5).

Concern over evoking panicky reactions sometime hinders even the alerting of people to possible dangers. Thus during the Rio Grande floods, some Mexican and American officials felt that they had to play down warnings otherwise people would panic (6). Because of a similar concern, forecasts of tornado conditions were not issued prior to the Worcester tornado (37). In a much more circumscribed crisis situation but because of this same fear of initiating panic, alarm bells were not rung on the collision-doomed *Andrea Doria* (36).

Much civilian defense planning in this country also assumes that not only will withdrawal be inevitable, but that it will be markedly maladaptive, unthinking, and contagious behavior. The major control problem is seen as one of stopping a panicky exodus. This is manifested in official articles (one by the former Civil Defense [CD] head very aptly illustrating our point by being called — *Panic, the Ultimate Weapon?*) (32), manuals, conferences, committee reports, and the literature distributed by many state and local CD agencies (10; 11; 16; 18; 22; 24). The narrowness of the focus is pinpointed by the observation made in a critique of a CD walkout exercise that "the problem of evacuation has largely been visualized up to now as being one of holding back the public from fleeing the city in a rout" (23, p. 7).

This is not a distinctively American cultural reaction. Prior to World War II, British planners also proceeded on the assumption that in the event of war:

... a large exodus from London and other cities was inevitable; panic would send the people out and unless the Government took firm control ... chaos and confusion were bound to ensue. . . . In its deliberations, the question was viewed not as a problem of getting people away, but as a problem of preventing panic flight. This led . . . to the suggestion that the [police] force should be enlarged and a cordon thrown round London. So convinced was the committee . . . that a "disorderly general flight" would take place that it felt it could not carry its study further until a decision had been reached on "how control of the population was to be exercised." (46, p. 23).

Nothing remotely approaching these expectations materialized. People showed a great reluctance to leave. For example, only 37 per cent of the total evacuable number of mothers and children left London (21, p. 79). This is the actual problem in most peace and wartime disasters—that of getting movement rather than preventing it. This should not be surprising. Human beings have a very strong tendency to continue with their on-going lines of action in preference to initiating new courses of activity.

Where the disaster threat is slow moving as in the instance of floods, this tendency inevitably poses a task of major magnitude for control officials. Studies of and reports about dozens of floods in American society consistently mention a reluctance to withdraw (23). However, this is not a peculiarly American cultural trait. It has similarly been reported for flood-threatened Mexican, English, Dutch, and Italian groups. In some of these instances, even the threat of force and coercive measures were not enough to motivate all inhabitants to leave their endangered areas (23).

Nor is this tendency to remain in

threatened locations confined to flood situations. An unwillingness to withdraw has been documented for disasters ranging from maritime catastrophes to air attacks on metropolitan areas to avalanches advancing on mountain villages (16; 21; 36; 46). It also has been reported for threats which endure and increase in intensity like epidemics, and for those marked by brief violent impact such as explosions (23; 28).

Sometime even when their physical world is literally disintegrating around them, substantial number of individuals refuse to withdraw from the impact area. What may appear to be an objectively impossible stress situation to an outsider, may not be so subjectively defined by the persons involved. For example, Bootle, England, a city of about 55,000 people was bombed nightly for a week. Sixty per cent of all houses were damaged at least twice, and only 10 per cent escaped serious damage. Community facilities were shattered and all the main roads for motor transportation were blocked. Yet despite this extensive damage, with all its consequent effects on food distribution, gas, water, and public services in general, around one fourth of the population remained to sleep in their homes throughout the raids (46, p. 311).

Mass media accounts frequently report "thousands" or whole communities fleeing upon the receipt of hurricane warnings. However, systematic studies of such situations do not bear out these accounts. Thus despite intensive warnings about Hurricane Florence, 66 per cent of the interviewed respondents in a Florida town did not leave their homes. Only about 17 per cent went to the shelters prepared by authorities (23, p. 8). In a New England city hit by Hurricane Carol and Edna in quick succession, only 4 per cent of the inhabitants evacuated each time (33). The evi-

dence suggests that such withdrawal behavior as does occur, is by transients such as tourists and not by the resident population (23).

Just as disaster agencies generally overestimate withdrawal because of the panic image, so do the mass communication agencies. This is true even when the news sources are present in the impact area. For example, there was an exodus from flood stricken Port Jervis, New York, when a false rumor spread about a dam break. Local newspaper accounts said "most of the city" of 9,000 inhabitants had fled. An actual field study showed that at a very maximum perhaps one fourth might have evacuated (8, p. 10).

People not only do not bolt from endangered areas; they sometimes return to them if they have left even though the threat is still existent. This is well illustrated in the return to their home towns by many German and English war-time evacuees. Over 60 per cent of the British government-sponsored evacuees had returned four months after their initial evacuation (21, p. 89). This drift back continued at a steady rate and despite official pleas, to areas that were prime targets for air and rocket attacks. At a time when the city was being bombed every night, even children were being brought back to London at nearly as rapid a rate as they were being evacuated (46). Similarly in Germany, children were brought back in the face of governmental efforts to discourage it by refusing to provide schooling or ration cards (21, p. 90). The same drift back to threatened areas has also been reported for prolonged epidemics (23). To be sure, if severity of threat continues to increase as in the instance of the air attacks on Japan, there is a gradual increase in withdrawal with fewer return movements (21). Nevertheless, the overall picture is clearly far from one of people wildly fleeing upon a sign of danger.

Scientific studies of disasters do not bear out the existence of pandemonium and chaos, or the extensive panic-stricken reactions frequently reported in journalistic and popular accounts, or by involved observers (e.g., relief personnel). Much of the discrepancy between the two versions lies in the failure of the non-scientist to note a distinction between personal and social disorganization. As W. I. Thomas pointed out long ago, one can be present without the other. In disasters there often is *relatively* widespread social or community disorganization concurrent with lack of disorganization at the individual and small group level.

Thus Clifford in his study of the Rio Grande flood, noted that organized rescue and evacuation by community agencies in the areas of greatest danger all but totally collapsed. Less than 5 per cent of the 30,000 evacuees from Piedras Negras, Mexico were helped by any organization at all (7, p. 84). However, in the absence of community wide coordination the inhabitants continued to act out their family and friendship roles. At the individual and small group level there was relatively deliberate behavior and much mutual assistance in evacuating the area. Thus on the American side, in Eagle Pass, 26 per cent of the respondents received help in evacuating from their immediate family, 20 per cent from other relatives, and 50 per cent from friends and neighbors (7, p. 118). In this and in drastically different kinds of disasters (e.g., the Texas City explosion) (27), below the community level, there was not the disorganization in fleeing from the disaster scene that is assumed in the panic image.

In addition to confusing social and personal disorganization, there is also a frequent failure to recognize that involved individuals and groups are often acting on the basis of different definitions of the disaster situation. This is illustrated in the behavior ex-

hibited during a series of house explosions in a Rochester, New York suburb. Viewed from the vantage point of an airplane, the withdrawal that was occurring might seem chaotic, and generally analogous to the helter-skelter observable if an ant hill is toppled over. However, a study revealed that viewed from the perspective of participants, there was *relatively* reasoned, controlled, logical and adaptive withdrawing from specific points of danger. In the course of interacting with others, divergent definitions of places of safety were developed, and accordingly led to different withdrawal patterns. As the NORC report stated:

Although people engaged in a crowd-like behavior . . . all critical judgment was not lost. People talked over the merits of moving from one place to another. They discussed the advisability of fleeing from the area altogether. There was a tendency to respond rather quickly to some suggestion on the part of others, but on the whole, people remained somewhat discriminating—taking into consideration various aspects of the situation as they saw them.

By far the most common activity that emerged out of the interaction of members of milling groups was a type of withdrawal behavior. As people talked over the event among themselves they would decide that some particular location, such as a backyard or the lawn in front of an all electric house, was a position of relative safety. On the basis of the group consensus they would then move to those places. . . . Some people left the area . . . because they felt the area in general to be an unsafe place with houses exploding all around them (28, pp. 135-136).

Another reason why the overall picture of withdrawal behavior that emerges from various disaster studies is drastically different from that implied in the "panic" image, is because the latter image fails to note the difference between flight and panic flight. The two are not equivalent. Panic is flight where the individual ceases to play any social role whatsoever and merely flees (36; 38; 39). Withdrawal that assumes this form is extremely

rare. Most withdrawal behavior involves definite role playing especially along lines of primary group ties. Thus in the precipitous so-called "panic flight" from Port Jervis (mentioned earlier) there was no solitary flight, and 23 per cent of those fleeing even made attempts to assist community members other than those who were in their own original fleeing group (8).

Additionally, when panic does occur it is very seldom on a large scale. Panic flights are almost always highly localized episodes, with few participants, and of short duration. In fact, except for some instances involving armies, the author after eight years of intensively seeking for such cases, can not cite a single clear cut instance where more than three or four score people were involved. The often cited case of the Invasion from Mars broadcast did not involve withdrawal leading to cessation of all role playing or much flight for that matter. (Even the Cantril study reported that around 84 per cent of the audience was in no way disturbed by the broadcast [4]). Many supposed cases of "mass panic", upon examination turn out to be crisis situations where behavior other than flight was manifested.

Even in those rare situations where panic does occur, the majority of participants in the situation seldom engage in panic flight. Here again as in the instance of the Martian broadcast, incorrect versions prevail regarding what happened in historically famous cases like the Cocoanut Grove night club fire or the Iroquois theatre fire. The available evidence fairly clearly suggests that panic was not the model form of withdrawal even in those highly circumscribed situations (36). More systematic studies of very extensive disasters like the California earthquake of 1952, or the two atomic bombings definitely indicate that the overwhelming majority of persons did

not panic in such cataclysmic circumstances either. Only very isolated instances of such flight behavior were found (21; 36).

The evidence is conclusive that when withdrawal does occur, it does not manifest itself in the way implied in the "panic" image. Such narrow emphasis on and concern with panic is actually dysfunctional. It results in a failure to predict and to be responsive to the stress behaviors that do occur. It leads to the overlooking of more important problems that do arise in connection with withdrawal.

THE "DEPENDENCY" IMAGE

In contrast to the hyperactivity assumed in the "panic" image, the "dependency" image embodies the idea of passivity. Withdrawal is visualized as taking the form of officially guided evacuations by helpless victims, who are so devoid of initiative that everything has to be done for them. The picture is one of docile and impotent individuals, waiting childlike for someone to take care of them. In general, the expectation is almost one of apathetic dependency on "Big Brothers" in the guise of relief workers and welfare planners.

Here again the image might appear overdrawn. However, it is an implicit one that clearly guides the thinking and planning of many disaster-concerned organizations and their personnel. Field procedures of various agencies and designers of disaster plans generally assume that the bulk of disaster victims will attain personal safety and comfort mostly through the resources of official sources. Or in the words of a former Red Cross president, agency help is needed because disasters create:

shock . . . uncertainty, crippling anxiety, - loss of confidence, discouragement, dependence . . . at the very time when the needs for social helpfulness are greatest and most acute, the normal protective and helping processes are inoperative or disrupted (3, p. 110).

There is some limited evidence of a "disaster syndrome." The initial stages of this reaction involve a state of apathy or shock leading to a regression in normal cognitive processes. It has been reported occurring following relatively sudden, violent-type catastrophes (47; 49).

However the "disaster syndrome" appears only in the more traumatic kinds of disasters, is confined to the post impact period, and is of short duration (its initial stage seldom enduring more than minutes or hours (9; 23). More important, the reaction does not occur on a large scale. Some disaster researchers have speculated that it might affect anywhere from 33 to 75 per cent of disaster victims (47, p. 152; 49, p. 110). But one of the few disaster studies that used an area probability sample, found that only 14 per cent of all respondents may have manifested the initial stages of the syndrome (15, p. 39). In the Flint-Beecher, Michigan tornado a figure of less than 20 per cent was reported (14, p. 86). There is evidence too that the reaction is culturally structured. It has not been observed in studies of responses to typhoons on Yap nor in reactions to explosive and destructive volcanic eruptions among the Orokaivas in New Guinea (25; 41).

Disaster victims react in an active manner, not passively as implied in the dependency image. They do not just wait around for offers of aid by organizations. They act on their own, sometime even contrary to the expressed wishes of formal agencies and public authorities. On a large scale, once they have started to react to the crisis, victims show personal initiative and a pattern of self and informal mutual help. Observations of flood evacuees in India suggest this is true even in societies passively oriented towards nature, and with a fatalistic attitude about personal crises and problems (36).

In general, disaster victims work out their own private withdrawal arrangements. For example, when a tornado hit Worcester, approximately 10,000 persons were made homeless. However, only about 50 individuals were housed by the public authorities. Displaced persons instead moved in with other family members, intimates, neighbors, and generally ignored the formal agencies (40). Such behavior additionally suggests an exaggeration of the belief regarding weakened kinship and primary ties in modern mass societies, and the full transfer of protective functions from the family to large scale organizations (35).

Viewed cross-culturally, the network of informal social relationships of societies seems to come especially to the fore in situations of this kind. Extensive mutual and self help and disregard of official sources has been documented for English flood evacuees and Japanese bombing refugees (23; 50). In one Mexican flood only 4.7 per cent of around 40,000 of those who evacuated received aid of an official organization. They relied instead on the help of friends and neighbors (7, p. 84). Data from wartime evacuations also report the same strong independent and avoidance behavior. Of around 1,400,000 persons made homeless in the London region, only about one in seven passed through the official rest centers provided (46, p. 301).

Even when the housing facilities of a whole community undergo complete or great destruction, there is still no inevitable movement towards emergency mass shelters. When 55 per cent of Eagle Pass, Texas, a city of 10,000 was inundated and other sections were threatened, only 350 persons made use of the available mass shelters in safe public buildings (6). Similarly in the 1955 California floods, in the hardest hit area, over 50,000 people had to evacuate their homes. However, 38 Red Cross shelters in 13

towns registered only 9,260 persons, around 18 per cent of all the evacuees (43, p. 163).

Mass shelters are seldom used for the purpose for which they are originally established. For instance, from 15,000 to 20,000 persons were forced by a flash flood to evacuate Vanport, Oregon. Less than 15 per cent of the evacuees, however, went to the more than 20 public shelters set up in nearby Portland (1). These shelters were therefore transformed into temporary food and clothing distribution centers. This often happens in disaster situations and could be viewed positively. What otherwise might not be available (i.e., distribution centers), are frequently ready at hand to be used as relief and rehabilitation activities are commenced. In this way perhaps, the misconception of dependency might be considered as having at least one positive latent function for relief operations.

In general, as in the instance of the expectation of "panic," an anticipation of "dependency" leads to a looking for what does not occur, with a consequent misdirection of organizational activity, and a failure to foresee and adequately provide for that which does occur. Thus in an Arkansas tornado, since the destruction of housing in some towns was close to 100 per cent, extensive preparations were made to receive and house evacuees in dormitories and public buildings. However, all but 2 per cent of the victims went elsewhere. There was little relationship between the time, energy, and personnel mobilized to prepare the emergency quarters and the actual usage of those facilities. In the process furthermore, crucial needs were ignored — e.g., the necessity of a centralized clearing house of information regarding whereabouts and conditions of evacuated victims (23). In many disasters moreover, the dependency image is actively dysfunctional in that it often leads to the duplication of un-

necessary efforts and an intensification of the already existing societal confusion.

The pattern of mutual and self help also prevails in other withdrawal activities besides that of obtaining shelter. Victims repeatedly show an ability, particularly when working in small informal groups, to cope with most immediate disaster problems (except those requiring highly specialized skills or special equipment as in some kinds of medical treatment). In the Flint-Beecher tornado the victim and fringe population, with almost no aid from formal agencies were able within 3 to 4 hours to rescue and bring to nearby hospitals from two thirds to three fourths of the 927 casualties. In fact, less than a fifth of the disaster-struck population had *any* contact at all with organizations during the early hours of the emergency period (14, p. 117).

Even in the most extensive disasters the formal agencies contact but a relative fraction of all victims. Thus the official statistics of the American Red Cross clearly show that emergency mass care was given to but a relatively small proportion of victims in any of its principal disaster relief operations from 1906 to 1955 (42, pp. 121-122). Similarly, in a systematic study NORC found that in a post-tornado impact period of three weeks, only around a third of the respondents had had contact of any kind with either the Red Cross or the Salvation Army (28).

The evidence is fairly strong that far from seeking and being dependent on formal disaster organizations, these are the last source that people turn to for help when seeking to cope with crisis-created problems. Rosow has well depicted the hierarchy of assistance seeking. He noted:

... the hierarchy of orientation in seeking and giving help ran from informal, intimate groups to formal, less familiar agencies. . . .

Sources of help could be ranked in an

order of preference or closeness to the person. People sought help first from family and intimates. Then they turned to larger membership groups where they felt a sense of belonging (*viz.*, church, occasionally place of work, etc.). They looked next to other individual members of the community (casual acquaintances and strangers). Only then, fourth, did they turn to more impersonal formal organizations. These were almost invariably the most familiar, established community institutions (*viz.*, radio stations, police, welfare department, etc.). Their final source was the group of special disaster agencies (*viz.*, Red Cross, Civil Defense, etc.).

... the general responses ... characterized by *informal self help and spontaneous mutual aid* rather than a reliance on public services ... caused inexperienced authorities to over-estimate the welfare needs in food, housing and clothing which they would be called upon to provide (40, pp. 87-88).

To emphasize the reasonable and striving behavior of persons in withdrawal is not to deny the importance and fundamental need for planning and actions by formal agencies. Under most circumstances, and especially the wider the scope of the disaster, organizations can do much to ameliorate and soften the problems involved in any sort of withdrawal. Nevertheless, it is a fact that responsible agencies and officials often have the incorrect images of "panic" and/or "dependency" discussed above with consequent inefficiencies and dysfunctionalities in their operations.*

In summary, even under very severe

*That misconceptions are not the monopoly of organizational personnel and the general populace only, can be illustrated by noting this statement in a 1956 text on social control:

In times of crisis such as induced by tornado, fire, flood, explosion, or destruction by war, the old habits of life are suddenly destroyed, and all existing systems of control ... are temporarily thrown out of gear. The entire social mechanism is thrown out of line. General chaos reigns. ... Orderly rescue work and reconstruction are impossible until some authority takes charge (26, p. 399).

stress people do not become completely irresponsible or totally impotent; rather they seek in conjunction with others to solve their withdrawal problems in those ways that appear most reasonable to them as they view the situation. Generally the same can be said of them that has been said of combat soldiers: "Under the most harrowing circumstances, they are able to control fear or anxiety, to think clearly and to make appropriate decisions with rapidity" (19, pp. 53-54).

THE "CONTROL" IMAGE

Whether it be thought in terms of the "panic" and/or "dependency" images, it is also implicitly assumed by most disaster authorities that withdrawal can be controlled to a very high degree. Many formal disaster plans specify in fine details the supposed ways of controlling all but the most ephemeral of withdrawal behavior. Rather extensive structuring of the behavior is envisioned as possible, actually as well as ideally.

Unlike the other two this image might not appear overdrawn but simply obvious. This is the image disaster agencies would be expected to have. However, this is just the point. Seldom in the thinking and planning of disaster administrators, is any question raised about the basic feasibility of such social engineering. The objective is taken for granted and it is assumed that means can be devised to achieve it.

There is even a tendency to view any "unplanned" withdrawal as unfortunate and disruptive behavior. As one agency official remarked about some upper New York state flood victims: "These darn people going off and doing things for themselves are just making a mess out of things. We can't send them off the right way and keep proper track of them" (36). A similar attitude was more formally expressed by an advisory committee for civil defense which stated that:

After civilian disaster due to enemy action, unregulated evacuation should be de-emphasized and rigidly controlled. Any but the most carefully regulated and disciplined evacuation will tend to disrupt transport, clog roads, dissolve group and family ties, and tear the individual away from any useful group role in disaster control and restoration of the community (2, p. 4).

Any formal organization or governmental agency with enough physical force at its disposal can move relatively rapidly large blocs of people. However, this has happened only where the reactions of the people involved were of no great import, and where the circumstances were defined as unusual even for a time of crisis. Thus during World War II, the U. S. government evacuated around 100,000 Japanese-Americans from the West Coast and the Soviet government transplanted certain ethnic groups from southern Russia to its Eastern areas, in both cases the moves being justified on the grounds of suspected disloyalty (31; 44).

Apart from such unusual situations, however, even totalitarian governments using compulsory measures during wartime, have found it exceedingly difficult to initiate or prevent withdrawal. Frequently orders have had to be rescinded in the face of widespread violations or violent objections. In Germany, for example, the authorities had to abandon direct and indirect attempts to prevent through official regulations, the return by children to cities from which they had been evacuated (48). Different social systems have had similar difficulties in enforcing compulsory measures. The British government in both World Wars initially banned the use of subway stations as overnight shelters from air raids. Both times, however, people continued to withdraw to the stations. The official regulations had to be changed (37). No greater success was obtained from an order aimed at preventing trecking behavior (i.e., the overnight withdrawal from a city

which in the case of Plymouth, for instance, involved at one time a nightly movement of between 30,000 to 50,000 people) (46, p. 308).

Lack of compliance with orders characterizes peacetime disasters too. In Zierikzee, Holland, an order to withdraw from the partially flooded city led not only to protests but an attempt to stay the order through legal court action. Nearly 3,000 of the residents never did leave but remained in defiance of repeated commands to leave and the threat of physical force (37). Likewise, orders not to withdraw from an area as sometimes have been issued in cases of epidemics have also been often disregarded (23). When people feel they have a legitimate reason for non-compliance, the issuance of an order has no more effect than the existence of unpopular laws against gambling prevent such activity. Disaster situations in themselves do not necessarily make people more pliable to direct organizational control than they normally are.

Scientific studies of disasters clearly show that at best outside agencies impose only a very relative and segmental ordering on the withdrawal behavior of disaster victims. It is a very different picture from what organizations believe possible. In part the discrepancy derives from the "panic" and "dependency" images discussed. These being incorrect, so is the belief that stems from them about the possibility of extensive control.

However, other factors are also involved. Most disaster organizations, because of their selectivity of perception on limited objectives or atypical followers, do not perceive disregard even of official proclamations as a challenge to their basic presupposition about being able to structure withdrawal. As Fritz and Mathewson have noted: "Disaster control and relief agencies often gain a false sense of power and omnipotence over population movements by virtue of structur-

ing one segment of the total field (16, p. 80). For example, an alarm was sounded over a possible tidal wave hitting a California city. Officials issued an order and were able to clear the downtown area rather quickly. The evacuation was called a "success." However, many of those who left went to the beach to look for the wave! Successful control of movement was evaluated in terms of getting people to withdraw from a specific area, not whether the withdrawal was to a place of safety (37). More often, officials simply observe just those persons who follow their orders and advice, and take it as evidence of their command of the total situation.

Organizations also appear immune to contradictory evidence regarding their presupposition of control, because the perceived failure of victims to follow orders is intercepted in part as institutional weaknesses in the means used. Lack of extensive control is attributed to inadequacies in advance planning or inexperience in administrative skills. The problem is thus defined as a failure in procedural means and not whether the end objective is one that can actually be realized. Frequent perceptions of lack of organizational control therefore do not serve to shake the belief in possible control (somewhat in the same manner as "exceptions to the rule" seldom ever change the perception of racial and other stereotypes.)

Another underlying reason for the organizational viewpoint is the belief that social norms and values undergo major changes during a disaster situation. It is believed that there occurs a relaxation or breakdown of pre-disaster taboos and values regarding modesty, privacy, intergroup relations, social class differences, etc. (17). Given relative absence of norms, it is assumed it becomes much more possible than would otherwise be the case to direct the behavior of people along certain organizationally desired lines.

However, the evidence indicates that at best there is only temporary and limited suspension of some norms. This fact is confused by the tendency in popular accounts and unsystematic observations to single out atypical happenings as if they were the model case. Thus, instances can be found of housing being shared by American Negro and white evacuees (30). There is, however, no data showing that this is ever a widespread disaster pattern. In fact, a study of a Louisiana area hit by Hurricane Audrey indicates that any such apparent deviation from norms actually may be part of the latent normative pattern, for "in times of impending danger or stress . . . it is customary [for Negroes] to seek refuge at the homes of friendly white employers" (12, p. 130). Only limited changes in pre-impact norms occur in other societies also. In the Holland flood evacuations, there were no major breaches of fundamental values and mores and but a temporary setting aside of a few secondary norms (37).

This is what would be sociologically expected. It is difficult to conceive how lifetime socialization could be reversed in a very short time period, or how social interaction could proceed without assuming the predictability given by the usual norms of any group. As Clifford in his cross-cultural study has noted:

It is unrealistic to assume that in disaster situations major values of a system will lose their force or be displaced by other values. [Such values] are important in disaster action if they are important in normal situations in the community. The way in which patterns of social action and relationships are structured tend to persist as action components (7, p. 127, *italics removed*).

Disaster organizations consequently do not have as normlessness a situation in which to structure withdrawal behavior as they seem to think they have.

Very extensive control of withdrawal might possibly be imposed by formal organizations in a situation approaching total social unorganization.

However, while it is evident that there is more social or community than personal or small group disruption, disasters do not create situations of total social anomie. Only some of the customary large scale behavior patterns are rendered ineffectual, and this usually only in relatively extensive and devastating crises. And in such situations new social patterns quickly emerge after impact to restore a social equilibrium. Or as Form and Loomis have stated: "Far from having a condition of social *anomie*, social systems continue to operate through all of the disaster stages, new systems emerge, and continuity is found between the old and the emergent social systems" (13, p. 181). Under such conditions, it is impossible that an outside framework of extensive control could be imposed on withdrawal.

Apart from being impossible, full control of withdrawal behavior is not necessarily desirable. It would for instance, be highly dysfunctional if impact populations let the burden of withdrawing fall exclusively on the efforts of disaster control agencies. It is apparent that in any but crises of the smallest scale, organizations would not be able to handle the task. The independent and striving behavior of victims represents a way pressure is taken off the security agencies of a social system, and displaced to those parts of the social structure, particularly the informal social groups, which can relatively adequately deal with the problem.

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HOUSING DISCRIMINATION, SOCIAL CONFLICT, AND THE LAW

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In community relations and civil rights circles, advancing the idea and practice of equality of opportunity in housing has generally been viewed as a discouraging and disheartening process—a sentiment openly expressed at regional and national conferences on housing problems during the last decade. This pessimism was undoubtedly intensified by the realization that housing is the crucial civil rights issue in the North.

BACKGROUND FACTORS

This pervasive manifestation of pessimism on the housing "front" was composed of a number of stubborn and irreducible factors, and it may be both informative and useful to review the most significant of them. First, we note the crucial and strategic importance of residential segregation, whether statutory or *de facto*, in creating and maintaining nearly all other forms of segregation—segregated schools, PTA's, community services, employment, and segregated social, political, and religious activities; indeed, a most ubiquitous and formidable phenomenon. Second, the community relations field was intimidated by the magnitude and depth of social and economic variables over which there seemed to be little possibility of exerting control, direction, or leverage: massive internal migrations, the highest rate of horizontal mobility known among modern nations (nearly 40 million persons change their place of residence annually in the United States), the decreasing but continuing

rural to urban shift, the continuing expansion of suburban communities, and the constant pressures brought about by the short supply of good housing at reasonable rents and prices.

Population shifts have brought many changes in the economic, social, and political life of American cities, e.g., the tremendous surge Northward of many Negro citizens, thus increasing the voter population of Negroes in Northern cities—a fact reflected in the presence of four Negro Congressmen in the national legislature and in increasing numbers of Negroes serving in the upper echelons of state and local governments. But the size of the Negro Northward movement has somewhat obscured the substantial movement of the white Southern population to the North and West and, as fragmentary evidence indicates, this population is encountering many of the classic problems that accompany social and economic re-location.

Fourth, research and experience quickly taught us that housing, of all the major civil rights fields, is the area of greatest resistance to the idea of equality of opportunity. For as we scan civil rights efforts in transportation, employment, education, and housing, we observe increasing resistance to the demands of equality of treatment and service. In addition, we discovered that there is no necessary carry-over of positive attitudes of group acceptance and co-operation from one area to another; that is, persons and groups may accept minority members on the job, but oppose their entry into the local community or neighborhood. Furthermore, the policy and practice of open-occupancy housing re-generated old fears often associated with the conventional view of "social equality"—what, in socio-

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logical circles, we refer to as the "status threat"—housing being considered as a prime symbol of social status, recognition, and of related ego-involvements. This type of resistance calls our attention to the consequences that unresolved conflict between drives for social recognition and the demands of the egalitarian ethos may have for the attainment of equality of opportunity in the American social system.

In particular, suburbanization has intensified the status dimension that is often reflected in opposition to open-occupancy housing. The suburbs have become, in many instances, prime "social filters," screening out the heterogeneity of group backgrounds that is characteristic of the urban setting. To the extent that suburban movements are essentially "status movements" (5; 8), place and type of residence may come to symbolize total social status in ways not generally possible in the city; heightened status-sensitivity tends to explain the hospitality that suburbia often extends to residential segregation and other devices calculated to insure residence-validated social status. Thus, in dealing with these problems, sometimes in mistaken fashion, we grew increasingly sophisticated in theory and practice. We discovered, for example, that, although violence and intimidation may, on occasion, accompany the introduction of non-discriminatory housing policies, that many such "incidents" were not, in fact, due to "race differences" or to that old bromide "racial tensions," but to differences in social experience, status, and expectation between the "old settlers" and the migrating "new-comers," and to the stresses and strains that are commonly associated with population growth, migration, and community expansion.

Fifth, it was also necessary to contend with the problems and obstacles generated by the extremely conservative character of the housing industry

—banking and lending institutions, developers, real estate associations, contractors and builders, insurance and mortgage companies, and the building trades—all seemingly engaged in a gigantic conspiracy to thwart the idea of open housing. The conservatism of the housing industry is unique in the American economy. In other fields, employment, for example, there have always been some internal forces for liberality and change, whether emanating from the unions or industry, but in housing one could only choose between conservatism and blind reaction.

Finally, there was the inhibiting fact that the magnitude and complexities of the housing problem in the United States were simply beyond the skills and experience of community relations practitioners and social scientists. Most of them lacked knowledge about and mastery of the mass of technical data, statistics, housing practices, and market conditions, necessary to the informed advancement of open-occupancy housing. Few agencies, even large ones, employ a full-time staff member to explore and manage problems in minority housing.

But the attempt to overcome and master these obstacles and circumstances did, nonetheless, result in change and improvement. Out of the Depression period came the need and demand for low-cost housing; subventions were granted to the housing industry for housing that it otherwise was not inclined to build; *public* attention was called to blight, slums, and their corroding impact on family and community life. The result of this concern and activity was to establish a new perspective on housing—the idea that housing is a matter of *public interest*. Heretofore, housing in America was generally regarded as a wholly private matter; that is, families simply housed themselves wherever they could in the absence of any public concern about supply, market conditions, the

quality of available housing, or about the special problems of minorities, the aged, and low-income groups.

Within a relatively short period, however, public interest was rapidly transformed into governmental aid and support—legislative and financial. It was in this fashion that concern about minority housing and discriminatory practices grew apace with increased governmental activity in financing, renewal programs, and slum clearance.

LAW, HOUSING, AND SOCIAL CONFLICT

In recent years, law and legislation have extended the principle of public interest to housing discrimination: the United States Supreme Court declared that restrictive covenants were not enforceable in courts of law, pressure mounted to alter the discriminatory policies of FHA, and numerous states found it necessary to enact legislation barring discrimination in public and publicly-assisted housing. In fact, by 1959, eight state anti-discrimination agencies were given jurisdiction over enforcing non-discriminatory policies in such housing.* Similarly, new legal bases were developed for the statutory prohibition of discrimination in housing; that is, not only those established bases for barring discrimination where public funds are involved but, in addition, where governmental *authority* (e.g., right of eminent domain) is invoked as an aid or condition for the development of housing, in the power retained by the state in granting tax exemption, in control over the use of land assembled and condemned by government authority, and in regulations enforcing proper concern for tenant re-location in large-scale redevelopment projects. In addition, New York City and Pittsburgh have enacted municipal statutes

barring discrimination in *private* as well as public housing; the Pittsburgh statute bars discrimination in "any housing." In other instances, certain states have turned over enforcement of anti-discrimination law in housing to existing statutory civil rights commissions. In New Jersey, the supreme court of that state recently declared that a new Levittown development comes under the purview of New Jersey's anti-discrimination statutes.

The legislative and litigative attack on housing discrimination is, of course, wholly consistent with the dramatic advances these approaches have made in other civil rights fields. This development also reflects increased acceptance of the role of law in promoting and maintaining equality of opportunity and a necessary relinquishing of an idea that has hampered inter-group relations for a quarter-century; namely, the curious notion that resort to law and litigation is "bad." In part, reluctance to invoke legal remedies in the effort to attain civil rights and community relations objectives, springs from a one-sided and uninformed image of the law—the law as "policeman," as naked, arbitrary force. But the law is also a major instrument of social change and the chief guarantor of individual rights and liberties.

The negative image of the law reflects the tendency of the "enlightened" middle class to identify the law solely with court suit and complaint, courtroom hostilities, and "notoriety;" in intergroup relations, it most commonly takes the form of assuming that resort to legal remedy inevitably "causes more conflict" and "worsens community relations." It is also related to the view that serious social problems are primarily "caused" by personal or individual dereliction, willfulness, caprice, failure, and ignorance, and not by the structure of the social system, the inadequacy of means for the attainment of social goals, or by the conflicts and cross-pressures generated

*Colorado, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Washington.

by dilemmas in choice, values, and goals. This view not only has obvious quasi-religious and psychologicistic overtones, but serves to deflect attention away from and subvert the analysis of the *social* origin and distribution of such problems as discrimination, crime, delinquency, and economic deprivation. An examination of these views and the assumptions upon which they rest does provide an explanation for those programs that seek to solve social problems solely through "adjustment," education, and gradualism and why, in fact, their advocates tend to reject, if not wholly misunderstand, the role of law and litigation in the attainment of equality of opportunity.

The recent efforts of civil rights organizations, for example, those of the NAACP and other agencies of similar purpose and function, are neither radical nor revolutionary. Civil rights groups are not asking for special privileges or for radical revision of the existing constitutional system but, merely, for the extension and application of constitutionally-guaranteed civil rights to all citizens. The ironic aspect of the civil rights effort goes to the fact that it is often necessary to enact "enabling" legislation in order to guarantee proper recognition of rights already statutorily embedded in the Constitution. And yet there can be little quarrel with the observation that the civil rights approach to problems in discrimination has, in the last decade, materially advanced the public welfare and the idea and practice of equality of opportunity, more rapidly and effectively than four decades of "greater intercultural equalitarianism," "brotherhood," and other devices of dubious validity and intellectual integrity.

But it cannot be said that social science is entirely blameless in promoting the view that legal redress and social conflict are to be avoided, if not condemned. Social scientists, particu-

larly sociologists, seem to have forgotten their Simmelian heritage; namely, that social conflict, whether religious, political, economic, legal, and industrial, has socially productive properties, qualities, and functions (1; 9) — particularly when they are measured against the demands and expectations of the democratic state. The important task is not, therefore, the naive and indiscriminate attempt to "eliminate" or deny the social efficacy of conflict, but the creation and preservation of devices whereby conflict can be made socially productive (4). The field of law, however, often exhibits a greater understanding of the role of conflict in advancing the commonweal than is sometimes found in social scientific literature dealing with problems in intergroup relations — a considerable paradox in view of the fact that, in the development of sociological theory, social conflict is generally regarded as one of the classic social processes of all human societies.

LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE AND LIMITATION

We must now consider, briefly, the purpose of anti-discrimination legislation enacted at local, state, or Federal levels. The purpose of such statutes is not only to bar discrimination, but to (a) place all available housing in the open, competitive market, and (b) to remove official and public sanction from the application of private prejudices and discriminatory determinations. At this stage, we have also come to realize that where government does not legislate in the housing field, housing policy and occupancy patterns will, by default, be set by private groups.

But the success and promise of the legislative approach should not blind us to the fact that many discriminatory practices and policies in housing are not directly subject to legal remedy and judicial review. There is, for example, the misuse of the discretionary

powers of local governments in perpetuating housing discrimination and residential segregation. I refer to the arbitrary administration of local laws and regulations in matters effecting land use, building codes, zoning, and the construction of public facilities. Local officials cannot legally segregate or discriminate, but they can use their authority to restrict housing opportunities for minorities in ways that are not always subject to legal challenge or review. The City Council of Chicago, for instance, manipulated the selection of public housing sites so as to contain Negroes within existing areas (6; 7) — a practice that is probably common to cities other than Chicago. Davis McEntire, director of research for the Commission on Race and Housing, has observed that local officials and city councils have manipulated and restricted the choice of sites for housing developments and that these practices have been accomplished in such fashion that discrimination cannot be detected nor brought under judicial review (6).

Urban renewal and redevelopment programs often suffer from these infirmities and, consequently, they may become projects in "minority clearance," rather than in "slum clearance." The magnitude of urban renewal and redevelopment programs can intensify the problems of minority populations, particularly in the matter of tenant relocation. Generally speaking, where urban renewal projects have removed minorities from renewal areas without opening up compensating areas of residence, renewal serves to reduce still further the supply of housing available to minorities. In addition, there is considerable doubt that urban renewal has, in fact, accomplished any serious reduction of slums and blighted areas because, in nearly every instance, new slums have been created and expanded by crowding re-located minorities into adjacent areas already on the way to becoming slums (6, p. 67).

The cumulative impact of specified advances in housing, the increase in certain types of open-occupancy housing, and the advent of law and legislation barring discrimination in housing have altered the housing situation — but we are not always sure that it is for the best or in the right direction. It has been observed, for example, that while there has been an increase in open-occupancy housing and in the number and scope of laws prohibiting discrimination, there appears to be an absolute increase in the amount of residential segregation in the nation.

Generally, this seeming paradox results from (a) the high rate of white migration from the central city to the suburbs that, in many cases, simply transplants and establishes residential segregation in communities where it has never existed, (b) the consequent reduction in the mixed occupancy patterns of the central city, thus increasing the size and persistence of minority ghettos, and (c) the barring of minorities from the housing market, thus forcing them to remain where they are because they cannot get out even when able to do so. The deleterious social, political, and economic consequences of these trends have been dramatically spelled out by Morton Grodzins (2; 3).

THE "QUOTA" PROBLEM

The use of quota systems to achieve civil rights and community relations objectives has always been abhorred — on the grounds that they institutionalize segregation and discrimination, that they are merely devices for "stalling," and that they are wrong in principle, morality, and theory. Nevertheless, many able and dedicated advocates of open-occupancy housing have come to adopt, under specified circumstances, the idea of "benign quotas." Morris Milgrim and associates, a major developer of open-housing projects, used a quota of 55 per cent white and 45 per cent Negro in the Concord

Park and Greenbelt Knoll projects. Milgrim points out, however, that quotas are not, as some fear, self-perpetuating, because they are costly to administer and maintain. The idea seems to be that quotas are workable under certain circumstances, particularly as a device for getting open-housing established while efforts continue to effect basic reform in local housing practices.

A recent (April, 1960) decision of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois has, however, cast doubt upon the validity of a "benign quota" in housing where it is intended to avoid the possibility that projects to which minority groups are admitted without limitation may become occupied almost exclusively by members of such groups. In its decision, the Court noted that the housing project in Deerfield, Illinois, was planned in such a way as to assure that an 80 to 20 white-Negro ratio of ownership would always be maintained and that, therefore, the Village of Deerfield could not legally be charged (as it was) with attempting to block an integrated housing development. Nonetheless, there is considerable force in the Court's observation that, once a quota system is upheld as constitutional, there may no longer be any basis for distinguishing between a ratio of 80 to 20 and 99 to 1, or perhaps even for one of 100 to zero.

STRATEGY AND FEDERAL RESPONSIBILITY

The matter of Federal responsibility and law in the field of housing is of paramount importance; on the other hand, the fulfillment of this responsibility is contingent upon the satisfactory resolution of certain conflicts in strategy and goal—conflicts that have occurred in other civil rights fields. In education, for instance, we recall the debate over the wisdom of attaching civil rights "riders" to proposals for Federal aid to education; that is, riders

denying Federal aid to those states not complying with the United States Supreme court decision of May, 1954. Many groups felt that such riders would kill all possibility of Federal aid to the public schools; others felt that such riders were both inevitable and necessary. A similar situation has arisen in housing. There are those who feel that civil rights riders or similar safeguards against the use of Federal funds to support or perpetuate segregated housing must be applied to FHA, VA, FNMA, and other Federal involvements in housing. On the other hand, there are those who insist that proposals of this kind will destroy the Federal housing program and seriously curtail the supply of housing for those most in need of it.

All serious dilemmas involve complexities, but there are feasible and acceptable alternatives at hand. To ignore the civil rights aspects of Federal involvement in housing is to adopt the position that attaining equality of opportunity in housing must await the solution of the nation's overall housing problem. This view is not generally acceptable to those groups concerned with both civil rights and the expansion of the nation's housing supply. They take the view that ignoring the civil rights issue serves the cause of segregation in the name of increasing that supply. They also point out that urban renewal and redevelopment programs are still immune from anti-discrimination controls and, so long as this situation obtains, it remains a serious threat to the establishment of open housing. Moreover, they aver, such a policy places the Federal government in the support of segregated housing contrary to its stated opposition to discrimination in other major areas of American life.

Admittedly, there are several persistent and disturbing aspects of the present Federal stance, particularly that of FHA, on the matter of dis-

crimnatory housing practices. In 1958, the Administrator of FHA expressed a point of view on this issue completely at odds with the national policy of non-discrimination in other areas of government control and interest, e.g., employment and government contracts, military service, and education. Moreover, FHA tends to adopt the dictates of local custom on the matter of occupancy patterns: if state law bars discrimination in housing, it will abide by that requirement; if state law or the absence of law permits discrimination, it will accept that condition and pattern of occupancy. This is to say that FHA favors equal rights in principle, but denies them in practice. It still does not control discrimination by lenders or developers. Furthermore, where FHA follows local custom or law in perpetuating segregated housing; that is, where it may accept local law or custom requiring segregation to be binding on FHA, it does so even though the Federal courts have declared such practices invalid—a curious position for a Federal agency.

On occasion, laws and programs designed to promote the public welfare can be used to thwart that end. Let us note, for example, that there is far less housing segregation, proportionately, in Southern than in Northern cities. There have always been large areas in Southern cities where whites and Negroes live together as neighbors. It is a most curious development, therefore, that Title I of the Federal Housing Act of 1949, enacted to assist local communities in managing the problems of slums and blight, is being used as an instrumentality for creating segregated housing in areas where it did not exist. Unless the United States Supreme Court reverses a recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit, it seems likely that there will be no obstacle in the way of communities that choose to develop segregated housing with the

use of Federal funds and governmental authority.

This situation arises out of the redevelopment plans of the city of Gadsden, Alabama. As planned, this development will clear an area where the *present* distribution of families is: 323 white and 331 Negro. Upon completion, however, there is every likelihood that Negroes will not be permitted to purchase homes in this development and, thus, segregated housing will be established where none existed. This case is important because (a) the actual development is in the hands of private developers, (b) the land turned over to the private developers was assembled and condemned by the state housing authority, and (c) the cost of the land acquisition is borne by government funds—two-thirds of the cost by the Federal government and one-third by the city of Gadsden. A majority of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that no restraining action can be brought against the state because the development is in private hands and, therefore, the "equal protection" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply. A minority opinion submitted in this case states, however, that the Gadsden development is a "governmentally coerced, governmentally-aided and governmentally regulated project in urban redevelopment."*

Concerning Federal action in the housing field, there are at least two possibilities: (a) insistence on anti-discrimination on all housing legislation involving the Federal government (publicly-owned, publicly-assisted, and publicly-aided housing); or (b) follow the recommendation made by the Commission on Race and Housing

*The United States Supreme Court has since denied *certiorari* in the Gadsden case, possibly on the view that the alleged intention to exclude Negroes from the new housing to be built under the redevelopment plan should be presented in a complaint *after* the housing is actually available for occupancy.

that the President take effective executive action to remove all sanction of the Federal government from discriminatory practices (10). Recently, the Annual Civil Rights Leadership Conference, one of the principal policy-making bodies in the civil rights field, recommended that the President assign responsibility for eliminating discrimination in all Federal involvement in housing to the Federal Civil Rights Commission. Meanwhile, it would be prudent for state and local governments to consider the enactment of legislation designed to prevent discrimination in at least five classes of housing: publicly-owned, publicly-assisted, publicly-aided, housing involving the privilege of state authorized tax exemption, and housing projects wherein government authority has been used to assemble and condemn land for renewal or redevelopment purposes.

Pessimism is often a state of mind for providing the motivation for continuing achievement because it generally springs from acknowledging the reality of existing problems and complexities. The effort to surmount past and existing obstacles in advancing the idea of open housing has slowly changed an uneasy pessimism into an

informed and productive optimism; without which, of course, very little would have been accomplished.

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PARENTAL INTERACTION AS RELATED TO THE EMOTIONAL HEALTH OF CHILDREN

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This paper presents some tentative findings about the psychodynamics of parental interaction and the emotional health of children. Specifically, it is concerned with the relationship between the quality of the parents' sex-

ual relationship, unresolved oral dependency needs, and the strength of the executive ego function of the father, on the one hand, and the average level of emotional health among the children on the other.

The data are drawn from an intensive, interdisciplinary exploratory study of the families of nine adoles-

This study is supported by a grant from the Foundation's Fund for Research in Psychiatry.

cents selected as the most emotionally healthy among a group of 140 first-year university students screened by psychiatric interviews and Rorschach Tests. Each student was independently rated by a psychologist and psychoanalytically trained psychiatrist according to a twelve-point scale based on whether they showed structured psychiatric symptoms, their degree of social and occupational adaptation, and the extent of their dynamic integration. Those rated from 1 to 6 were considered healthy and those from 7 to 12 unhealthy. The families of the students showing the highest level of emotional health were asked to co-operate in an intensive study, and all responded favourably. They were all Anglo-Saxon, white, middle-class, Canadian-born Protestants. Details of the methodology and criteria of mental health have been presented elsewhere (2; 3; 5; 6).

COMPLEMENTARITY

In this paper the "complementarity" of these families, as this term is being currently used in psychiatric and sociological studies (1; 7) is examined. Ackerman (1) defines the term *complementarity* as referring to "specific patterns of family role relations that provide satisfaction, avenues of solutions of conflict, support for a needed self-image and buttressing of crucial forms of defenses against anxiety. . . . "Positive complementarity exists when the members of family pairs and triads experience mutual fulfillment of need in a way which promotes positive emotional growth of the relationship and of the interacting individuals. Negative complementarity in family relations signifies a buttressing of defenses against pathogenic anxiety but does not significantly foster positive emotional growth."

An original hypothesis of this study was that (1) complementarity which resulted in either emotional growth or support of the couple as individuals

would be positively associated with emotional health in the children; and (2) complementarity which aggravated the psychopathology of the couple would be associated with emotional ill-health in the children. However, it was impossible to test this hypothesis because constructive and destructive complementarity could not be differentiated empirically except on a post hoc basis. This type of complementarity could not be predicted and could not even be determined without information about the functioning of the individuals at the time of assessment and evaluation relative to their functioning at the beginning of the marriage. Furthermore, the complementarity of marital pairs often varies in different areas of their relationship. It may be "positive" in one area, "negative" in another, and "destructive" in yet another. Since it is difficult at this stage of family research to state with certainty which variables in the marital relationship take precedence over others, the difficulty in applying the concept in classificatory differentiation of the total marital relationship is obvious. Therefore the complementarity of each relationship was broken down into what were considered to be its constituent elements.

This paper presents the findings in the examination of three of these elements or discrete areas in each of the nine families and their relationship to the emotional health of the children.

SEXUAL RELATIONSHIP

The sexual relationship of each couple is rated, taking into consideration the level of sexual conflict in each parent, as well as the frequency and satisfactoriness of intercourse. The method of rating the marital sexual relationship is as follows:

A low degree of sexual conflict and a high level of mutual sexual gratification in an active sexual relationship;	rated as Good or 1
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A moderate degree of sexual conflict and a moderate level of mutual sexual gratification in a sexual relationship that may vary considerably in frequency;

rated as
Fair or 2

A high degree of sexual conflict, usually in both partners, and a low level of mutual sexual gratification in a sexual relationship which is usually fairly inactive.

rated as
Poor or 3

The following chart shows the relationship between the marital sexual relationship and the health of the children in each family.

TABLE 1

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SEXUAL ADJUSTMENT OF PARENTS AND THE AVERAGE LEVEL OF EMOTIONAL HEALTH OF THE CHILDREN

Family Number	Degree of Sexual Difficulty	Emotional Health of Children
A 6	1	4.7
A 3	1	4.5
A 1	1	5.3
A 8	2	7.8
A 9	2	6.0
A 7	2	5.0
A 5	3	4.5
A 2	3	4.5
A 4	3	4.3

The findings show that in these families there is no firm relationship between the level of parental sexual relationship and the average level of emotional health among their children. This is confirmed by clinical data from these families which reveal that some of the best adjusted and integrated families had a poor sexual relationship, whereas some of those with the poorest adjustment had a satisfactory sexual relationship.

The following description of some of the sexual and other aspects of some of these families will serve to highlight the information noted in Table 1. The sexual relationship of Mr. and Mrs. 6 has improved throughout the

years of their marriage to its present high level of mutual gratification and absence of conflict. At the beginning of the marriage Mr. 6 was considerably inhibited, fairly rigid, with many doubts about his masculine potency. He had had no previous coital experience. Mrs. 6 was also virginal at marriage. She was markedly inhibited and rigid and had strong doubts and confusion concerning her femininity. Mrs. 6 was unable to achieve an orgasm until many years after marriage. However, the history of the sexual relationship of this couple shows a gradual progressive improvement over the years. At the present time the marital sexual relationship is highly satisfactory to both partners. This is an active relationship and both of them achieve regular orgasmic release. This improved sexual relationship is directly correlated with a concomitant progressive improvement in the level of emotional health of Mr. 6. Mrs. 6 has also shown considerable emotional maturation and has achieved a higher level of emotional health over the years of the marriage.

This relationship between improvement in the level of emotional health of the parents and improvement in the marital sexual relationship is not seen in Family 2. Both Mr. and Mrs. 2 have achieved a far healthier level of emotional functioning over the years of their marriage, but their sexual relationship has, if anything, deteriorated. At the beginning of this marriage both partners displayed marked sexual conflicts, particularly Mrs. 2. Despite this, the couple participated in fairly regular, active intercourse in the early years of the marriage. It seems that as Mrs. 2 achieved more self-confidence in herself and in her marriage she began to avoid sexual relations to a progressively increasing degree. Mr. 2 seems quite willing to accept this avoidance of sexual relations because of his own unresolved sexual conflicts, despite the fact that

he has shown positive improvement in other areas of his personality functioning. Thus, the improvement in the personality functioning of each member of this couple has not included the sexual area as it has in the case of family 6. However, the level of mental health of the children in each of these families is almost similar. It is even slightly higher in the case of family 2—4.5—than it is in family 6—4.7.

ORAL DEPENDENCY

In the investigation of the interaction of the oral dependency needs of the marital pair the level of unresolved, infantile dependency needs of each individual was rated according to the following gross scale:

Low: 1; — Medium: 2; — High: 3.

The scoring of each individual in each marital pair was noted and related to the average score of the emo-

TABLE 2

THE DEPENDENCY NEEDS OF
PARENTS AS RELATED TO THE
EMOTIONAL HEALTH OF THEIR
CHILDREN

Family Number	Level of Dependency Needs	Level of Emotional Health
A 4	Mr. 1	4.3
	Mrs. 2	
A 2	Mr. 2	4.5
	Mrs. 3	
A 3	Mr. 1	4.5
	Mrs. 3	
A 5	Mr. 3	4.5
	Mrs. 3	
A 6	Mr. 1	4.7
	Mrs. 2	
A 7	Mr. 3	5.0
	Mrs. 1	
A 1	Mr. 3	5.3
	Mrs. 2	
A 9	Mr. 3	6.0
	Mrs. 2	
A 8	Mr. 3	7.8
	Mrs. 2	

tional health of the children, as seen in Table 2.

The findings indicate that, except

for one case, there is a clear and unvarying relationship between the degree of dependency needs in the father and the level of the emotional health of the children in the family. Where the father had a lower degree of unresolved dependency needs than the mother, the emotional health of the children was high. Where the father had a higher degree of unresolved dependency needs than the mother, the emotional health of the children was lower than in the first instance. Even in the exceptional case—Family 5—the rating of the father's dependency needs is not higher than that of the mother. The dependency needs of each parent in this family are rated as equal.

EGO FUNCTIONING OF THE FATHER

This section deals with the integrity and strength of the executive function of the ego of the father, and the extent to which he uses his wife as a support or substitute for this adaptive function. This may be seen as a dependency need related to ego function in contrast to the id or intrapsychic aspects of dependency discussed in the preceding section.

The degree to which the father used his wife for ego support or as an ego substitute was rated according to the following rough scale:

Minimal: 1; — Moderate: 2; —
Extreme supportive: 3;
Extreme substitutive: 4.

Table 3 shows the relationship between this aspect of dependency and the emotional health of children.

It can be seen that there is a close relationship between the degree to which the father uses his wife as ego support or as an executive ego substitute and the level of emotional health of the children in the family. Where the father functions with an intact and relatively well-integrated executive ego the level of emotional health in the children is quite high. Where the executive ego function of the

TABLE 3

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE WIFE
AS AN EGO SUPPORT AND THE
EMOTIONAL HEALTH OF CHILDREN

Family Number	Extent to which Wife is Ego Support	Emotional Health of Children
A 4	1	4.3
A 2	1	4.5
A 3	1	4.5
A 5	2	4.5
A 6	1	4.7
A 7	3	5.0
A 1	3	5.3
A 9	4	6.0
A 8	4	7.8

father is defective and he is forced to turn to the mother for strong degrees of support in this area, the level of emotional health in the children is lower.

These findings are clearly illustrated in the cases of families 9 and 8. In both families the father's ego functioning in the executive area is markedly defective. They both use their wives as ego substitutes. The wives are dominant and in complete control of all aspects of the family life. The husbands depend on the wives for direction, control and total support, even though they remain the breadwinners.

In the case of Family 9 this state of affairs is not hidden but is overt, accepted, and spoken of by all the members of the family without any obvious feelings of depreciation of the father. In Family 8 there is a marked attempt by all family members to deny this obvious state of affairs. There is a strong attempt to maintain the façade of the strong, dominant father, even though they all recognize the mother as the source of strength. The older children admit knowledge of the true situation, albeit with obvious conflict. It is probably legitimate to speculate that this attempt at disguising the true state of affairs only adds to the existing difficulties. It obviously contributes to the emotional disturbances of

the children in this family, whose average score for emotional health reveals the poorest level of emotional health of all this group of families. This family displays the poorest adjustment and integration of the total group of families included in this report.

Only one family (case A 5) consistently failed to fit the pattern of relationship. In this case although the father has a high level of unresolved dependency needs, they are not greater than those of his wife. In addition he turns to his wife for only a moderate degree of ego support. Despite the fact that Mr. 5 is severely conflict ridden, the executive function in his ego is fairly intact and integrated. He functions independently and extremely well in his business life, where he has been extremely successful. He has marked difficulties in interpersonal relationships, but nevertheless he manages to hold his own in this area as well. In neither area does he have to rely upon his wife to run interference for him.

DISCUSSION AND SIGNIFICANCE

These findings, although they are extremely tentative, and must be verified in a large sample, do suggest that there is no firm relationship between a satisfactory sexual relationship between the parents and the average level of emotional health among their children. Some of the best adjusted and integrated families had a poor parental sexual relationship, whereas some of those with the poorest adjustment had a satisfactory parental sexual relationship. Thus, at least in these nine families, the sexual relationship of the marital pair is neither 1) a valid indication of the emotional health and level of integration of the family unit nor 2) a variable of major importance in the determination of such family integration and health.

This we consider a most significant and unexpected finding, since it con-

tradicts rather generally accepted psychiatric assumptions.

All these findings indicate the importance of the father as a variable in the family with respect to the emotional health of the children and the integration and strength of the family unit. In a previous paper (4) we reported that a very high level of unresolved dependency needs and a marked need for ego support among mothers is compatible with a high level of emotional health in the family provided that they get the necessary support from the father. Here we suggest that this is not true for the father. In these nine families when the father is the major source of emotional strength or at least not weaker than the mother, the level of emotional health of the family and its members is high. He may have a high level of unresolved dependency needs but this does not seem to affect his children's mental health as long as he is stronger than the mother.

These findings seem to highlight the importance in our culture of the maintenance of the traditional Anglo-Saxon family role relationship pattern for the development of sound emotional health in the family and its members. It seems to be a necessity for the development and maintenance

of a sense of security in the family and its members and for the development of clear, undisturbed sexual identification and ego identity in the family members.

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REPORTS AND ANNOUNCEMENTS

SOCIETY FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS

*Results of the Final Election
for the year 1960-1961*

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THE HUMAN BETTERMENT ASSO-
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thesis in the field of "Responsible Parent-

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hood". The purpose of the award is to encourage excellence of research as to the relationship between mental ability of the parents and the behavior and intelligence of their children. For further information write to: HUMAN BETTERMENT ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INC., 105 West 55th St., New York 19, N. Y.

BOOK REVIEWS

Book Selection and Censorship: A Study of School and Public Libraries in California. By Marjorie Fiske. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959. ix + 145 pp. \$3.75.

The process of book selection, and the pressures that are brought to bear upon individuals charged with this task, are brought into sharp focus in this study of library officials and administrators in 26 California communities. Based upon 204 extensive interviews with school, municipal and county librarians or administrators, this research presents a thoughtful analysis of the problems which arise when such officials perform their basic function—that of bringing people and books together. As the author states, the findings of this research are limited in a strictly statistical sense to the 94 institutions under study. On the other hand, the pressures exerted on book selectors have perhaps been felt more keenly in the state of California than has been the case in many other regions.

The role of the librarian as a selector of books for the public, which finances his operation, involves a major dilemma. On

the one hand, he feels professional responsibility to provide readers with reading and reference materials of high quality. On the other hand, his library appropriations often depend upon circulation figures. This means an increasing emphasis upon meeting the public's current tastes with little regard to trying to raise their tastes.

Librarians resolve this conflict in several ways. Some have become "demand" oriented. Others appear to stress quality, even at the cost of circulation. Still others hope for a "come-on" effect. "You give the public what it wants and at the same time dangle something better before it."

The people who make selection decisions do so within a complex power organization composed of library boards, school boards, county boards of supervisors, city managerial hierarchies and voluntary organizations and even local newspapers. The extent to which these factors impinge upon the selection role depends upon the complexity of the power structures and the librarian's position in the hierarchy.

The attitudes of the respondents toward voluntary organizations ranged from

painful awareness of censorship pressures, to uneasiness concerning indifference to the library. No school administrator or head librarian singled out any organization as supportive of the values for which the library stands. The American Legion was the most frequently referred to group of any kind. Some librarians and school administrators make a point of informal "clearance" with the Legion regarding new programs and policies. Other groups such as the League of Women Voters, and the American Association of University Women, have played active roles in maintaining free procedures. The P. T. A. was mentioned as a source of considerable distress for varied reasons. Reproaches from religious groups are perennial, based largely on moralistic grounds rather than patriotic. Newspapers, which frequently editorialize on the freedom to read, give wide publicity to anti-book campaigners and thus give aid to the would-be book burners. The general attitude of librarians toward the press on such issues is one of futility.

Public criticisms of libraries range from the trivial to the traumatic. Patrons, parents, individual crusaders and organized groups either object to library policy or demand removal of (or addition to) material on the shelves. Their objections are based upon religious, ethnic, political or moral grounds. Response to these criticisms has in general been increased caution concerning reading materials which pose ideological controversy, ethnic issues, or political alternatives to American democracy.

Professional training is related to both attitudes and actions regarding controversial books. Librarians with professional training are more likely to give verbal support to the freedom to read than those with no such training. In spite of such verbal attitudes, about two-thirds of all librarians who select books report instances where the controversiality of a book influenced them not to buy it. Controversiality is handled not only in terms of avoiding selection, but by restrictions on circulation. In the majority of libraries, such books are, on occasion, "transferred" to the librarian's office, placed on "reserve," put under the counter, or simply removed.

By and large, it is to their professional organizations and professional schools that librarians look for enhancement of their professional image and role. Many librarians feel that their professional organizations have been less than satisfactory in past controversies and in promoting professionalization. Opinion remains divided

as to the necessity of professional training, and many respondents were critical of their own schools as well as advanced training in library science in general. These respondents believe that the public holds both libraries and librarians in low repute. On the whole, the respondents themselves shared this allegedly low opinion of the profession. The self image of the librarian is one of ambiguity and ambivalence.

This is a carefully prepared, readable account of a major social problem. It should be of considerable interest to the educated layman, the civic leader, the educator, students of occupational sociology, community organization, mass communication, and especially to librarians themselves.

MELVIN L. DEFLEUR

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Birth Control and Catholic Doctrine. By Alvah W. Sulloway. Boston: Beacon Press, 1959. xxiii + 257 pp. \$3.95.

Mr. Sulloway has provided us with a carefully documented analysis of the development of Catholic policies concerning birth control. Although this book is not written from an explicitly sociological orientation there is much material here which merits the attention of sociologists. The author describes the growth of the birth control movement in America and the active opposition attending that movement. Much of this opposition has been in the form of "Catholic action," "a political and religious force which has the blessing and encouragement of the highest Church authority." The tactics and name-calling employed in this connection must give pause to any sociologist who may still uncritically apply to modern complex societies the notion of the primarily integrative function of religion.

The larger portion of the book consists of an analysis of Catholic doctrine on birth control, as such. The author focuses special attention on the shift in Catholic policy which appears to have resulted from the discovery, in 1932, of the "safe period" or rhythm method of family limitation. Prior to that time Catholic doctrine labelled contraception *per se* an offense against God and nature. Spokesmen for the Catholic view also claimed that separation of intercourse from parenthood would lead to all sorts of horrible consequences — individual ailments, promiscuity, "race suicide." With the discovery of the rhythm method, and its approval by Church authorities, this line of reasoning was no longer tenable. Catholic statements began emphasizing the sinfulness of contraceptives, rather than of

contraception; some Catholic writers even encouraged use of the safe period technique. But there was no way of erasing the earlier arguments, and it is this inconsistency (between the claim that family planning is inherently immoral and dangerous, and the acceptance of one kind of family planning) which Sulloway stresses again and again. That non-theological factors may partially have determined Church doctrine in this area provides support for the general view that religious belief systems reflect, as well as influence, socio-cultural developments. But beyond that it is difficult to see what the author proves by demonstrating an inconsistency in the Church's policy towards birth control. Surely the Church does not consider itself bound by any secular logic, in this realm or in any other. The fact that Catholic birth control doctrine has not been unchanging encourages the author to feel that the Church might well reappraise its current policy. A recent statement by the Roman Catholic Bishops of America—

asserting that "the promotion of artificial birth prevention is a morally, humanly, psychologically, and politically disastrous approach to the population problem"—suggests, however, that such optimism may perhaps be unfounded.

In his preface, Aldous Huxley comments: "Uncontrolled fertility threatens thousands of millions of persons now on earth, thousands of millions yet unborn, with a life sentence to deepening misery, with loss of liberty and human dignity, with famine, pestilence, war, and enslavement—and all the help we get from the theologians is a discourse on the horrors of onanism. Very edifying, no doubt, but not particularly helpful." Sociologists may be inclined to agree, but at the same time we cannot ignore the very real social force exerted by Catholic policy in this area. Mr. Sulloway lucidly describes and intensively analyzes the Church's rationalization of such policy.

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Listing of a publication here does not preclude its being reviewed in a subsequent issue of *SOCIAL PROBLEMS*.

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